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For much of the 20
th century and in most countries, network utilities—telecommunications, 
electricity, natural gas, railroads, water supply—were vertically and horizontally integrated state 
monopolies under ministerial control.
1 Almost universally, infrastructure’s economic importance 
and concerns about monopoly power led governments to conclude that control over these services 
could not be entrusted to the signals, motivations, and penalties of free markets. 
 
Governments also believed that, given the large investments involved, public resources were 
required to increase infrastructure coverage. In most cases a single public entity controlled every 
aspect of a utility—from operations to administration—and determined which services to provide to 
essentially captive markets. 
 
But this approach often led to extremely weak infrastructure services—especially in 
developing and transition economies. Common problems included low productivity, high costs, 
poor quality, chronic revenue shortages and falling investments, long waits for and shortages of 
services, and nonpayment for and theft of services. Such inefficiencies significantly impeded 
sustained economic growth and international competitiveness. In the early 1990s, for example, 
annual losses due to mispricing and technical inefficiency were almost equal to annual 
investments in infrastructure in developing countries (figure 1). With growing budget deficits 
and the resulting inability of governments to maintain and expand infrastructure services, most 
countries simply could not continue to maintain state-owned utilities.  
 
 
Recent Decades Have Seen a New Model for Financing and Providing Infrastructure  
 
As a result of these problems, public policies toward infrastructure have undergone 
profound changes over the past two decades. Nearly all industrial and many developing countries 
have implemented far-reaching structural reforms of utilities—including privatization of many 
services. The new economic framework entails: 
 
•  Reorganizing state-owned utilities into autonomous enterprises that run on commercial 
principles and are largely free from ministerial control. 
•  Unbundling structurally competitive or contestable activities from natural monopolies. 
•  Removing statutory restrictions on entry into the potentially competitive segments. 
•  Privatizing some or all assets, especially in the competitive elements. 




                                                 
1 This refers mainly to the period after World War II. Private ownership in electricity was initially the norm in many 
countries in Europe and North and South America. State ownership spread later, especially after World War II, 
either for ideological reasons (as in England and France) or because political constraints on prices forced private 
firms into bankruptcy (as in Latin America). Similar situations prevailed for railroads, trucking, and water in many 
countries. Telephone services became captive of state-owned post offices in Europe and Japan, but not in Canada, 
the United States, or, initially, Latin America.    II 
Figure 1 In the early 1990s developing countries lost nearly as much to infrastructure 
mispricing and inefficiency as they invested in infrastructure each year 
 
Note: Estimates of mispricing subsidies and technical inefficiency costs cover water, railroads, 
roads, and power. 
Source: World Bank 1994. 
 
But for privatization and related infrastructure reforms to succeed over the long term, 
they must be accompanied by well-designed market and governance structures. Achieving the 
public interest goals of privatization requires a microeconomic structure open to competition. 
Few—if any—sustainable improvements in utility performance can be achieved simply by 
replacing a state-owned monopoly with a private one. 
 
Regulatory features are also extremely important for performance. In general, 
performance is better when regulatory agencies are free of political influence and their decisions 
are subject to review by the judiciary or another nonpolitical entity. In addition, regulatory 
processes should be open and transparent, and policies should facilitate and encourage 
competition—while ensuring minimal interference with economic efficiency. Finally, regulation 
should be designed in advance of privatization. 
Most countries—rich and poor—share common objectives for infrastructure, the most 
important being universal access to affordable, efficient, safe, reliable services produced and 
delivered in environmentally responsible ways. So, many of the regulatory principles that have 
emerged in industrial countries should be applicable in developing and transition economies. 
But developing and transition economies also have socioeconomic features that must be 
taken into account when designing new regulatory policies. For example, major price increases 
and tariff rebalancing are likely to be more disruptive in poor countries—and may pose 
enormous burdens. Thus regulation must be sensitive to concerns about affordability. Including 
consumers—particularly disadvantaged groups—in the regulatory dialogue can help ensure that 
regulators are sensitive to the need for accessible, affordable services.  In addition, experience 
with privatization especially in the water sector in developing countries has shown that 
contractual provisions to encourage operators to innovate in providing non-conventional services 
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may be needed to ensure that services expand rapidly to poor households, both in rural and 
informal urban settlements.  
 
 
What Has Been the Record So Far? 
 
Future efforts at privatization and regulatory reform in developing and transition 
economies will be shaped by their economic and political features as well as by assessments of 
the record so far—both in those countries and elsewhere. But because the performance of every 
network utility is multifaceted, it is never susceptible to a definitive evaluation: different 
observers place emphasis on different aspects of performance. 
 
Assessments of performance are further complicated by the short lifespan of 
privatization, restructuring, and regulatory reform in most developing and transition economies. 
In addition, crucial economic variables are subject to severe measurement problems. And 
because privatization, restructuring, and regulatory reform have generally occurred 
simultaneously, it is almost impossible to identify their separate effects econometrically. (Only in 
the United States, where the structure of ownership remained constant, can changes in 
performance be confidently traced to changes in regulation.) 
 
Leaving aside these measurement difficulties, empirical evaluations of privatization and 
restructuring are largely favorable. While experiences have varied considerably across countries 
and industries, most infrastructure reforms have improved many aspects of performance. Service 
quality has improved. Productivity and cost-effectiveness have risen. Investment and service 
coverage have increased. Prices have become more closely aligned with underlying costs. And 
services have become more responsive to consumer and business needs and to opportunities for 
innovation. 
 
Operating efficiency increases considerably when utilities are held to hard budget 
constraints and relatively free from political interference in their business decisions. Privatized 
utilities generally exhibit better performance than commercialized ones that remain mostly under 
public ownership. But the performance differences between these alternative organizational 
forms  are often small  in comparison to the improvements that either brings relative to state 
utilities under ministerial control—especially when competition is encouraged. 
 
This report evaluates the privatization of network utilities in developing and transition 
economies using three criteria: the resulting levels of investment (and thus service expansion), 
operating (technical) efficiency, and allocative efficiency (as indicated by the rebalancing of 
tariffs). But no public policy can be justified on purely economic grounds if a country’s 
population considers its results unacceptably unjust. Thus this report also assesses the 
distributional consequences of reforms—especially their effects on basic services for poor 
households and other disadvantaged groups.   IV 
Figure 3 Privatized services have considerably increased 
access to safe water in a variety of cities and countries 
 
Effects on investment and service 
expansion 
 
The relaxation of investment 
constraints on public utilities and the 
elimination of restrictions on new private 
entrants have led to impressive increases 
in investment. Between 1990 and 2001 
more than $750 billion was invested in 
2,500 private infrastructure projects in 
developing and transition economies. 
(Investment dropped after the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis, however, and 
today’s investment climate is extremely adverse.) 
 
Such investment varied enormously across regions, with nearly half going to Latin 
America and the Caribbean (mainly through divestitures) and more than a quarter going to East 
Asia and the Pacific (mainly in greenfield projects; figure 2). Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Middle East and North Africa each received just 3 percent of private investment—
reflecting much weaker reform 
efforts. Investment also varied 
considerably by sector, with most 
going to telecommunications and 
power. 
 
By relaxing financial 
constraints on state utilities and 
strengthening regulation, reforms 
have expedited service expansion 
in a variety of sectors and 
countries. Telecommunications 
coverage has seen the largest 
jump, but significant increases 
have also occurred in electricity, 
transportation, and access to safe 
water (figure 3). The size of such 
changes depends enormously on 
the extent to which the market is 
liberalized and the effectiveness 
of regulation. For example, 
increased competition has been 
particularly powerful in boosting 
telecommunications coverage. In 
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Figure 2  In 1990-2001 Latin America and East Asia 
received the bulk of private investment in 
infrastructure
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Source: Harris 2003.   V 
Figure 5 Railway concessions led to stunning increases in labor productivity  




























Source: Thompson and Budin 2001. 
 
Latin American countries that have allowed competition in telecommunications after 
privatization, networks have expanded almost twice as quickly as in  countries that simply 
converted to private monopolies. But even private monopolies have expanded faster than public 
ones (figure 4). 
 
  
Effects on operating efficiency  
Privatization, restructuring,  and 
deregulation have made network 
utilities far more efficient in 
developing and transition 
economies. Many of these gains 
resulted from policy options 
previously denied to state 
enterprises. As part of their 
privatization contracts, new 
operators could generally start 
shedding excess employees—one  of 
the most vexing problems for 
state-owned utilities in nearly 
every developing and transition 
economy. As a result, reforming 
countries have often seen dramatic 


























Figure 4 In 1989-94 privatization dramatically 
increased growth in telecommunications lines in 
Latin America
Source: Wellenius 1997.  VI 
A key argument for privatization is that, relative to state-owned utilities, private owners 
and operators have stronger incentives and are better able to control costs, respond to consumer 
needs, and adopt new technologies and management practices. In many developing and transition 
economies, privatization and deregulation have significantly improved physical performance, 
service quality, and other aspects of efficiency. Although the most dramatic gains have been in 
telecommunications (due to revolutionary technological changes in recent years and the sector’s 
substantial scope for competitive entry), other infrastructure sectors have also made swift 
advances. 
 
In telecommunications, privatization and related reforms have reduced repair requests 
and raised call completion rates and the probability of receiving a dial tone. In railroads they 
have increased locomotive availability. In ports they have shortened waiting times for vessels 
and increased crane handling rates. And in electricity they have lowered energy losses, outages 
per customer, and rates of plant unavailability (figure 6). 
 
 




Source: Feler 2001. 
 
 
Effects on allocative efficiency 
 
Before reforms, inefficient pricing was one of the main reasons for the worsening 
performance of infrastructure services in developing and transition economies. Prices for basic 
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Figure 7 In 2000, electricity prices covered only a small fraction of long-run marginal costs in 
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Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
financial distress and substantially impairing their ability to maintain and expand services—
particularly to poor households and rural areas. The failure of many governments to adequately 
increase rates, especially during periods of high inflation, effectively decapitalized their 
infrastructure systems. 
 
Most developing and transition economies have also used systematic cross-subsidies to 
control prices. In telecommunications, for example, rates for access and for local calls have been 
low, while those for domestic and international long-distance calls have been high (relative to 
underlying long-term costs). Similarly, residential electricity has often been priced below its 
incremental cost—while service for industrial users has been priced above its standalone cost. 
 
The public rationale for such policies is that they foster desirable social goals (such as 
helping certain groups of customers who would otherwise be disadvantaged) and positive 
economic externalities (such as those associated with universal service). But in practice a large 
portion of such subsidies have flowed to people other than the i ntended beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, distorted prices imposed significant costs by sending the wrong economic signals 
to consumers, suppliers, and investors. 
 
In developing and transition economies one of the main attractions of infrastructure 
reform is the expectation that it will make price reform a policy priority. The assumption has 
been that private investors will be unwilling to invest in the sunk assets required to supply 
infrastructure services unless governments agree to implement tariffs that reflect costs. And 
indeed, many countries are dismantling long-standing policies of underpricing and cross-
subsidies. But in some countries price reform has been very slow, with infrastructure prices still 
far removed from their underlying costs in a highly unbalanced structure. For example, in 2000 
household electricity prices still covered less than 50 percent, and industrial prices less than 70 
percent, of long-run marginal costs in most transition economies (figure 7).   VIII 
Effects on distributional equity 
 
In recent years the alleged failures of privatization have led to violent street riots, 
skeptical press coverage, and mounting criticism of multilateral institutions and i nternational 
investors. Contributing to this disillusionment have been employee layoffs, price increases, 
perceived long delays in benefits, and the distributional impacts of privatization. 
 
The apparent discrepancy between scholarly assessments and public perceptions of 
privatization may result from the different yardsticks and time horizons used. Consumers dislike 
higher prices—even if they result in better services. Similarly, the general public dislikes 
layoffs—even if agencies were clearly overstaffed. And tariff rebalancing, though usually 
essential to effective privatization, can hurt poor people. 
 
Thus privatization efforts require more comprehensive assessments of their welfare 
effects—moving beyond standard analyses of their effects on firm profitability and other 
elements of industry performance to include their effects on workers and on households at 
different spending levels. Moreover, distinctions between low- and middle-income countries 
need to be made more carefully. In low-income countries nearly all rural and many poor urban 
residents lack access to basic infrastructure services. Thus the policy reforms that normally 
accompany privatization—such as eliminating cross-subsidies and moving toward tariffs that 
reflect costs—mainly affect higher-income groups. But in middle-income countries—such as 
those in Latin America and especially the transition economies—such reforms can hurt poor 
people because many of them (mainly in urban areas) have access to basic services.  The solution 
is not to halt the needed reforms but to put in place effective safety nets.  
 
Recent empirical work offers important insights on the distributional effects of utility 
privatization and regulation. It also highlights an important potential pitfall in developing and 
transition economies: weak regulatory capacity. Studies using computable general equilibrium 
models have found that in Argentina all income classes benefited from the efficiency, quality, 
and access improvements resulting from the utility privatizations that began in 1990. More 
efficient infrastructure services also affect most other economic activities and promote general 
economic growth—enhancing economic opportunities for poor people. When these general 
equilibrium effects are taken into account, the poorest groups seem to benefit the most from the 
increased productivity and access brought about by privatization and related reforms.  
 
Recent research analyzing the welfare effects of utility privatizations in four Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua) found no clear pattern  in price 
changes—in about half the cases, prices fell. But there were adverse distributional effects on the 
bottom half of the income distribution due to job cuts in the privatized utilities. (Though the 
utilities accounted for only a small share of employment in these countries, so privatization 
cannot be blamed for any significant increases in national unemployment.) Still, the negative 
distributional effects of layoffs and price adjustments were more than offset by improvements in 
service quality, increased access for poor people (figure 8), and the changed structure of public 
finances, which benefited poor people more. 
 
   IX 
Figure 8 In Chile privatization significantly increased access to electricity for rural households, 
1992–99 
 
 Source: Chile National Energy Commission 1999. 
 
 
Negative popular perceptions of privatization might also reflect a process that has at 
times been deeply flawed. For privatization to achieve its public interest objectives, significant 
institutional preconditions must be met. For example, effective regulation is needed to balance 
the interests of consumers and operators—to protect consumers lacking competitive alternatives 
while allowing operators to earn a fair return on prudent investments. In some countries where 
privatization was pushed in the absence of such institutional safeguards, it led to serious 
problems. Advocates may have overestimated its benefits and underestimated its costs and 
requirements. 
 
Given the importance of network utilities, removing pricing distortions in these sectors is 
crucial to any economic reform in developing and transition economies. Still, there are good 
reasons to avoid overly abrupt, across-the-board price changes. Rapid, substantial price changes 
can cause large, unnecessary adjustment costs to consumers and firms alike. Even optimal prices, 
if instituted extremely quickly and without sufficient notice, can lead to a difficult transition 
process that is far from optimal. This point has been ignored in some privatization and 
restructuring programs, creating public disenchantment with reforms and a danger of policy 
reversals. This is not to say that the required realignment of consumer prices and underlying 
costs should merely be postponed. To the contrary, policymakers should plan from the outset for 
a smooth, deliberate transition to efficient pricing levels and structures.  
 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999














(left axis)  X 
 
The New Model Poses Sizable Risks—But Also Holds Enormous Promise 
 
The global wave of infrastructure privatization and liberalization in the 1990s was a 
significant departure from previous economic consensus. This departure did more than just 
question the need for state ownership of infrastructure: it also reconsidered long-standing notions 
about natural monopolies and related regulatory interventions. 
 
The old utility model assumed that every infrastructure network industry was a natural 
monopoly in which a single firm could achieve lower costs and provide better services than 
multiple competing suppliers. But in recent years there has been growing recognition that 
network utilities are not monolithic natural monopolies. Rather, they encompass distinct 
activities with entirely different economic characteristics—entailing a mix of structurally 
competitive (or contestable) and monopoly elements. 
 
Today the public utility concept has been undermined by technological progress (which 
has proven a potent enemy of natural monopolies), advances in economic thinking, and 
mounting evidence of the high costs of government intervention. As a result it is widely accepted 
that the monopoly utility model no longer applies—and perhaps never should have been 
applied—to all network industries. Moreover, if these industries are properly reorganized and 
restructured, substantial competition can emerge for many activities. 
 
  Yet today’s industrial countries relied on the old, vertically integrated model to develop good 
infrastructure and have only recently  pursued the new paradigm of  unbundling. So why should 
developing and transition economies take this approach when the old model worked reasonably well 
for wealthier countries? This question is especially relevant given that the new model poses 
considerable risks if not accompanied by policies that harmonize competition with regulation. 
 
The simple answer is that the new model, implemented correctly, offer benefits too big to 
ignore—for governments, operators, and consumers—especially relative to the status quo. And with 
the right approach and proper know-how, the new model can be implemented correctly. Still, it 
should not be pursued without careful attention to the concerns it raises. 
 
Unbundling is difficult to do well… 
 
The new conventional wisdom is that network utilities should be unbundled, with 
potentially competitive segments under separate ownership from the natural monopoly network: 
 
•  In electricity, transmission and distribution should be unbundled from generation. 
•  In telecommunications, the local loop should be split from long-distance, mobile, and value 
added services. 
•  In natural gas, high-pressure transmission and local distribution should be separated from 
production, supply, and storage.   XI 
The unbundling of tiny power systems 
exemplifies the formulaic approach to 
policy reform pursued by developing and 
transition economies and their international 
advisers. Potential economies of vertical 
integration have often been ignored—
creating many problems in restructuring 
and in introducing competition.  
•  In railroads, tracks, signals, and other fixed facilities should be separated from train 
operations and maintenance. 
 
Under this view, in competitive or contestable segments any interference with market 
mechanisms should be minimized and p rivatization and competitive entry should be fully 
exploited. Only segments where natural monopoly conditions persist and are unavoidable 
(generally  because they involve substantial sunk capital) should be regulated and perhaps 
operated by the public sector. 
 
The tradeoff between unbundled and vertically integrated organizational forms is that 
between the potential efficiency gains from competition and the potential loss of coordination 
and scope economies. Thus the primary virtue of unbundling is that it may foster competition, 
ensuring efficient selection among firms to provide their services at efficient prices. Unbundling 
is likely to be particularly attractive when market size and density permit many operators to 
function, providing both active and potential competition.  
 
But in many developing countries 
markets might be too small for substantial 
competition to emerge. In electricity, for 
example, 60 developing  countries have peak 
system loads below 150 megawatts, another 
30 between 150 and  500  megawatts, and 
possibly another 20 between 500 and 1,000 
megawatts. Even a 1,000-megawatt system is 
small for introducing competition. Thus the 
benefits of competition that come from 
unbundling will be limited in many 
developing and transition economies. 
 
Provision of many innovative, market-responsive utility services may require specific 
investments in physical infrastructure. In unbundled systems it may be difficult and inefficient 
for any provider of competitive final services to coordinate, as necessary, with the monopoly 
infrastructure entity—especially if their incentives for investments are not in harmony. Thus 
another factor required for unbundling is a mature, well-developed set of fixed network facilities, 
so that there is little need for new infrastructure investments where incentive problems are more 
likely. Yet circumstances in most developing and transition economies are exactly the opposite. 
These countries require substantial new infrastructure investments, either because their networks 
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As with all economic elixirs, infrastructure 
privatization was initially oversimplified and 
oversold—and ultimately disappointing, 
delivering less than promised. At the same time, 
many of its critics are unduly impatient and 
suffer from some illusion and 
misunderstanding. Privatization is no panacea, 
but neither is returning to the old ways. 
Poor regulatory design can have dire 
consequences, undermining the benefits of 
restructuring and privatization. 
…and demands careful regulation 
 
Unbundling can reduce the scope of 
regulation by isolating monopoly segments, 
containing their damaging consequences, and 
replacing regulation with competition in 
competitive activities. But even though a 
smaller range of activities requires continued 
regulatory oversight in unbundled systems, performance becomes much more sensitive to 
regulatory efficacy. In fact, certain inefficient practices (such as internal cross-subsidies) that 
were tolerable in a monopoly environment can cause much more damage in the new setting. 
 
To obtain the benefits of unbundling, policies need to harmonize regulatory oversight of 
monopoly activities with increasing competition. Otherwise, the interface between bottleneck 
components (those essential to the provision of final services and too costly to duplicate) and 
competitive segments can create such severe distortions that the mixed system is the worst of 
both worlds. Thus unbundling makes the regulatory task more complex, which is likely to be a 
problem in environments with weak governance—as in most developing and transition 
economies. 
 
Privatization has been oversold and misunderstood 
 
Just a few years ago, privatization was heralded as the elixir that would—by promoting 
investment, productivity, and growth—rejuvenate lethargic, wasteful infrastructure industries 
and revitalize stagnating economies. Today privatization is undergoing many revisions, and its 
critics are numerous and vocal. Skepticism 
and outright hostility toward privatization 
are not limited to a few radical protesters. 
Opinion polls in several developing and 
transition economies, especially in Latin 
America, reveal growing public 
dissatisfaction with privatization. 
Disapproval ratings were higher in 2001 
than in 2000, and higher in 2000 than in 
1998.  In 2001 almost 80 percent of 




Most developing and transition economies have suffered from much worse infrastructure 
performance than have  advanced industrial economies. But the structure of ownership has not 
                                                 
2 The results of such polls, however, can be very sensitive to how the questions are asked. As Klein (2003) notes, 
according to such polls only 21 percent of Peruvians seemed to generally support electricity privatization. But when 
asked specifically about privatization implemented transparently and accompanied by increased investments as well 
as prices set by a regulatory process, more than 60 percent favored privatization.    XIII 
been the key explanatory variable for the differences in performance. After all, for many years 
state ownership also prevailed in most advanced economies. The true explanation lies elsewhere.  
 
It can be argued that the performance of state-owned network industries is an accurate 
summary statistic of a variety of country characteristics both observable and unobservable 
(institutional endowments, nature of organized interest groups and patterns of social conflict, 
business culture and codes of conduct, and so on). It would be unrealistic to expect such features 
to change on a timescale comparable to that of privatization transactions—or to think that less 
attractive attributes would disappear overnight. 
 
Strong institutions took a long time to develop even in advanced industrial economies. It 
is difficult to create such institutions overnight in societies that do not have the constitutional, 
political, and legal traditions required to support them. Thus achieving the public interest 
objectives of privatization will take longer than has elapsed since such reforms were introduced 
in most developing and transition economies. Even in East Asia’s “miracle” economies it took 
several decades of concerted efforts to produce notable results. 
 
Public discontent with privatization has been fueled by price increases, job reductions, 
and the high profits of firms that have improved operating performance. But these adjustments 
have been necessary for privatization to achieve its public interest objectives. As noted, one of 
the main problems with the old utility model was underinvestment, largely caused by 
underpricing. Government subsidies simply perpetuated the problem—until the fiscal crunch 
occurred. Then the choice became higher taxes or higher prices. Higher prices generally fall on 
those benefiting from existing services—the middle and upper classes—while higher taxes are 
likely to hit poor people and other vulnerable groups. Thus a sensible, and arguably less 
regressive, response is to realign prices with costs. That privatization makes such adjustments 
mandatory—to attract investors—is one of its main appeals.  
 
As for layoffs, state utilities in most developing and transition economies had high excess 
employment before reforms. Efficiency and competitiveness require eliminating redundant jobs. 
Efficiency is especially important in infrastructure because such services are critical for 
manufacturing, transportation, and commerce—and so essential to boosting economic activity 
and increasing competition by expanding product lines and geographic distribution. 
 
Moreover, the market’s primary incentive mechanism is the prospect of profits for firms 
that succeed. So, while preventing monopoly profits is a legitimate goal for public policy, it 
should not lead to artificial limits on post-privatization profits or restrict such profits based on 
mechanistic formulas or populist demands. Otherwise, incentives for investment, innovation, 
efficiency, and productive growth—badly needed in the network utilities of most developing and 
transition economies—would be undermined or eliminated. 
 
 
One model does not fit all—choosing among imperfect options 
 
One clear lesson from the restructuring of network utilities is that there is no universally 
appropriate reform model (table 1). Every restructuring and privatization program must take into   XIV 
account the features of each sector (its underlying economic attributes and the technological 






























The limits of state ownership are numerous and widely accepted. But the fact that state 
ownership is flawed does not mean that private ownership is better for all infrastructure activities 
and in all countries. Before state ownership is supplanted by another institutional mechanism, it 
is essential to assess the properties and requirements of the proposed alternative—not just 
generally but also specifically for the activity and country in question. 
 
Telecommunications provides the most compelling case for privatization and 
liberalization in developing and transition economies because: 
 
•  Revolutionary technological changes have almost entirely eliminated natural monopoly. 
•  In most countries coverage has been very low, and easing restrictions on entry could lead to 
enormous gains. 
•  Cross-subsidies embedded in monopoly pricing structures cannot be defended on equity 
grounds because most people with telephone connections are relatively well-off. 
Table 1 Approaches to privatization and sector reform in network industries 
 in selected developing and transition economies 
 
Divestitures  Concessions and leases 
(introduction of competition for 
the market through competitive 
bidding) 
Introduction of 
competition in the 
market (such as by 








Argentina, Chile, Cuba, 
Guinea, Hungary, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 
China, Cook Islands, Guinea-







Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Hungary, Pakistan, Peru 
China, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Hungary, Mexico 
Argentina, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Chile, India, 





Natural gas transport and 
distribution 
Hungary, Latvia, Russia  Argentina  Argentina, Hungary  Argentina 
(distribution) 
Railways   Bolivia  Argentina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Mexico 
     
Water distribution 
 
   Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Hungary, Macao, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Senegal 
     
 
Note: Includes only countries that have privatized by transferring public facilities to the private sector, not those that have opened up sectors only through 
greenfield concessions or build-operate-transfer (BOT) and build-own-operate (BOO) contracts—such as China (power generation) and Thailand 
(telecommunications). 
Source: Dnes 1995; Guislain 1997; Nellis and Roger 1994; Otobo 1998; Paddon 1998; Plane 1998; Thompson and Budin 1997. 
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•  Significant scope exists for flexible pricing to alleviate supply shortages because consumers 
are willing to pay for new and better services, and the sector is amenable to competition. 
 
Because of their financial, technical, and managerial resources, private entities may have a 
distinct advantage in this increasingly complex industry. 
 
In many segments of the transportation sector—railways, ports, trucking, airlines, 
interurban busing—competition within and between modes is sufficient in most countries to 
justify substantial liberalization and privatization. But the case for privatizing transport network 
infrastructure is much less compelling than that for privatizing services operating on the network. 
Rail track, basic and access port infrastructure, and certain portions of airport facilities, where 
monopolies are unavoidable or substantial amounts of sunk capital are involved, must be 
regulated or even operated by the public sector.  
 
Electricity restructuring and privatization in developing and transition economies is more 
problematic. Wholesale competition has worked well in industrial countries because of excess 
capacity, modest demand growth, and the availability of natural gas (which enabled the entry of 
gas-fired plants at modest scale and relatively low cost). In contrast, electricity markets in many 
developing countries face capacity shortages, enormous excess demand, and periodic blackouts. 
California’s experience has shown that market liberalization under conditions of tight demand 
can lead to serious problems: market-clearing prices would be politically unacceptable and 
would likely derail attempts at radical liberalization. 
 
The scope for introducing competition in the supply of water and sanitation services is far 
more limited than in other network utilities. Local networks of pipes and sewers remain the 
quintessential natural monopolies. Moreover, unbundling is not as attractive because increased 
competition in supply will likely provide far fewer benefits than in other network utilities—the 
costs of producing water are low relative to the value added at the transportation stage, though 
this may vary across countries. Greater opportunities exist to introduce competition in sewage 
treatment. Overall, concessions and leases will likely be the most effective way of increasing 




Developing Good Regulation Remains a Major Challenge for Developing and Transition 
Economies  
 
Among the most critical tasks for policymakers in developing and transition economies is 
designing and implementing stable, effective regulation for network utilities. In many advanced 
industrial economies the challenge has been reforming existing regulation and reducing 
unwarranted governmental intrusion. By contrast, in nearly every developing and transition 
economy the most pressing issue is designing—from scratch—regulatory mechanisms for 
privatized utilities.
3 
                                                 
3 The regulatory function was not entirely avoided under state ownership. For example, service quality still had to 
be monitored, and prices for infrastructure services had to be set. The main difference lies in the characteristics of   XVI 
In the past most developing and transition 
economies chose nationalization over regulation 
to control monopoly power in infrastructure. 
Thus these countries are the least prepared to 
develop and implement rational regulations. Yet 
their policymakers are quickly facing the 
complex second-generation regulatory issues that 
arise after privatization, particularly when 
combined with unbundling—without having any 
experience with the traditional first-generation 
issues of regulating private monopolies. Many 
are simply repeating the mistakes of U.S. 
regulation, which have taken decades to 
ameliorate. 
 
For regulation to promote welfare 
by facilitating investment, innovation, 
and allocatively efficient pricing, its 
institutional design and substantive 
content must be consistent with country 
circumstances—particularly the 
country’s size, institutional endowments 
(including checks and balances), 
technical expertise, auditing 
technologies, fiscal condition and tax 
system efficacy, and the economic 
characteristics of its industries. Thus it 
would be inappropriate and often costly 
for developing and transition economies 
to try to  uncritically  replicate the 
regulatory frameworks of advanced 
industrial countries. 
 
Nevertheless, under external pressures many developing and transition economies have 
quickly adopted regulatory templates from advanced industrial economies (especially the United 
Kingdom and United States). With few exceptions, the specific institutional and structural 
features of the poorer economies have received little attention. Moreover, almost all the 
regulatory principles were developed in the advanced economies and have substantial 
informational requirements. Implementing these principles will be difficult in most developing 
and transition economies because of severe problems measuring relevant economic variables and 
a lack of proper accounting systems and technical skills. Models based on conditions and 




What makes for effective regulation? 
 
Given the importance of effective regulation for financial viability, investment behavior, and 
other crucial elements of infrastructure performance, regulatory procedures must be predictable, 
accountable, and transparent. Regulatory bodies should: 
 
•  Have competent, nonpolitical, professional staffs—expert in relevant economic, accounting, 
engineering, and legal principles and familiar with good regulatory practices. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the regulatory process, which was ad hoc and opaque under the old regime—while it is required to adhere to certain 
transparent requirements of due process in the new setting.  
   XVII 
The label “independent” is somewhat 
exaggerated among new regulatory 
agencies in developing and transition 
economies. Effective regulation requires 
that regulators be removed from political 
influence and act as impartial enforcers of 
policies set forth in controlling statutes. But 
absolute independence for these agencies is 
neither possible nor really desirable. The 
executive can hardly be denied the authority 
to ensure that the regulators it appoints are 
sympathetic to its reforms and to 
administration policies generally.  
•  Operate within a statutory framework that fosters competition and market-like regulatory 
policies and practices. 
•  Be subject to substantive and procedural requirements that ensure integrity, independence, 
transparency, and accountability.  
 
 
Where do things stand? 
 
Political interference has undermined regulatory independence in many developing and 
transition economies. Governments, especially line ministries, have been reluctant to relegate 
important regulatory functions to independent agencies. Instead many regulatory agencies report 
to sectoral ministries and are filled with 
government representatives. 
 
Before privatization the state 
controlled every aspect of the infrastructure 
sectors in developing and transition 
economies. Ownership, operational,  policy, 
and regulatory functions were typically fused, 
even when exercised by different government 
agencies. Thus it is not surprising that line 
ministries would resist having their post-
reform role limited to policy oversight: 
assessing industry developments, reviewing 
the adequacy of policy in light of these 




Recent surveys indicate that most regulatory agencies in developing and transition 
economies are not legally required to hold open meetings. Nor are they obligated to provide 
written justifications for their decisions. And in many economies the regulatory framework lacks 
coherence, with responsibilities splintered among regulatory agencies and line ministries. 
 
One clearly emerging lesson is that although formal requirements for integrity, 
independence, transparency, and accountability are essential for effective regulation, they are far 
from sufficient. The experience so far raises doubts that governments will observe the spirit of 
the law and implement proper, consistent regulatory procedures—especially when their choices 
are influenced (and constrained) by external pressures and loan conditions.  
 
                                                 
4 In fact as Estache (2002) has observed governments are more active players in the regulatory game than it appears 
because of some perverse incentives that they face.  Large rents that are left by regulation to the privatized utility 
operators imply large income taxes.  Fiscally constrained governments might therefore be tempted to use the 
regulatory process to prevent the redistribution of rents in order to enlarge their fiscal payoffs from privatization 
reforms.  Thus, there could be considerable scope for implicit collusion between privatized operators and 
governments to weaken the regulatory process.   XVIII 
When assessing regulation in the developing world, it is important to remember that it 
took many years for advanced economies to achieve regulatory effectiveness. For example, it 
took decades for the United States to reach an equilibrium in which the independence of 
regulatory agencies was recognized, expected, and supported by administrative procedures, ex 
parte rules, and judicial review. In developing countries regulatory structures have been created 
from scratch and are still in early stages of development. But at least in terms of formal 
regulatory arrangements, the trend is in the right direction—greater independence, 
accountability, and transparency than under state ownership.  
 
 
How Can Effective Regulation Improve the Investment Climate? 
 
Arguably the strongest impetus for privatizing infrastructure in developing and transition 
economies has  been the public sector’s inability to continue financing its maintenance, 
modernization, and expansion. If adequate private investment does not flow into infrastructure 
sectors, the goals of universal service in some areas and increased services for poor people in others 
will inevitably suffer. And if investment is stifled by restrictive regulation, entry and competition 
will not materialize. Thus regulatory policies designed to encourage sustained private investment in 
infrastructure do more than merely serve the narrow interests of investors: they also widen access to 
basic services and promote competition. 
 
 
Balancing regulatory commitment and flexibility 
 
An indispensable precondition for effective privatization and sustained private 
investment is a country’s institutional capacity to restrain arbitrary administrative action and 
credibly commit to a stable policy process. Developing mechanisms that enforce substantive and 
procedural restraints on administrative discretion and limit regulatory opportunism is especially 
important in infrastructure, where the establishment of transportation and distribution networks 
requires large, mostly sunk investments. Without government commitment to policy stability, 
frequent changes in regulation can have the same effect as outright expropriation of sunk 
investments. 
 
Yet a good regulatory system must also be responsive to changes in industry technology, 
in the competitiveness of directly regulated and adjacent markets, and in demand and supply. To 
foster efficient performance, the system must be able to adapt its mandates and rules in response 
to new problems, circumstances, information, and experience. Such flexibility is especially 
imperative in sectors experiencing rapid technological and market changes. 
 
  The rigidity of certain features of the privatization agreements that established industry 
structures severely impedes solving regulatory problems in the network utilities of developing 
and transition economies. Such inflexibilities were needed to create commitments to reform, to 
consumer protection, and to the private capital needed for investment in these sectors. But they 
also make it difficult to adapt to emerging challenges, because operators and investors find such   XIX 
adaptations threatening to the privatization commitments that protect their interests and the entire 
fabric of reform. 
 
  Thus there is a need to strike a delicate balance between regulatory commitment and 
flexibility—to limit regulatory discretion while avoiding the rigidity and paralysis of 
micromanaged privatizations or concessions. One way to limit government discretion in a 
socially desirable way is to require regulators to publicly articulate the basic economic principles 
that they use for policy analyses and decisions. These principles could be included in a statute or 
a concession agreement and should guide post-privatization governance. They must cover issues 
ranging from safeguarding the value of investments in infrastructure (without going so far as to 
shield investors from market-based risks), to protecting consumers, and to ensuring efficient, 
equitable tariff setting. To date, few if any regulatory agencies in developing and transition 
economies have articulated such principles. 
 
 
Getting the economics right 
 
Much of the discussion on infrastructure reform in developing and transition economies 
has correctly focused on the institutional foundations of regulatory effectiveness and 
nondiscretionary governance. Establishing institutional mechanisms that restrain arbitrary 
administrative intervention signals to potential investors that the value they add to infrastructure 
will not be expropriated. This type of commitment, flowing from a country’s legal and regulatory 
systems, reduces investment risk and so the discount rate applied to net present value and cash-
flow calculations.  
 
But for any business investment plan to be feasible, basic sector economics must be right. 
After all, a pricing policy transparently implemented by an independent regulator will still repel 
investors if it does not allow for adequate revenue. Consider again the low coverage of long-run 
marginal costs provided by residential and industrial electricity prices in transition economies (see 
figure 7). Even a truly independent, transparent regulatory regime would have a very h ard time 
facilitating private investment under such pricing conditions. 
 
Similarly, a regulatory regime that interferes with competitiveness by disallowing 
flexible prices and terms or by imposing social service obligations on only some competitors will 
not promote efficient investment—even if institutional mechanisms provide a credible 
commitment to policy stability. Especially given today’s extraordinarily adverse financing 
climate, in the second stage of reforms policymakers in developing and transition  economies 
must focus on the economic content of regulation—to ensure an economically attractive 
environment for investors. 
 
 
An Agenda for Action 
 
In many developing and transition economies, network utilities have been privatized, 
restructured, and regulated in ways influenced by the state-of-the-art in policy, with genuine 
creativity applied to advance the public interest. Thus there is much to applaud in these sectors—  XX 
from their new architectures to the skills and commitment of those who crafted them, who 
operate in them, and who regulate them. 
 
But even in countries where restructuring has been excellent, reforms have had 
unintended consequences and caused significant problems. The emerging second-generation 
regulatory problems in the network utilities of developing and transition economies are endemic 
to infrastructure sectors everywhere and largely reflect issues that arise after privatization, 
especially when combined with unbundling. In fact, many asserted deficiencies of their 
regulatory systems are similar to economic regulation as it evolved in advanced industrial 
economies. 
 
Experience and economic logic suggest that post-reform improvements in performance 
will be limited, and probably unsustainable, unless accompanied by appropriate second-
generation regulatory reforms. These include: 
 
•  Designing  pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social 
equity. 
•  Developing rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities. 
•  Finding new ways to increase poor people’s access to services. 
 
Many of the rules and principles for resolving second-generation regulatory issues have been 
developed in the context of advanced industrial economies. To be effective in developing and 
transition economies, they must be modified.  
 
Policy solutions consistent with both economic efficiency and social equity are not 
always available or politically feasible. Thus policymakers in the World Bank’s client countries 
face no greater challenge than to design and implement price reforms that better balance 
economic efficiency and distributional equity. The existing literature provides little guidance for 
managing the move to cost-reflective prices. Specific challenges for developing and transition 
economies include what standards to apply to tariff rebalancing, how fast to proceed, and how to 
promote universal service in a competitive environment. 
 
The literature does offer significant advances in developing infrastructure pricing 
principles that replicate the behaviors and outcomes of competitive markets, and satisfy 
conditions for economic efficiency. But translating these principles into workable rules and 
actual pricing schedules has proven extraordinarily difficult and contentious. Indeed, in most 
developing and transition economies these principles cannot easily be translated into policies 
because of their information requirements and technical complexity. Thus a key challenge for 
applied policy research is to develop next-best, less informationally demanding variants of these 
optimal pricing principles—and to translate them into viable rules and procedures, especially in 
the face of severe measurement problems and deficient monitoring technologies. 
 
In addition to reducing distortions and adjustment costs, pricing policies must be 
designed to maximize efficiency—subject to meeting certain social policy goals, such as 
universal access for rural and poor urban consumers. When considering and undertaking reforms, 
policymakers need to know existing service levels for these groups, how policy proposals will   XXI 
affect them, and how to enhance their access. Although low coverage among low-income and 
rural households suggests that public monopolies have not successfully provided these 
households with access to infrastructure services in most developing countries, it is not clear that 
privatization and liberalization will automatically benefit them either. 
 
Rigorously evaluating poor people’s access to infrastructure facilities is imperative to 
developing pro-poor regulatory policies. Little consistent data exist to support the design of such 
policies. Thus there is an urgent need to obtain additional data on infrastructure services and low-
income households. In particular, poor people’s demand for infrastructure services needs to be 
analyzed more thoroughly—including factors that influence their decisions to connect, the role 
of informal providers, and how the presence of alternatives affects household connections.   1
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The deficiencies of 
infrastructure, together with 
the weakness of management 
and economic organization, 
are likely to account for a 
substantial part of low factor 




The New Paradigm for Utilities 
he twentieth  century saw most countries pursue social fairness in access to 
economic infrastructure  — non-exploitative prices, nondiscrimination, and 
universal service— through government ownership and regulation (the public 
utility paradigm).
5  It was broadly agreed that these sectors could not be entrusted to the signals, 
motivations and penalties of free markets because of concerns with monopoly power and because of 
infrastructure’s strategic importance.  Most governments were also convinced that the large 
investments required to extend coverage required the resources of the state. This chapter explains 
why this consensus changed, and what it bodes for the future. 
Why Focus on the Network Utilities 
Network utilities have a significant share in the national product and disproportionately influence its 
growth [World Bank (WDR) 1994; Newbery 1999].  These industries provide services that are 
critical inputs to manufacturing and commerce.  Indeed, economic development requires such 
“infrastructure” and the failure to reform and modernize these 
sectors risks economic stagnation and threatens national 
competitiveness. 
The report’s focus on the regulatory governance of the 
network utilities is also motivated by their unique economic 
characteristics, which make them a natural target for 
government intervention and yet, render them particularly 
difficult to regulate in the public interest.  These characteristics include: 
                                                 
5 This refers mainly to the period after World War II. Private ownership in electricity was initially the norm in many 
countries in Europe and North and South America. State ownership spread later, especially after World War II, 
either for ideological reasons (as in England and France) or because political constraints on prices forced private 
firms into bankruptcy (as in Latin America). Similar situations prevailed for railroads, trucking, and water in many 
countries. Telephone services became captive of state-owned post offices in Europe and Japan, but not in Canada, 




















Table 1.1  Vertical Integration 
in Electricity 
•  Extensive economies of scale and scope that generally lead to market concentration and inhibit 
competition.  So regulation cannot be completely abolished. 
•  High ratio of sunk costs to fixed and variable (avoidable) costs.  Sunk costs are those that (in the 
short-intermediate run) cannot be eliminated even by ceasing production.  Sunk costs deter entry 
because they impose a major hurdle of risk taking for a newcomer.    
•  Services to a broad range of users and deemed “essential”, making their provision and pricing 
politically sensitive. 
  The extensive economies of scale and scope led to monopolistic organization.  Significant sunk 
costs exacerbate the problem of market power and virtually ensure that private unregulated pricing 
and investment decisions will not be socially optimal.  The combinations of large, durable assets 
that are characterized by a high degree of sunkeness and the highly politicized  consumption makes 
the network utilities especially vulnerable to administrative expropriation—both directly and 
through uneconomic price controls.  Foreign investors are particularly vulnerable, resulting in their 
demanding high risk premia.   These basic features, common to varying degree to utilities across 
different sectors, create special challenges for effective regulation that the subsequent chapters of 
this report will seek to explain. 
From State to Market--Evolution in Thinking about Utilities 
The vertically integrated, state-owned utility became the standard industry model in electricity, 
telecommunications, water, gas, railways and other 
transportation services (e.g., Table 1.1).  At the time, it 
seemed to represent a sensible reorganization of previously 
private utilities that were either highly fragmented or too 
large to prevent monopolistic abuse.  Public ownership was 
promoted to secure the benefits of size, and the requisite 
large scale financing, without suffering the disadvantages of 
monopolistic pricing.  Thus most of the world chose 
nationalization over regulation—except the United States, 
where the network utilities were under private ownership but 
subject to comprehensive regulatory controls (Laffont 2002).  
Still, the two different forms of ownership and regulation   5
Box 1.1  Milestones of US Deregulation 
 
Airline Deregulation Act   1978 
The Staggers Act   
(Rail Deregulation)  1980 
The Motor Carrier Act     
(Trucking Deregulation)  1980 
AT&T Divestiture  1984 
FERC Order 636       
(Gas Deregulation)  1992 
FERC Order 888       
(Electricity Deregulation)  1996 
Telecommunication Act  1996 
 
 
Box 1.2  Milestones of UK Privatization 
 
British Telecom            1984 
British Gas              1986 
British Airways            1987 
British Airports Authority       1987 
Water and Sewage Companies     1989 
Electricity Companies        1990 
• British Rail          1995 
• British Energy (nuclear)   1996 
 
 
Source: Newbery (2000). 
were quite similar in the structure and stability of the industrial form (Newbery 2002). 
  At first, vertically integrated, state-owned utilities produced reasonably satisfactory results (Fare 
et al 1985).  For example, British and French public firms were leaders in efficient utility pricing 
from the 1950s on (Turvey 1968).  The Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States 
demonstrated the advantages of reaching down the demand curve by reducing prices (Scherer 1980, 
p. 487).  In Brazil, the state-owned telecommunications company, Telebras, grew impressively after 
it was restructured and consolidated in 1972 (World Bank 1992). 
During the last two decades, however, the monolithic model has proven progressively unsuited to 
the drastically altered conditions of both developed and developing economies.  This has led to a 
profound worldwide reassessment of the traditional 
public policies in the network utilities. 
The reassessment of traditional utility policies begun 
with the regulatory reform movement in the United 
States in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Joskow and Noll 
1994, Noll, 1999).  Several historical forces propelled the 
revolutionary changes across a wide swath o f the 
economy, and much of the country’s public utility 
industries (Box 1.1): double-digit inflation, energy crises, 
stagflation, heightened environmental concerns, the 
virtual bankruptcy of backbone industries, and a perceived erosion of the country’s productivity 
edge and its international competitiveness.  Proponents of deregulation emphasized its potential to 
combat inflation and restore the growth in productivity 
by unleashing the forces of competition.  Concerns about 
the energy crises and environmental protection facilitated 
the introduction of economically efficient pricing which 
was expected to discourage wasteful consumption (Kahn 
2001).   
  Roughly during the same period, major sectors of the 
British economy were also being transformed (Box 1.2).  
Deregulation and new methods of regulation were 
introduced in the financial services and the professions.  Large-scale privatization begun in 1984,   6
Box 1.3  EU Liberalization Directives 
 
•  Telecommunications:  1990 
•  Rail            1991 
•  Electricity:        1996 
•  Gas:             1998   
 
 
Table 1.2  Investment in Infrastructure Projects with Private 
Participation by Sector, 1990-2001 
2001 US$ billions           
   Telecoms 
Electricit
y  Transport  Water  Gas  Total 
1990  6.2  1.3  10.3  -  -  17.8 
1991  13.5  1.3  3.3  0.1  -  18.2 
1992  7.9  8.9  4.6  2.0  4.0  23.4 
1993  10.9  11.1  5.7  7.9  4.6  35.6 
1994  20.3  15.2  8.9  0.5  1.8  44.9 
1995  20.1  20.9  12.0  1.8  4.1  54.8 
1996  29.7  30.6  17.4  1.9  3.0  79.6 
1997  45.4  48.7  21.7  9.3  3.3  125.1 
1998  57.3  24.6  18.4  2.4  6.5  102.7 
1999  43.3  14.4  8.9  6.9  3.7  73.5 
2000  45.3  26.4  11.6  4.8  2.3  88.1 
2001  31.7  10.0  12.4  2.2  1.2  56.3 
Total  331.6  213.4  135.2  39.8  34.5  720.0 
Source: World Bank PPI 
with the sale of 51 percent of British Telecom (BT) to the private sector.  BT’s divestiture was 
largely motivated by the government’s desire to remove telecommunications investment off the 
government balance sheet in order to meet its (post-1976 IMF) targets for the level of public sector 
borrowing (Kay 2001).  Radical regulatory reform accompanied the subsequent privatization of the 
utility industries (Newbery 1999).  Several new regulatory institutions were established and new 
tasks given to existing agencies such as the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Armstrong et al 
1994). 
Meanwhile, the European Union issued a series of directives beginning in the late 1980s aiming 
to create a single market--an area without internal borders 
where goods, people, services, and capital could move 
freely.   These directives spelled out common rules for 
telecommunications, electricity, natural gas and 
transportation markets across the Member States (Box 1.3).  
Taken together, they mapped out a common regulatory 
framework and the extensive liberalization of these industries.  In fact, water is the only EU network 
utility where liberalization is still in its infancy. 
While the US deregulated and the UK privatized, and the EU directives (which called for 
extensive liberalization but 
remained silent on the issue of 
ownership) were building a 
single market, a strong 
privatization movement begun 
to sweep the globe.  Between 
1990 and 2001, 132 
developing and transition 
economies (DTEs) have taken 
substantive steps to introduce 
private participation in 
infrastructure sectors.  During 
that period, over US$750 
billion of investment in infrastructure projects with private participation took place in the DTEs--in   7
the form of divestitures, green field projects, and management and operational contracts with major 
capital expenditures (Table 1.2). 
  The primary impetus for privatization in 
many developing countries came from the 
debt and fiscal crises that emerged in the 
early 1980s (Estache 1999).  The 
extraordinary low levels of objective 
performance in infrastructure compared to 
the equivalent sectors in developed 
countries also played a major role.   
Reforms in the transition economies were 
motivated by similar factors beginning in 
the early 1990s.  The external sovereign 
debt burden led many countries through 
forced fiscal adjustments which hit public 
infrastructure investment particularly h ard.  In Latin America, between 1980-84 and 1995-1998 
infrastructure investment, as a percentage of GDP, declined by 2.85 points in Argentina, 3.10 in 
Bolivia, 3.08 in Brazil, 1.41 in Chile, 1.98 in Mexico and 1.51 in Peru (Calderon et al, 2002).  While 
the region was experiencing a sharp contraction in public infrastructure spending, it led the world in 
infrastructure privatization during the 1990s (Roger 1999, Izaguirre 2002).  Almost 50 percent of 
the total infrastructure investment with private participation (primarily through divestitures) during 
1990-2001 was accounted for by Latin America and the Caribbean (Fig. 1.1). 
  At the same time, there was mounting evidence that public enterprises were seriously 
mismanaged and that the damage to the infrastructure sectors was becoming intolerable (Shirley and 
Walsh 2001).  State-owned entities pursued multiple, poorly-defined and conflicting objectives and 
managers were often appointed on the basis of political loyalty, not competence. Funds for 
investment were often squandered through poor projects. Moreover, price controls were imposed in 
disregard of their performance implications, subjecting the operating entities to considerable 
financial distress and substantially impairing their ability to mobilize investment and provide 
reliable service (Kerf and Smith 1996). 












Fig. 1.1  Investment in Infrastructure Projects with 
Private Participation in Developing Countries, by 
Region and Type of Project, 1990–2001 
Divestitures
Management and operation contracts
Greenfield projects
Source: World Bank IPP Project Database
2001 US$ 
billions  8
The monopoly-based system of service supply, 
which has dominated the world’s infrastructure  
markets for almost a century, continues to decline 
in popularity around the world. 
  Attempts at reforming the public enterprises had only very limited success [World Bank (PRR) 
1995].  These efforts either did not bring the desired results or the improvements were not sustained.  
Very few governments were able to introduce and maintain the large number of complex and 
demanding policy measures needed for efficient public enterprise performance.  In many countries, 
inefficient public enterprises, especially in the infrastructure sectors, were draining the state budgets, 
diverting resources from other social priorities such as health and education, undermining the 
banking sector, and impeding the development of the private sector.  In the context of a globalized 
economy, the poorly performing state-owned infrastructure sectors were increasingly seen as 
constraining economic growth and undermining international competitiveness. Developing 
countries simply could not continue absorbing the fiscal burden of their state-owned enterprises. 
(Lieberman, 1997).  It became evident to policymakers throughout the world that the long-term 
solution to the problems of poor service delivery, lackluster growth, and damaging political 
interference required radical structural changes and a realignment of the government’s role relative 
to that of the private sector. 
The Dawn of the New Utility Model 
The wave of infrastructure privatization and liberalization that swept the globe during the 1990s 
must be seen as a significant departure from the previous economic consensus.  This departure 
not only questioned the necessity of state ownership in these sectors, but also reexamined several 
preconceived notions about natural monopoly and the character of the concomitant regulatory 
intervention. 
Unbundling—Isolating the Monopoly Parts 
The public utility paradigm was premised on the assumption that each infrastructure network 
industry constitutes a natural monopoly in which a single firm could achieve lower costs and better 
service than a number of competing suppliers.  The monolithic organization enshrined this view, 
whereby a single entity controlled all facilities, operating and administrative functions, and was 
obligated in accordance with its public utility responsibilities to serve on demand within its territory. 
  In recent years, however, there has 
been an increasing recognition that the 
network utilities are not monolithic   9
natural monopolies, but rather encompass several distinct activities with entirely different economic 
characteristics—in fact, entailing a mixture of competition and monopoly elements in supply.  
Technological progress, which has been proven to be a potent enemy of natural monopolies (Klein 
1996), coupled with mounting evidence of the high costs of regulatory intervention, have 
undermined the public utility concept.  Thus, it is widely accepted today that the vertically 
integrated utility model no longer applies and perhaps should never have been applied, across the 
board to all the network utilities.   
  Electricity, gas, telecommunications, railroads and water evolved as vertically integrated 
industries characterized by transportation and distribution networks linking upstream production 
with downstream consumption.  These networks consist of: a hierarchy of transmission links in 
electricity; national pipelines and regional distributional links in gas; transmission media and 
switching centers in telecommunications; earthworks, track, signaling, and stations in railroads; and 
pipes and sewers in water.   Most of the network elements entail substantial fixed costs that are 
largely sunk because the assets are of minimal value for other purposes.  However, the cost 
conditions relating to upstream production and downstream supply activities (electricity, gas, and 
water), certain portions of the network (interexchange services in telecommunications), and the 
operation of services on the physical network (railroads) are more conducive to competition (Gray 
and Klein 1997).  Although there are important economies of scale and inevitably some sunk costs 
associated with these activities, they are small in relation to those encountered in network 
infrastructure and, in any case, are being continuously undermined by technological change. 
Therefore, substantial competition could emerge in many components of these sectors (Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3  Network Industries Featuring Both Competitive and Non-competitive Segments 
     
Sector  Activities which are usually non-competitive  Activities which are potentially competitive 
Railways  Track and signaling infrastructure  Train operations & maintenance facilities 
Electricity  High voltage transmission & local distribution  Generation & supply 
Telecoms  Local residential telephony or local loop  Long distance, mobile, and value added services 
Gas  High pressure transmission and local distribution Production, supply and storage 
Water  Water distribution and wastewater  Collection and treatment   10
Air services  Airport facilities  Aircraft operations, maintenance facilities, and 
commercial activities 
Source: OECD Secretariat   
  A new industry paradigm has emerged for the organizational restructuring of network utilities.  
This holds that: network utilities should be unbundled, both horizontally and vertically, with the 
potentially competitive segments under separate ownership from the natural monopoly network; in 
the competitive or structurally contestable segments, interference with the market mechanism and 
restrictions on ownership should be relaxed and the scope for introducing competition should be 
fully exploited; only the segments where natural monopoly conditions are still present and 
unavoidable, or where substantial amounts of sunk capital are involved, should be placed under 
regulation and perhaps even operated by the public sector (Guasch and Blitzer 1993). 
Competition for the Market—A Promising Old Idea 
Some have even questioned the need for regulating, at least extensively, the natural monopoly 
segments of infrastructure by drawing the distinction between competition  in the market and 
competition for the market.  Proponents of this view have resurrected an old, yet powerful idea: 
where a large number of firms enter non-collusive bids to become the supplier of a natural 
monopoly activity, the resulting price need not reflect exploitive market power (Demsetz 1968). 
Thus, even when competition in the market is not feasible, some of its benefits could be achieved 
by introducing competition for the market.  Under this approach, time-bound monopoly franchises 
are awarded by competitive bidding and periodically re-bid.  This provides incentives for firms to 
perform well to retain the franchise (Klein and Roger 1994).  However, franchising has some 
serious limitations on it own.  The bidding for the franchise might be uncompetitive.  Another 
source of difficulty is contract specification and monitoring.  Product or service complexity will 
frequently lead to contractual incompleteness and opportunistic renegotiation. 
Technological Change—Breaking Down the Monopoly Barriers 
Technological innovation increasingly is the driving force behind the move toward competition in 
the network utilities.  The market structure implications of changes in the  
production and distribution technologies have been especially dramatic in the electricity and 
telecommunications industries.   11
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  In electricity, the i ntroduction of new technologies has significantly reduced the minimum 
efficient scale of generating plants, the investment costs of new units, and the time to plan and build 
new plants (Fig. 1.2, also see Chapter 4 and the references cited therein for a more detailed 
exposition).  Generation is clearly capable of being structurally competitive now for many DTEs, 
especially those that have access to natural gas.  Smaller plant sizes expand considerably the range 
of ownership options.  Moreover, low-cost, small-scale generation units allow the production of 
electric power closer to the end users, thereby reducing reliance on transmission and even 
distribution and eventually undermining their natural monopoly characteristics as well.  Small scale 
off-grid supply may ultimately prove a practical sensible solution to the electricity problem of many 
low income developing countries, especially in Africa. 
  The telecommunications industry has experienced revolutionary change through advances in 
microelectronics, opto-electronics, fixed and mobile internet platforms, and a plethora of other 
exciting new technologies. (Box 1.4).  These innovations have radically altered the cost structures of 
the industry and brought about high, continuous productivity increases.  
As a result of the dramatic, albeit somewhat uneven, impact of technology, competition has 
intensified in many components of the telecommunications network.  New entrants are accounting 
for an increasing share of the global telecommunications investment-- from 23.8 percent in 1996 to 
33.5 percent in 2000 (Siemens 2001).   Technological change has almost entirely eliminated natural 
monopoly in interexchange markets as evidenced by actual market tests in several countries.  In 
contrast, the erosion of natural monopoly in local exchange service has been slower, although   12
competition in that segment of the market may not be absent for too long.  Wireless, cable, and 
voice over IP technologies are beginning to seriously challenge wireline telephony (Vogelsang and 
Mitchell 1997, Laffont and Tirole 2000, Woroch, 2002). 
   13
Box 1.4   Technological Revolution in Telecommunications 
 
The impact of technological change has been massive but somewhat uneven.  Cost reductions have been 
particularly impressive in the long-distance and traffic-sensitive segments of the industry.  Dramatic reductions in 
transmission costs have been effected by advances in microwave, satellite, and opto-electronic technologies.  The 
impact of opto-electronics in particular has been nothing less than spectacular.  Within one decade, optical systems 
have completely outperformed coaxial cables and fixed satellite links in long-distance high-capacity transmission 
(Arnbak 1997).  Significant, although not as great, costs reductions in switching were induced by declines in the 
costs of integrated circuits and computers and software innovation.  Cost reductions and significant improvements 
in software interfaces have facilitated a variety of data- and transmission-intensive services (Economides 1998). 
 
 
Source: Bond (1997) and AT&T data 
 
Where usage is not concentrated, however, technological change has not had nearly the same impact on costs.  The 
nontraffic-sensitive and customer-specific loop that connects every subscriber to the central office have not 
experienced anywhere near the technological change that has occurred in the long-distance  and other traffic-
sensitive portions of the industry.  For low volume nodes, the copper cable pairs continued, until recently, to 
represent the least-cost technology.  Still, fiber optic distribution and microwave bypass have become 
economically viable in large office buildings. 
In recent years, telephone networks have been substantially digitized.  Digital bits traveling on the information 
highway can be parts of voice, video, or of a database or other computer applications.  Voice is treated as data with 
specific time requirements.  Digital convergence has, therefore, blurred the boundary between voice telephony and 
data services.  If regulation-imposed price discrimination between voice and data is eliminated, arbitrage can lead 
to dramatic reductions in the price of voice calls that use relatively few bits.  This has important implications for 
pricing and market structure.  Internet-based telecommunications services already pose a serious threat to 
traditional domestic and international long-distance service providers.  As the bandwidth to customers’ homes 
increases, voice over IP is likely to become a viable option to wireline telephone.  The old monolithic structure of 
the telephone industry is clearly both inappropriate and unsustainable  
 
Source: Noll (2000). 
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Fig. 1.3  Fixed and Mobile Users (World, Millions)  
 
Source: ITU 
As radio technology in the form of microwave 
challenged more traditional long-distance 
transmission systems, so radio technology in a new 
form is effectively challenging the traditional 





The rapid growth of cellular telephony (Fig. 
1.3) in particular threatens to diminish the 
importance of scale and natural monopoly 
associated  with the conventional local loop.  
Cellular telephones are very obvious substitutes 
for wireline service.  In the early stages of its 
development, wireless was positioned in the 
market as a premium product that delivered 
mobility as well as connectivity and was more 
expensive than wireline—as such, it was mostly 
a supplement for basic telephony.  
However, the costs of wireless have been declining and in many cases (e.g. in low subscriber 
density areas) it is cheaper than wireline.  Consequently, their substitutability will increase over 
time.  Moreover, the much flatter average cost curves of wireless indicate that size does not confer 
any significant cost advantages.  It is now cost effective to have several competing providers of 
local telecommunications services--
regulated monopoly is no longer the 
optimal  market structure.  The 
implications for developing countries 
with underdeveloped fixed networks, 
especially in low density rural areas, are enormous. 
  Technological change in the transportation sectors has been evolutionary, rather than 
revolutionary as in telecommunications and to some extent, electricity.  The introduction of the jet 
engine in the 1950s and 1960s and the increase in aircraft sizes and loads made possible by the 
turbofan engine and improved airframe design, led to a continuous decline in operating costs and 
changed dramatically the competitive landscape in long-distance passenger and even freight 
transport.  Beginning in the early 1970s, however, new engine, track, and signaling technologies   15
Fig. 1.4  Rate of Rejection of Privatization  




Source: Estache (2002a) 
made high train speeds possible, restoring some o f rail’s lost competitive advantage.  The 
introduction of multiple-axle trucks and improved road engineering altered significantly the terms 
of competition between trucking and railroads in freight transport.  Moreover, containerization, 
advances in freight logistics and information technologies (e.g. real time tracking of freight 
containers), and intermodalism have profoundly affected both the organization and conduct of 
transportation markets.  In the water sector, advances in telemetry and satellite imaging techniques 
show considerable promise for the efficient management of scarce resources.          
 
Promises, Perils and Tradeoffs  
Just a few years ago, privatization was heralded as the elixir that would transform ailing and 
lethargic state-owned enterprises into sources of creative productivity and dynamism for the public 
interest.  National leaders burdened by sizeable budget deficits and stagnating economies were 
outspoken on the need to foster private initiative as a means of promoting growth and prosperity and 
enhancing the economic opportunities of all citizens.  Multilateral institutions offered advice and 
added stimulus to this movement among their national recipients of aid.  The world-wide press 
provided a near harmony of voices in praise of the new trend in policy thinking (Willig 1994). 
Recently, the alleged “failures” of privatization have led to street riots, skeptical press coverage 
and mounting criticism of multilateral 
institutions.  This hostility is not limited to a 
few radical protesters.  Opinion polls in 
several DTEs, especially in Latin America, 
reveal growing public dissatisfaction and 
disenchantment with privatization (Fig. 
1.4).  The disapproval ratings in 2001 were 
higher than 2000, and the latter were higher 
than 1998.  Almost 8 0 percent of the 
Argentines polled in 2001 disapproved of 
the privatization process.  Employee 
layoffs, price increases, perceived long delays in benefits, and the distributional impacts of 
privatization have all contributed to this disillusionment.   16
Efficiency Impacts of Privatization and Liberalization—Grounds for Cautious Optimism 
The future course of privatization and regulatory reform in the DTEs will be determined not only by 
the prevailing economic and political philosophies, and macroeconomic conditions, but also by the 
collective assessment of the record so far. A review of the evidence suggests that while there have 
been disappointments, there have been substantial gains that are not always obvious.  However, 
seeing a clear picture of results is difficult because the performance of each network utility is multi-
faceted and different observers may weigh various aspects of performance differently.  It is even less 
possible to reach an unequivocal verdict about the effects of privatization and regulatory reform on 
the diverse collection of network utilities and countries that have experienced them in varying ways 
and degrees.  Assessment is further complicated by the very short time span of privatization, 
restructuring and major regulatory reforms in the majority of DTEs; by the severe measurement 
problems with respect to important economic variables; and by the fact that privatization and 
regulatory reform were implemented simultaneously, so it is virtually impossible to econometrically 
identify their separate effects. (Only in the United States, where the structure of ownership remained 
constant, changes in performance can be confidently traced to changes in the regulatory regime.) 
  All of the above measurement difficulties notwithstanding, most of the empirical evaluations of 
privatization and restructuring seem to be favorable (Gray 2001, Megginson and Netter 2001).  At 
the microeconomic level, the emerging empirical evidence provides support to the view that 
privatization has positive effects on efficiency (labor and total factor productivity), financial 
performance of utilities, and service expansion.  This empirical support is derived from a variety of 
studies that analyze the pre- and post-privatization performance of specific firms, a cross-section of 
firms from different industries within a given country, and a cross-section of firms from different 
countries (Galal et al 1994, Bourbakri and Cosset 1998, Dewenter and Malatesta 2000, Sheshinski 
and Lopez-Calva 2000, Delfino and Casarin 2001, Torero and Pasco-Font 2001). 
  Other studies, however, are somewhat more equivocal about the economic gains resulting from 
privatization alone.  The success or failure of privatization is found to depend on the post-
privatization regulatory governance (Levy and Spiller 1996, Bortolotti et al 1998, Torp and Revke 
1998, Jamasb and Pollitt 2000, Villalonga 2000, Arocena and Price, 2002) and the extent to which 
competition is introduced in the market (Bouin and Michalet 1991, Kwoka 1996, Kleit and Terrell 
2001, Zhang et al 2002).          17
  A detailed assessment of the post-reform performance of the transportation, electricity and water 
sectors is presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5.  The analysis below is confined to the privatization and 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector, because it represents the most distinctive illustration 
of changing public policy towards infrastructure and the sector with the largest reform experience to 
date in the DTEs. 
The Case of Telecommunications 
Several studies provide evidence that privatization has a strong impact on network expansion.  A 
study of telecommunications in Argentina, Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela found significant 
increases in the rates of network expansion following privatization.  For example, the Jamaican 
telecommunications firm increased network expansion from 4.5 percent in the 11 years before 
privatization to 18 percent per year in the first four years following privatization.  Entel, the 
Argentine telecommunications firm, increased network expansion from about 6 percent per year in 
the decade before privatization to over 14 percent per year after privatization.  In these instances, the 
network expansion resulted from a three or four-fold increase in capital expenditure compared to the 
period before privatization ( Ramamurti 
1996). 
The analysis of a cross sample of both 
developing and developed countries found 
similar results on the impact of privatization 
on the performance of telecommunications 
firms.  Holding other factors constant, 
privatization was positively associated with 
both a higher level of main lines per 100 
inhabitants and higher growth in main lines 
per 100 inhabitants.  This finding held true for low-income countries.  For example, in countries 
with GDP per capita less than $10,000 that have privatized their telecommunications system, main 
lines per 100 inhabitants was 30.8 percent higher and growth in main lines per 100 inhabitants was 
129 percent higher (Ros 1999).  Moreover, privatization is positively associated with increases in 




































Figure 1.5  Percentage Change in Rate of 
Telecommunications Network Expansion 
Following Privatization
(C) Countries with per capita CDP<10,000
Sources: (1)= Ramamurti (1996);  (2) = Ros (1999)  18
The level and form of efficiency 
benefits available under private 
participation depend in large part on 
incentives created by competition and 
the regulatory framework (Newbery 
1997). 
efficiency gains seem to have resulted from better incentives and productivity, rather than from 
wholesale firing of employees  (Bortolotti et al 2001). 
  While these results of privatization are encouraging, there is evidence that their magnitude and 
incidence depend critically on the extent to which the 
market is liberalized and the effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime.  The impact of competition can be 
particularly powerful, and Ros (1999) found that the 
introduction of both competition and privatization in 
telecommunications resulted in greater efficiency improvements than either policy alone.  The 
analysis of a cross-section of 30 African and Latin American telecommunications industries reveals 
that privatization has a significant impact on performance only when it is combined with an 
independent regulator (Wallsten 2001).  
In Latin America, countries that granted monopoly rights of 6 to 10 years to their privatized 
telecommunications operators achieved 1.5 
times higher network expansion rates than 
those achieved under state ownership but only 
half the rate of growth of countries where the 
government retained the right to issues 
competing licenses at any time (Wellenius 
1997).  The complementarity between 
privatization and competition in spurring 
capacity expansion is confirmed by the cross-
section analysis of wireline 
telecommunications performance in a large 
number of developing countries (Laffont and 
N’Guessan 2002, Li and Xu 2001).  The beneficial impact of liberalization is also confirmed by the 
analysis of the mobile markets of several small and middle-sized emerging economies (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Romania, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines).  There is strong evidence that the 
introduction of a competing cellular operator typically resulted in lower prices, wider service 

























Figure 1.6  Telecom Line Growth Rates in 
Latin America 
Source:  Wellenius (1997).  19
that resulted from competition stimulated demand in the market and led to increased subscribership 
for all competitors, including the incumbent wireline operator  (Rohlfs et al 2000).      
Distributive Impacts of Privatization and Regulation—Need for Caution 
The apparent discrepancy between scholarly assessments of privatization and public perceptions 
may result because they use different yardsticks and time horizons.  Consumers dislike higher 
prices, even if they result in better service.  Similarly, the public dislikes labor retrenchment even 
when overstaffing was obvious.  Tariff rebalancing, while necessary, could hurt the poor.  A more 
comprehensive welfare assessment of privatization is required that incorporates the effects on 
households across different expenditure categories and on workers, in addition to impacts on firm 
profitability and other elements of industry performance.   
Recent empirical work offers some important insights on the distributive impacts of privatization 
and regulation in the network utilities and highlights an important trap of the reform process in the 
DTEs: weak regulatory capacity.  An analysis of the changes in welfare, as measured by consumer 
surplus, due to post-privatization price and access changes in the Argentine utilities confirms that 
the magnitude of these welfare changes differs across income groups and services.  Welfare gains 
were achieved in telecommunications and electricity, but losses were experienced in gas and 
sanitation.  Moreover, the alterations in the level and structure of prices seem to have affected poor 
households more severely, or to have provided the least benefit to this group (Delfino and Casarin 
2001). 
However, studies employing computable general equilibrium models found that all income 
classes in Argentina had benefited from the efficiency, quality, and access improvements due to the 
privatization of utilities beginning in 1990 (Chisari et al 1999, Navajas 2000).  The provision of 
more efficient infrastructure services affects most other sectors of the economy and promotes 
general economic growth, which in turn enhances the economic opportunities facing the poor 
(Kraay and Dollar 2000).  When these general equilibrium effects are taken into account, the 
poorest groups seem to benefit the most from the improvements in productivity and increased 
access that were brought about by the privatization reforms (Benitez et al 2001).  The results of a 
recent research project analyzing the welfare effects of privatization in four Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Nicaragua) indicate that there is no clear pattern 
concerning price changes—prices went down in about half of the cases.  However, there were   20
Box 1.5  Prerequisites of Effective Privatization 
•  A suitable set of institutions, a suitable  
legal system, and a country-specific strategy 
•  Market-friendly institutional framework 
•  A microeconomic structure open to competition
•  An effective system of regulation 
  
adverse distributive impacts on the bottom half of the income distribution due to the significant 
employment contractions within the privatized utilities.  The negative distributive impacts of layoffs 
and price rebalancing were more than offset by the corresponding increases in access by the poor, 
enhanced service quality, and the changed structure of public finances that benefited the poor more 
(McKenzie and Mokherjee 2002). 
  There is an evident discrepancy between the accumulating statistical evidence and popular 
perceptions about the effects of privatization, and none of the studies reviewed here can offer an 
adequate explanation for the increasing popular disenchantment with the reform process. Certainly, 
it is possible that due to data limitations and perhaps even methodological flaws, the statistical 
models do not accurately measure the true welfare impact of the reforms.  It is equally possible that 
public perceptions are subject to systematic biases.  The benefits of reform are generally diffused 
across a large number of consumers whose individualized gains are relatively modest--certainly not 
the topic headline news.  On the other hand, firing half the employees of a large utility is more likely 
to lead to protests and attract media attention, even if the specific employment contraction is small 
in relation to the country’s aggregate labor force.  Psychologists have found that individuals exhibit 
“loss aversion”—they react more strongly to losses than to gains relative to the status quo.  They 
also tend to have a short time horizon--they focus much more on the immediate effects of policy 
reforms that might require painful adjustments, while they discount heavily the gains flowing in the 
future.          
The Perils 
Privatization’s bad name is probably not fully 
deserved.  Some of the difficulties are the result 
of illusion and misunderstanding by the public, 
and of poor communication by  the political 
leadership.  The impatience with the long delays 
before some of the benefits of privatization 
emerge reveals a lack of recognition that even in the prosperous industrialized economies, many 
major institutional reforms took decades to bear full fruit (Baumol 1993).  But public support 
determines policies.  It is therefore not enough to show that privatization  generally improves 
matters: one must design policies that ensure that they do – and are seen to have done so.   21
Table 1.4  Exclusivity Period of the Incumbent 










Argentina  LD  ND  ID  1990  10    
Bolivia  LD  ND  ID  1995  6    
Brazil  LD  ND  ID  1998  0.5    
Chile   -   -   -   -   -    
Colombia   -   -   -   -   -    
Ecuador  LD  ND  ID  1995  5    
El Salvador   -   -   -   -   -    
Guatemala   -   -   -   -   -    
Honduras  LD  ND  ID  1995  10    
Mexico   -  ND  ID  1990  6    
Nicaragua  LD  ND  ID  1995  4    
Panama  LD  ND  ID  1997  5    
Peru  LD  ND  ID  1994  5    
Venezuela  LD  ND  ID  1991  9    
              
LD= Local Distance            
ND= National Distance          
ID= International Distance        
The negative popular perceptions might also be symptomatic of a process that at times has been 
deeply flawed.  Inter-country experience reveals the institutional preconditions for privatization to 
achieve its public interest objectives (Guislain 1992 and Box 1.5).  To the extent that in some 
countries privatization was pushed in the absence of such institutional safeguards, it was clearly 
oversold as the solution to the problems facing the DTEs.  The advocates of privatization may have 
overestimated its benefits and underestimated its costs and prerequisites.  A change in the structure 
of ownership involves a tradeoff between different types of cost (Laffont and Tirole 1991). 
 
The First Trap: Privatization Without Competitive Restructuring 
Fiscally strapped governments could raise more revenues by selling the utility as a monopoly – 
with regulations that ensure this rather than promote competition – and some have done so.  
Prospective investors and the underwriting investment banks (whose success fees are generally 
 
calculated as a percentage of the sales price) naturally encouraged these predilections.  With the 
intuitively appealing presumption that even a poorly designed privatization is better than continued 
state ownership, the international financial institutions supported such structural decisions in their 
client countries to “seize the window of 
political opportunity”. 
Exclusivity provisions in the privatized 
utilities are quite common and are 
rationalized on several grounds.  It is argued 
that profit margins need to be maintained at 
high levels to finance the substantial new 
investment required; that competitive entry 
would harm universal service goals, 
because new entrants would be willing to 
supply only low-cost, high demand 
customers, undermining existing cross-
subsidy systems; and that domestic market 
conditions are too weak and uncertain to   22
When the appropriate framework and 
fundamental structural conditions are in 
place to make post-privatization competition 
reasonably feasible, it would harm the public 
interest to privatize a monopoly via some 
form of exclusivity arrangements. The cross-
country privatization experience in the 
telecommunications sector provides strong 
support to this claim.  The added fiscal 
benefit that might be forthcoming to the 
treasury from privatizing a protected
monopoly is not worth the added costs to 
consumers from having to deal with a 
monopoly, to say nothing of the subsequent 
losses to the economy from foregone industry 
vitality and progressiveness. 
attract foreign investors without the assurances offered by exclusivity (Laffont and N’Gbo 2000). 
The tradeoffs are quite clear.  Longer exclusivity implies a higher bid price and hence high up-
front privatization proceeds, while a shorter exclusivity would stimulate the economy through 
competition and lead to higher recurring tax revenues.  However, part of the core argument in 
support of exclusivity is economically flawed and has predictably led to post-privatization 
problems. 
  A longer exclusivity naturally elicits a higher bid piece because a stream of monopoly profits is 
more valuable than a stream of competitive returns.  However, in the absence of a substantial state 
subsidy for customers with a low ability to pay, the high monopoly prices under exclusivity reduce 
the demand for service.  So monopoly would lead to less, not more, private investment.  By 
contrast, lower competitive prices—so long as they yield the revenue level necessary for the 
network utilities to compete equally with other firms for available financing in order to maintain, 
replace, modernize, and expand their facilities and services—-would increase demand and therefore 
lead to more, not less, private investment.  This argument is especially powerful in the developing 
countries where a significant portion of the population is characterized by a low ability to pay (Noll 
2001). 
One of the main arguments against 
liberalization is that it conflicts with network 
development and the promotion of universal 
service, under the logic that profit-maximizing 
firms will not find it profitable to extend service 
to the marginal subscribers.  The emerging 
empirical evidence casts doubt on the validity 
of this argument, especially in  the 
telecommunications sector.  The results from 
several empirical studies (cited above) 
analyzing the performance of 
telecommunications in the DTEs seem to 
indicate that market liberalization spurs, and exclusivity protection retards, network development.  
Granting a temporary telephone monopoly increases significantly the firm’s sale price, but at the   23
Box 1.6  Getting Out of the Exclusivity Trap Can 
Be Very Costly 
 
In January 1994, Lattelekom, was formed as a joint 
venture between the Republic of Latvia (51%) and 
Tilts Communications (41%) and was granted a 20-
year fixed line monopoly.  Tilts Communications 
committed to invest US$160 million in Lattelekom 
over a 3 -year period in return for the 49% equity 
stake.  When in 1999, the government of Latvia 
unilaterally shortened the Lattlekom exclusivity from 
2013 to 2003, Tilts Communications demanded 
compensation in the amount of US$380 million.  A 
protracted legal battle ensued which impeded the 
development of the sector. 
Tilts Communications is jointly owned by Sonera of 
Finland (90%) and the IFC (10%). 
  
 
cost of reducing investment: exclusivity reduces network expansion by between 10 to 40 percent, 
and the annual growth rate of the network by more than 2 percent (Wallsten 2000). 
  Countries are learning from their mistakes, and those of others.  In Latin America, early movers 
such as Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela offered between 6 and 10 years of exclusivity in their 
telecommunications sectors in the early 1990s.  In the mid-1990s, the second wave of reformers 
(Peru, Bolivia and Panama) offered exclusivities between 5 and 6 years. By 1998, small and poor 
countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador were able to sell their telecommunications companies 
with no exclusivity at all.  These countries were able to attract a large number of operators as well. 
The damaging consequences of exclusivity are likely to be particularly severe in poor countries 
where the incumbent state-owned monopoly 
has not provided reliable nation-wide service.  
Those who remain without a connection to the 
formal monopoly network, especially the rural 
poor, could benefit by the availability of 
alternative suppliers who might utilize more 
effectively advances in technology and offer a 
wider  range of price/service options than the 
incumbent monopolist.   In the absence of 
competitive pressure, the privatized monopolist 
may remain lethargic and not innovate or 
expand coverage, especially if it is restricted by 
uniform pricing rules.  Efficient solutions to the problem of expanding access, especially to the poor 
rural areas, will require a variety of approaches that exploit all technological opportunities and 
experiment with alternative forms of organizing supply.  Exclusivity clearly undermines  the 
potential for such service innovation.   
The Second Trap: Weak Regulatory Capacity 
  Especially during the early years of the privatization process, establishing appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms to curb the potential abuse of monopoly power was subordinated to the immediate goal 
of closing transactions.  Such attention as was given to regulation focused on creating the regulatory 
entities and writing their charters to meet the formal requirements of the privatization process or the   24
conditions of international organizations.   Regulatory institutions were often created through 
simply replication of the systems from advanced industrial nations, mainly the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  
  Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of the problems and the reality gap characterizing this 
“regulatory policy transfer” to the DTEs.   There was an unrealistically hopeful and fundamentally 
wrong presumption underlying the prefabricated approach to regulatory institutions in some DTEs: 
that if the issues of funding, organizational design, and internal procedural safeguards were 
resolved, somehow satisfactory regulatory performance would emerge, serving the public interest.  
This approach underestimated the probability that the same forces of political interference that 
rendered public enterprises in these countries such effective instruments for collecting and 
dispensing favors to constituents and special interest groups would seek to preserve these status quo 
benefits, by deliberately weakening the regulatory process. 
It should have been expected that fiscally constrained governments in continual search of tax 
revenues would be tempted to retain political control of the regulatory process, leaving monopoly 
rents to the operators and subsequently taxing them away, rather than distributing the efficiency 
gains from privatization to consumers (Estache 2002).  Because of deliberate government actions, 
or a historic lack of acceptance and understanding of the importance of separation of powers, it has 
proven exceedingly  difficult to establish and maintain regulatory independence in the DTEs.  
Regulatory effectiveness was further undermined by the scarcity of technical expertise.  
One Model Doesn’t Fit All—Choosing Among Imperfect Systems 
One clear lesson that has emerged from the restructuring of network utilities during the past two 
decades is that there is no universally appropriate reform model (Laffont 2001, 2002).  Every 
restructuring and privatization program needs to explicitly take into account the important specific 
features of each utility (its underlying economic attributes and the technological conditions of its 
production) as well as the country’s relevant economic, institutional, social and political 
characteristics.  The cookie-cutter approach to  reform is unlikely to work and would predictably 
lead to problems for the public interest. 
The limits of state ownership are numerous and widely accepted.  However, the fact that state 
ownership is flawed does not imply that private enterprise is a superior form of organization for all 
infrastructural activities and in every country setting.  Before state ownership is supplanted by   25
another institutional mechanism it is essential to carefully assess the properties and requirements of 
the proposed alternative—not only in general but also specifically with respect to the activity and 
country in question (Box 1.4).  
The benefits from privatization derive from the changed incentive structures facing firms.  
However, those incentives will also depend upon the competitive and regulatory framework in 
which the privatized firms operate (Vickers and Yarrow 1991).  In many DTEs, the opportunities for 
introducing competition in the utilities appear limited due to the small size of their markets.  
Establishing the effective regulatory mechanisms that are needed, especially in the face of such 
naturally monopolistic small markets, is likely to be impeded by the lack of technical expertise and 
institutional preconditions (such as well-developed accounting systems), as well as by a resistant 
political and administrative culture.  Thus, the relationships between privatization, incentives and 
efficiency are complex and the difference between public and private ownership in the DTEs will 
frequently be much less distinct than in countries with deeper private sector traditions and stronger 
institutions. 
Arguably, the most compelling case for privatization and liberalization that can be made in the 
DTEs, is in the telecommunications sector because: (i) revolutionary technological change has 
almost entirely eliminated natural monopoly; (ii) in most developing countries coverage ratios have 
been very low and the potential gains from relaxing restrictions on entry could be substantial; (iii) 
the cross-subsidies embedded in monopoly pricing structures could not be defended on equity 
grounds, since most of those who had telephone connection were relatively well-off; (iv) the scope 
for pricing flexibility to alleviate supply shortages is significant, because of the high willingness of 
consumers to pay for new and better services and the sector is amenable to competition.  Because of 
their financial, technical, and managerial resources, private sector entities may indeed have a 
distinct advantage in keeping abreast of this increasingly complex industry. 
In many segments of the transportation sector (rail, ports, trucking, airlines, inter-urban busing) 
the pressures of inter- and intra-modal competition are sufficient in most countries to justify 
substantial liberalization and privatization.  It is difficult for regulators or service providers to 
predict what are efficient and market-responsive vertical relationships and combinations of logistical 
roles among various rail entities, truckers, barge operators, port operators, air carriers, warehouses, 
forwarders, etc.  The experience from both the advanced industrial economies and DTEs confirms 
what theory predicts: decentralized market-oriented decision-making that is freed from excessive   26
Box 1.4  Privatization May Not Be Always Advisable   
 
Advice on privatization needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the circumstances of the particular sector 
in the country concerned.  The case of power generation in Brazil illustrates how even policy recommendations that 
make sense in most contexts can be out of place. 
 The distinctive feature of Brazil’s electricity system is that it is predominantly (95%) hydro-based, with large multi-
year storage dams. In contrast to almost all other countries, the long-run marginal cost of additional hydro investment 
is probably lower than that of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). The dams are multi-use, and managing them for 
irrigation and other water uses requires close basin-wide coordination between the water management authorities and 
power dispatch.  
These conditions create the strongest case for public ownership and operation of the dams, while being the least 
propitious for a competitive, privately owned generation market. Investing in multi-use hydroelectric projects that 
need coordinated regulation would entail considerable private investor risk. Dams are entirely front-end loaded, with 
negligible running costs but massive investment costs. The gains from private operation are thus likely to be small, 
and the risks that prices will be held down in periods of tight demand high. Investing in CCGT is equally unattractive 
to private financing.  Even though from a least-cost system ex pansion viewpoint, some low capital cost, flexible plant 
may be desirable, the thermal capacity would only operate in drought years, with an overall load factor probably less 
than 35%.  The power price would be set by hydro and would likely be unremunerative for CCGT without special 
payments for its role as emergency capacity or reserve. 
It is therefore very unlikely that private ownership is an efficient way to plan, develop and finance the power 
generation sector in Brazil. It is an open question whether it would ever be in countries requiring large-scale, multi-
use river basis management schemes. The most favorable circumstances would be for dams whose sole use is for 
hydro-electricity, and where the price of electricity is set by thermal plant, as in Chile and Argentina. Private 
involvement in generation has a comparative advantage where timely construction and maintenance are required to 
deliver possible efficiency benefits, but is least likely to work in predominantly hydro systems. 
 
Source: Newbery (2001). 
regulatory controls and energized by market incentives is the surest means of finding and 
implementing efficient and innovative solutions to the needs for these transport modes.  However, it 
is important to draw a distinction between transport services, which are generally competitive or 
contestable, and the  physical infrastructure facilities, which may exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics.  The case for privatizing the transport infrastructure is clearly much less compelling 
than that of services operating on the physical network.  The rail track, basic and access port 
infrastructure, and certain portions of airport facilities, where monopoly is unavoidable or 
substantial amounts of sunk capital are involved, must be regulated or even operated by the public 
sector.  
Electricity restructuring and privatization in the context of the DTEs is more problematic.  
Wholesale competition worked well in the developed economies because of excess capacity, modest 
demand growth, and the availability of gas that enabled entry of gas-fired plants at modest scale and 
relatively low cost.  In contrast, the electricity markets of many DTEs face great excess demand, 
capacity shortages, and periodic blackouts.  The experience from California has demonstrated that 
market liberalization under conditions of tight demand can lead to serious problems--market   27
clearing prices would be politically unacceptable, and would likely derail any attempts at radical 
liberalization. 
  Electricity prices have been historically low and their realignment with underlying costs has been 
politically prevented in most DTEs.  Private entrants facing significant sunk costs would naturally 
demand a credible commitment  that future prices would be consistent with revenue adequacy.  
However, most of these countries have not put in place the needed regulatory mechanisms for 
providing such a credible commitment.  In several developing countries attempts to raise tariffs in 
the face of acute power shortages have led to street riots.  Moreover, the electricity markets in many 
DTEs  are relatively small—60 developing countries have a system peak load below 150 megawatts 
(MWs), 30 between 150 and 500 MWs, and another 20 between 500 and 1,000 MWs (Bacon 1994).  
Under the most favorable circumstances, the opportunities for introducing competition in such small 
systems will be limited.  And even in a very large market such as that of Brazil, particular sectoral 
conditions can make privatization of electricity generation nonviable (Box 1.4).  So clearly, the 
suitability of privatization to this sector needs to be very carefully assessed on the basis of the 
circumstances in each case. 
  The scope for introducing competition in the supply of water and sewerage services is much 
more limited in comparison to the other network utilities.  Local networks of pipes and sewers 
remain the quintessential natural monopolies.  Moreover, unbundling is not as attractive because the 
resulting benefits from increased competition in supply are likely to be considerably less than in 
other network utilities--the costs of producing water are relatively low in relation to the value added 
at the transportation stage, although this may vary across countries.  The opportunities for 
introducing competition in sewage treatment, on the other hand, are of greater significance.  Overall, 
franchising is likely to be the most effective way of increasing competition in the sector.      
National Goals for Regulation in Developing and Transition Economies 
Regulation has as its general purpose to promote efficient markets and to correct for market failures.  
In the infrastructure sectors which have been newly liberalized and privatized, regulation needs to 
focus on certain key principles to support market functioning: 
•  Ensuring incentives for investment—so that the reforms draw resources into the sector to 
expand, modernize and improve the quality of infrastructure facilities and services     28
•  Promoting fair competition—by easing barriers to entry and allowing access of entrants to the 
network infrastructure  
•  Facilitating innovation—by focusing on goals to be achieved, leave operators and investors 
leeway to introduce more efficient technologies and find innovative service arrangements. 
  The regulator also has a major role to play to promote the public interest where market forces 
cannot.  This includes: 
•  Pursuing social fairness and universal service 
•  Protecting public health and safety, and avoiding harm to the environment 
•  Ensuring that even where the private sector takes the lead, services are minimally reliable and 
networks interoperable. 
These principles apply to regulation in any country. But the developing and transition economies, 
to varying degrees, pose four special challenges that realign the priorities and tighten the 
institutional constraints confronting regulators  (Laffont 2000, Smith, 2000).  These issues are the 
following: 
  The need for access.  In industrialized countries (and in the relatively better-off transition 
countries), most residents have access to electricity, telephone service, in-house piped water, 
sewerage, and good transportation alternatives.  Regulation can therefore focus on maintaining 
overall incentives for efficiency and modernization.  But in the developing countries, often the 
majority of the population does not have access to these services at even a basic standard, and 
transportation and communication networks are sparse and very low quality.   Large shares of the 
population—many millions of people—live in relatively low-density rural areas, and in urban 
slums, where traditional utilities do not reach.  The effectiveness of any regulatory strategy must be 
judged by its ability to meet the goal of expanding access to basic services, rather than just 
improving the convenience of those who already have service. 
Limited affordability.  In the developed countries citizens and firms are sensitive to the pricing of 
infrastructure services but for relatively few is affordability a major hardship.  But among the poor 
of the DTEs the costs of connection to infrastructure networks are often prohibitive, and past 
policies have discouraged a large-scale search for l ower cost alternatives.  Many poor people 
demonstrate a willingness and ability to pay the costs of efficient service provision if it were 
offered.  Any regulatory strategy must seek to promote affordability by encouraging reduction of the 
costs of provision, and by providing workable and effective subsidies where needed.   29
Weak administrative and regulatory capacity. Many, if not most, of the developing and transition 
economies have an extreme scarcity of the qualified administrators and technical personnel  who 
have both the training and experience to serve as effective regulators.  Even the most dedicated 
professionals are handicapped in their roles by difficulties of communications and access to 
information within the country, shortages of middle-level personnel, and institutional norms that 
impede oversight by civil society and tolerate corruption.  Such capacity constraints create an extra 
burden of proving that regulatory designs will be feasible and will promote net social benefits. 
Political and regulatory risk.  Most industrialized countries have relatively stable political 
systems and independent judiciaries, and private investors enjoy a basic trust that their rights will be 
protected without undue risk.  But many DTEs are still undergoing fundamental political and 
institutional transformations.  The private sector therefore perceives less security and higher 
political risks in making long-term investments, and therefore is wary of regulatory discretion.  
Without adequate safeguards against the misuse of regulation, investment flows will be discouraged 
and prices higher than needed. 
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I 
Box 2.1 Characteristics of Developing 
Countries 
 
•  Lack of institutional checks and balances
•  Low government credibility 
•  High incidence of capture and corruption 
•  Scarcity of technical expertise 
•  Poor auditing technologies  
•  Inefficient tax systems 
 
Source: Laffont (1996). 
CHAPTER TWO 
Designing Regulatory Mechanisms 
n an era of rapid change, one of the most challenging tasks facing policymakers in 
developing countries and transition economies (DTEs) is how to manage the 
transformation from exercising direct operational control through state ownership to a 
more independent process of regulatory oversight. When the privatization reforms were 
introduced, the DTEs had few precedents to guide their design of regulatory mechanisms. Before 
the 1980s, the state owned and operated core infrastructure industries in the vast majority of nations, 
usually as part of sectoral ministries. Only a handful of countries had privately owned infrastructure 
sectors. Those countries based their regulatory policy on the principle that these industries were 
mostly durable monopolies, and the substantive goal of regulation was to capture the efficiency 
benefits of natural monopoly without exploiting the consumers. 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a dramatic, worldwide reassessment of the role of the state in the 
infrastructure sectors and of the view that most components of these industries were natural 
monopolies. As the DTEs began to restructure and privatize these industries, they looked to the 
experience of countries that were first to adopt this approach: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand.  But these countries are advanced, industrial economies with a long 
tradition of market capitalism.  They have decades of experience with the legal institutions needed 
to support a market economy, and their well-developed educational systems teach the analytical 
methods needed to effectively regulate large private monopolies while facilitating entry to the 
market and promoting competition. Not having these 
background conditions, the DTEs faced the much more 
difficult task of creating new, effective regulatory 
mechanisms (Gray 1998; Noll 2000). 
  The international agencies, investment banks, and 
financial advisers encouraged the rapid development of 
these new mechanisms in many DTEs. Under external 
pressures the DTEs speedily adopted templates from the advanced industrial economies (especially   31
the United Kingdom and the United States). With few exceptions, the specificities of these 
developing economies (Box 2.1) received little attention. Only broad-brush attempts were made to 
match regulatory regimes to each country’s institutional and structural inheritance (Laffont 2001), 
and models based on conditions and practices in industrial countries frequently led to only partial 
success or even outright failure.  Some notable examples of not getting the fit right include: the 
Philippines, where in the face of a weak judiciary, the adoption of the quasi-judicial US model in the 
telecommunications and energy sectors led to significant regulatory failure (Smith and Wellenius, 
1999); and Jamaica, where the adoption of a US-style Public Utility Commission without the 
constitutional protections and well developed rules of administrative due process that are prevalent 
in the US, led to serious regulatory instability that culminated in the nationalization of 
telecommunications in 1975 (Levy and Spiller, 1993).  
  Before privatization, the state had an all-embracing role in the infrastructure sectors of the DTEs. 
The ownership, operational, policy, and regulatory functions were typically fused, even if they were 
exercised separately by various agencies of government. Not surprisingly, governments, especially 
line ministries, were reluctant to relegate the important regulatory function to independent agencies. 
They were also reluctant to limit their own interest to that of policy oversight: assessing industry 
developments, reviewing the adequacy of policy in light of these developments, and enacting 
legislative changes (Criales and Smith 1997). In Brazil, for example, the ministries of 
communications and mines and energy have sought to recapture some of the functions absorbed by 
regulatory agencies (Landau 2002). In Morocco, the telecommunications regulator (Agence national 
de réglementation des télécommunications), an exemplary regulatory agency in the world, has been 
in a continuing struggle with the ministry (Secrétariat d’État chargé de la poste et des technologies 
des télécommunications et de l’information) (Samarajiva, Mahan, and Barendse 2002). Most, if not 
all, new regulatory agencies likely fail to meet the prevalent expectation that they be independent of 
government and insulated from political control—an important prerequisite if privatization is to 
achieve its public interest objectives. 
  State-owned enterprises were organized to achieve a variety of political objectives, rather than to 
solve market failures (Guasch and Hahn 1999). They have effectively extracted rents and allocated 
these and other advantages to organized interests and political groups. In many instances, they have 
been vehicles for the corrupt activities of opportunistic public officials and other self-interested 
individuals. There is a clear danger that such rent-seeking coalitions would subvert the regulatory   32
Box 2.2. Argentina: Repeating the Mistakes of U.S. 
Regulation 
 
A review of the regulatory i ssues in the Argentine electricity 
sector in 1995 revealed that the system of pricing of transmission 
services was not market based but a version of economically 
meaningless accounting allocations. For example, payments for a 
new transmission line were based on a determination of the 
beneficiaries of the line and their calculated levels of “energy” 
benefits. These assessments were somewhat unrelated to the 
markets or to incremental transmission costs. Moreover, they 
depended on a version of the fully distributed cost methodology 
of allocating common and fixed costs, a method that was 
abandoned a decade earlier by regulators in the United States, 
where it was considered a major factor in the deterioration of 
performance, and virtual bankruptcy, of the railroad industry.  
 
Source: Willig (1995). 
process to avoid financial loss from privatization and competition. Groups exploit regulatory 
institutions and processes to their own self-serving ends in the advanced industrial economies as 
well. However, social welfare is at much greater risk in the DTEs because of the weak rule of law, 
the culture of cronyism and clientelism, and the high incidence of corruption in these countries. The 
substantial risks that these types of political and regulatory capture pose to the public interest have 
been largely ignored by the international privatization advisers and donor bodies (Laffont 2002).
6 
  For regulatory mechanisms to make their intended contribution to social welfare, they need to be 
geared to the local capacity. H owever, almost all regulatory principles have been developed by 
advanced industrial economies and have substantial informational requirements. Their practical 
implementation in most DTEs is likely to be difficult because of severe measurement problems with 
respect to the relevant economic variables and the lack of technical skills. For example, the use of 
long-run incremental costs, a key concept in public utility pricing in industrial economies, is likely 
to be hampered in most DTEs by their lack of proper accounting systems (Laffont 1996). At least in 
the medium term, until they develop indigenous economic and technical expertise, they will need 
simple regulatory mechanisms—workable rules, second best perhaps, but consistent with local 
capacity. Further analytic work and technical assistance from international agencies are urgently 
needed. 
There is also a need to critically 
evaluate the weaknesses of regulatory 
models from the advanced industrial 
economies before applying the 
models in the DTEs. For example, 
policymakers in the DTEs need to 
understand clearly what went wrong 
with regulation in the United States 
and elsewhere so not repeat the same 
mistakes (Box 2.2) (Joskow and Noll 
1994). The lack of such critical 
                                                 
6 There are some notables exceptions.  In a series of papers dealing with the architecture of regulatory governance in 
the DTEs, that provided the analytic foundation for the World Bank’s assistance in this area,  Warrick Smith has 
explicitly addressed the problem of regulatory and political capture and how it might affect the optimal design of 
regulatory mechanisms.  See for example Smith (2000b).   33
analysis is another area of weakness in the regulatory policy transfer to the DTEs of recent years. 
Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries 
The benefits of privatization and market liberalization in the infrastructure sectors cannot be realized 
or sustained without establishing credible, stable regulatory governance as part of the reform 
program. Moreover, experience of the last two decades indicates the importance of planning the 
structure of post-privatization governance ahead of time, including the institutional architecture and 
the substantive economic content of that governance (Willig 1999). An inadequate focus on 
fundamental sector economics is a notable weakness of the privatization process in many 
developing countries; it is also a weakness of the technical assistance programs offered by their 
international advisers, including the World Bank. 
  Many DTEs also lack several institutional prerequisites for well-functioning regulatory 
mechanisms, including  
•  separation of powers, especially between those of the executive and those of the judiciary 
•  effective political and economic institutions 
•  a well-functioning legal system 
•  good contract law and mechanisms for resolving contract disputes 
•  a good supply of professional staff, expert in the relevant economic, accounting, and legal 
principles.  
  Well-defined and credible political institutions, as well as judicial independence, appear to be 
important determinants of regulatory effectiveness (Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller 1998). The DTEs 
will need time to establish these important preconditions.  
Institutional Characteristics of Effective Regulation 
The structure and process of regulation determine how effectively regulatory institutions can serve 
the goals of infrastructure reforms and promote efficiency and other social objectives (Smith 1997).  
In the last few years, a substantial body of research has examined the experiences of developing 
countries in reforming their infrastructure industries. Although in most DTEs regulatory policies are 
at a very early stage of implementation, still several lessons can be dawn that are useful guides to 
designing the transition to, and regulation of, privatized utilities.  These lessons relate to the   34
Box 2.3 Romania: Lack of Regulatory Coherence 
 
In the telecommunications sector in Romania, responsibility for 
overseeing pricing is spread between the National Agency for 
Communications and Informatics, the Office of Competition, 
the Cabinet, and conceivably the Competition Council. 
Moreover, the basis for deciding which prices ought to be 
regulated is unclear and produces strange anomalies, such as 
the absence of regulation of interconnection between any two 
operators other than Rom Telecom, the dominant carrier. 
Moreover, none of these entities is required to clearly articulate 
its principles for policy setting, and none has the authority to 
require information about costs from firms in the industry. As a 
result, pricing decisions are uncoordinated and piecemeal, and 
inconsistencies among them (such as differences in usage 
prices for local service, for interconnection between Rom 
Telecom and mobile carriers, and for interconnection between 
mobile carriers) are not explained by any entity. 
 
Source: Noll (2000). 
characteristics of an effective regulatory system: coherence, independence, accountability, 
transparency, predictability, and capacity (Noll 2001). 
Coherence 
The elements of policy towards a 
regulated sector should fit logically 
together and be mutually supportive. 
The laws underlying policies must not 
be in conflict, and the implementing 
regulations must be consistent over 
time—as regulations are developed, 
each subsequent rule takes into account 
previous rules and, to the extent 
necessary, amends prior regulations to 
eliminate any significant 
inconsistencies. 
An important requirement for 
coherence is a clear demarcation of responsibilities among national regulators, provincial or 
municipal regulators, and ministries. The clear assignment of  regulatory responsibilities and 
jurisdictions ensures that decisions in a particular area of regulation are always made by the same 
agency. This usually implies some continuity in the people and methods used in decision making 
and makes adherence to the rule of law more likely. Also, regulatory responsibilities that must be 
delicately harmonized should be kept together within a single agency and not be 
counterproductively splintered. For example, since privatization of the Argentine 
telecommunications sector, end-user rates have been under the purview of the Secretariat of Energy 
and Communications, whereas access prices and cost reporting by the operators have been the 
responsibility of the sector’s regulatory agency. However, the regulations for end-user and access 
rates need to be closely harmonized, and both institutions should base their decisions on cost data. 
  The agency should have a statutory obligation to publish a formal statement outlining its policy 
for making decisions on entry, pricing, and all other elements of industry behavior that are subject to 
regulatory oversight. This would be extremely important because it would allow both firms and   35
Box 2.4. Latvia: Lack of Regulatory Independence 
 
In March 1999, the Telecommunications Rate Council in 
Latvia approved significant increases in telephone rates, to take 
effect on 1 April. The minister of Transportation declared that 
the rate increases were unfair to consumers, as the Council had 
not adopted a procedure for consumers to request compensation 
for low-quality telephone connections. In a manner not clearly 
provided by law, the minister annulled the council's decision to 
raise the rates. At the request of the Council, the Ministry of 
Justice evaluated the legality of the annulment and declared 
legal. The Latvian parliament backed the Ministry of Justice 
and the transport minister, arguing that the annulment was valid 
and that the council had failed to safeguard the interests of 
consumers. The government then announced that a new council 




consumers to build realistic expectations of how they will be treated in the future, and it would force 
the government to think through its long-term policy objectives and regulatory principles. 
Accountability and predictability will be enhanced if the regulatory agency states its objectives 
clearly and commits to reaching decisions through publicly articulated economic principles (Box 
2.3). 
Independence 
Effective regulation requires some 
independence of the regulators from 
political  influences, especially on a 
day-to-day or decision-by-decision 
basis. The agency must an impartial, 
objective, nonpolitical enforcer of 
policies set forth in the controlling 
statutes, free of transitory political 
influences (Box 2.4). 
How much authority should 
members of the executive branch 
have to determine regulatory policies? 
Clearly, absolute independence of these regulatory agencies is neither possible nor really desirable. 
The executive branch can hardly be denied the authority to ensure that the regulators it appoints are 
sympathetic to the sector reforms and to administration policy generally. However, if the regulators 
have no insulation from political intervention, the regulatory process may itself become politicized, 
decisions may be discredited, and policy may lack continuity. 
Clearly, some compromise is needed to ensure that the regulator is both independent and 
responsive to the broad policies of an elected administration. Several formal safeguards can be 
implemented to achieve such compromise: 
•  Providing the regulatory agency with a distinct statutory authority, free of ministerial control 
•  Prescribing well-defined professional criteria for appointments 
•  Mandating the participation of both the executive and the legislative branches of government in 
the appointment process   36
Box 2.5 Brazil: Regulatory Accountability 
 
The National Telecommunications Regulatory 
Agency (ANATEL, Agência Nacional de 
Telecomunicaçöes) of Brazil has introduced a 
number of innovative regulatory mechanisms. In 
December 2000 it became the first 
telecommunications regulatory agency in the world 
to receive ISO-9001 certification, an internationally 
accepted technical standard for handling customer 
requirements. ANATEL’s website gives all 
Brazilians an opportunity to be informed and 
participate in the agency’s activities. It also contains 
annual updates on how operator compliance; 
comments made during consultations; all 
telecommunications laws and decrees; and best 
prices and tariffs available from operators. Files can 
be electronically submitted in public consultations. 
In 1998, the site had 13,000 pages. By 1999, it had 
grown to almost 23,000 pages. 
ANATEL’s annual reports are assessed by the 
Advisory Council, an institutional body comprising 
representatives from society, and the Council’s 
assessments are published in the official gazette and 
on ANATEL’s website. ANATEL also has an 
ombudsperson who produces biannual critical 
evaluations of its performance. 
 
Source: ITU (2001). 
•  Appointing regulators for a fixed period and prohibiting their removal, except for clearly 
defined due cause (subject to formal review) 
•  Staggering the terms of the agency’s board members so that they can be replaced only gradually 
by each successive administration 
•  Funding the agency’s operations with user fees or levies on the regulated industry, to insulate it 
from political interference through the budget process 
•  Exempting the agency from civil service salary caps, to enable it to attract and retain well-
qualified staff 
•  Prohibiting the executive from overturning the agency’s decisions, except through new 
legislation or appeals to the courts on existing law. 
Accountability 
The independence of the regulator needs to be 
reconciled w ith its accountability, as well. 
Allowing a regulatory body to set prices and 
service-quality standards and effectively change 
the rules of the game gives it an enormous 
amount of power to redistribute rents. Without an 
accompanying obligation to be responsible and 
respect previous decisions and the legal rights of 
all parties, a regulatory body would have 
considerable leeway for opportunism. Therefore, 
checks and balances are required to ensure that 
the regulator does not become capricious, corrupt, 
or grossly inefficient. Citizens and regulated 
firms alike should be able to find out who is 
responsible for a decision and the basis for it and 
be able to effectively voice their concerns (Box 
2.5). The litmus test is whether affected parties 
can easily and quickly obtain redress when the regulatory body has acted arbitrarily or 
incompetently.   37
Box 2.6 Peru: Regulatory Transparency 
 
In Peru, the Supervisory Authority for Private Investment 
in Telecommunications (OSIPTEL, Organismo Supervisor 
de la Inversión Privada en Telecomunicaciones) is 
responsible for regulating and supervising the 
telecommunications industry. It monitors compliance with 
concession contracts and quality standards, it sets prices, 
and it ensures a competitive market structure. 
OSIPTEL has transparent and credible mechanisms for 
formulating norms. For instance, the agency requires that 
any regulatory proposal be supported by a technical study 
of net welfare benefits and best practices. After being 
reviewed by the Oversight Board of OSIPTEL, each 
proposal is published in the official gazette and submitted 
to a 30-day consultative period. In some cases, the 
procedure also includes public hearings, where all 
interested parties may discuss their positions. OSIPTEL 
has also created ad hoc independent committees to solve 
disputes between companies. Supported by specialists on 
the issues under dispute, these committees attempt to 
reconcile the interested parties. However, they reserve the 
right to dictate a solution if the parties are not able to reach 
an agreement. OSIPTEL has created an internal tribunal to 
handle consumer complaints that are not satisfactorily 
managed by the telephone companies. 
 
 
Striking a proper balance between independence and accountability is a delicate and difficult 
task. Some concrete measures can be adopted to strike this balance: 
•  Writing statutes that clearly specify the duties, responsibilities, and rights and obligations of the 
agency and differentiating between primary and secondary objectives, when there are multiple 
goals 
•  Subjecting the agency’s decisions to review by the courts or some other nonpolitical entity 
•  Mandating annual reports by the agency on its activities and requiring a formal review of its 
performance by independent auditors or oversight committees of the legislature 
•  Removing regulators if they show 
evidence of misconduct or 
incompetence 
•  Requiring the agency to allow 
interested parties to make submissions 
on matters under review and requiring 
the agency to publish its decisions and 
the reasons for those decisions. 
Transparency 
The existing regulatory rules and policies, 
the principles for making future regulations, 
and all regulatory decisions and agreements 
should be a matter of public record. This 
record must be accessible to all market 
participants, not just firms that supply 
services. Users of services need this type of 
information to make long-term business plans. Transparency is necessary to induce investment by 
both incumbents and new entrants in the sector and to avoid the costs and delays of regulatory 
disputes over whether an activity is permitted (Box 2.6). Infrastructure regulation is an important 
policy issue, and in a democratic society all citizens need information about policy to evaluate the 
performance of government so they can express approval or disapproval in the political process.   38
Box 2.7. Argentina: Lack of Transparency and 
Predictability 
 
A review of the Argentine gas sector in 1996 
uncovered investor concerns about the transparency 
and predictability of the National Gas Regulatory 
Authority (ENARGAS, Ente Nacional Regulador 
del Gas). In one case, ENARGAS did not permit the 
pass-through to consumers of wholesale prices 
charged by the dominant gas producer, YPF, to 
distribution companies. ENARGAS had used its 
authority to regulate the transportation and 
distribution parts of the industry to regulate the field 
price as well. ENARGAS’s decision was a means of 
indirectly controlling the market power of YPF, and 
it effectively changed the rules of the game, since 
the field price of gas had been deregulated as part of 
the privatization process. Moreover, ENARGAS 
had stated no coherent principles o r predictable 
basis for deciding what price levels for gas were 
acceptable. Additionally, there were complaints 
about capricious penalties for violations of gas-
quality standards. Although in one case ENARGAS 
had reversed its earlier decision after operator 
complaints, criticism arose about the lack of 
structure and transparency in imposing penalties. 
 
Source: Kahn (1996). 
 
  Transparency is an important safeguard against corruption in regulatory policy. Transparency 
also lessens the likelihood that citizens (especially those adversely affected by a regulatory decision) 
will believe that important regulatory decisions are corrupt. If regulatory decisions, including the 
principles and evidence that guided them, are clearly articulated in written form, the reasons for 
them will be apparent. Corrupt decisions will be easier to detect and more difficult to defend. 
Predictability 
Regulatory agencies are predictable if they adhere 
to the rule of law. The most important features of 
the rule of law are respect for precedent and the 
principle of stare decisis. Respect for precedent 
means that regulators do not reverse policy 
decisions unless there is evidence that those 
decisions have led to significant problems; stare 
decisis requires that cases with the same 
underlying facts be decided in the same way 
every time. 
  Efficient development and use of 
infrastructure require substantial long-term 
investments. Market participants need to be 
reasonably confident that the rules of the game 
will not suddenly change, either because of a 
change in the overall regulatory framework or 
because of a change in the ways regulators make decisions within this framework (Box 2.7). 
Regulatory uncertainty will adversely affect the scope, quality, and size of infrastructure.  
Capacity 
The regulatory agency’s policy responsibilities need to match the resources at its command, if it is 
to carry out its mandate. The tasks associated with some of its functions (for example, monitoring 
industry performance, analyzing cost data, and dealing with information asymmetries and strategic 
behavior of the regulated firms) require highly developed economic, accounting, engineering, and   39
Box 2.8. Ukraine: Lack of Regulatory Capacity 
in the Energy Sector 
 
The National Electricity Regulatory Commission of 
Ukraine (NERC),  established in 1994, was one of 
the first independent regulators in postsocialist 
countries. In 1997, about 70 percent of NERC’s 
specialists were engineers, 20 percent economists, 
and 10 percent lawyers. All the economists but one 
graduated from soviet universities in the period 
1965–1981. The commission has no specialists in 
regulatory economics, and Ukraine offers no 
academic training for energy regulators. This lack of 
expertise has led to a revolving-door problem. Key 
specialists and officers have left  NERC to join 
private companies regulated by it, exacerbating 
problems of pro-industry bias and potential capture. 
For example, the heads of the pricing and licensing 
departments who joined private distribution 
companies were instrumental in obtaining a 
beneficial pricing rule for their companies.  
 
Source: Tsaplin (2001). 
legal skills (Estache and Martimort 1999). The scarcity of such expertise in many DTEs poses an 
acute challenge (Box 2.8). In many developing countries, the allocation of staff and budget 
resources is not the result of a careful, rational planning process. The regulator seem to give highest 
priority to the purely technical functions, such as monitoring technical standards and quality 
requirements, and to the setting of fees for the industry to cover regulatory costs. 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Systems: Early 
Appraisal 
The transition from monolithic state-owned 
monopolies to regulated private entities is still 
ongoing in most DTEs. Thus, regulatory 
institutions in those countries have generally 
not been in existence long enough to permit a 
definitive assessment of their effectiveness and 
their impact on post-privatization industry 
performance.  The ratio of objective empirical 
research to didactic policy advocacy is still very 
low.
7  Still, several empirical regularities 
provide insights for the current debate on 
appropriate regulatory frameworks for developing countries. 
One lesson clearly emerging is that the formal requirements of independence, accountability, and 
transparency are far from sufficient, although they are needed for effective regulation. The 
experience so far raises doubts that governments will observe the spirit of the law and implement 
proper and consistent regulatory procedures, especially when a country’s choices are influenced by 
external pressures and loan conditionalities. The regulatory frameworks and the attendant 
institutions may not operate in practice as expected, if they are transplanted without taking into 
account each country’s unique constitutional, legal, and public interest mechanisms (Stern 1997). 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that this deficiency in our knowledge about regulation in developing countries is being rapidly 
redressed.  For example, the papers of Antonio Estache and his coauthors that are being cited in this report represent 
an important methodological advance and are making a very valuable contribution to our state of knowledge.    40
Progress Toward the Benchmarks of Regulatory Effectiveness 
How well have the regulatory agencies of the DTEs performed so far, especially in attaining the 
institutional attributes of effective regulation? On paper, these countries seem to have made 
considerable progress in establishing independent regulatory bodies. How these agencies will work 
in practice in the years ahead is a major question, with several dimensions to consider. The record so 
far is decidedly mixed, and initial developments in some countries are discouraging. 
Casual empiricism suggests that regulatory independence has been compromised in some 
countries and sectoral settings. Even some early reformers in Latin America whose regulatory 
frameworks closely follow the U.S. model in theory have not achieved independence in practice. In 
Chile and Colombia, the independence of their respective regulatory bodies in the power sector—
the National Energy Commission (CNE, Comisión Nacional de Energía) and the Energy and Gas 
Regulatory Commission (Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas)—has been questioned because 
of the presence of government ministers on their boards. Furthermore, the independence of these 
two agencies has been compromised by their reliance on budget allocations made by ministry 
officials. Lack of independence allegedly led to the resignation of CNE’s executive secretary in 
1999.  
Political interference has also undermined the independence of the electricity regulatory agencies 
of Guatemala and Peru. In contrast, a fair degree of autonomy has been achieved in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua and to a lesser extent in Ecuador and Honduras (IADB 1999). In Jamaica, the 
multisectoral Office of Utilities Regulation, which began work in 1997, was handicapped by 
defective legislation. It could only act in an advisory capacity, as decisionmaking authority was 
vested in the line ministries (Stirton and Lodge 2001). In Costa Rica, government interference, 
especially in tariff adjustments, has weakened the independence and effectiveness of the 
multisectoral Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios 
Públicos). 
In Argentina, the two regulatory agencies in the power sector, the National Electricity Regulatory 
Authority (Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad) and the National Gas Regulatory Authority 
(Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas), are reasonably independent. However, concerns have been 
expressed about the lack of transparency and predictability in some of their decisions (see Box 2.7) 
and the absence of any systematic external scrutiny of their administrative procedures and practices 
(Estache 1997). Similar problems of transparency also initially plagued the water regulator, the   41
Tripartite Agency for Sanitation Works and Services (Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios 
Sanitarios). In the first few years after its creation, the telecommunications regulatory authority, the 
National Telecommunications Commission (Comisíon Nacional de Telecomunicaciones), lacked 
both independence and transparency.  
In Mexico, the frontline telecommunications regulatory agency, Cofetel (Comisíon Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones), is not autonomous. In most cases, its decisions must be approved by the 
Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT, Secretaría de Comunicaciónes y Transportes) 
before they are adopted, which makes them more political than is necessary or desirable. Cofetel’s 
commissioners, though appointed for fixed terms, can be removed by the SCT.  Moreover, Cofetel’s 
procedures are neither transparent nor open. In nearly all cases (and especially with respect to 
pricing), the agency develops regulations through secret bilateral negotiations on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than through open rule-making proceedings in which industry, users, and disinterested 
experts may participate. No other parties have the right to participate in these bilateral negotiations, 
including the antitrust authority (Comisíon Federal de Competencia), despite its interest in the 
competitive effects of interconnection rules (Noll, 2001). 
In Hungary, the independence of the energy regulator, the Hungarian Energy Office, is limited by 
several factors: lack of an autonomous revenue source, no fixed-term appointments for the board of 
directors, lack of well-defined criteria for the directors’ appointment and dismissal, and the 
imposition of civil service pay-scale caps on its staff. In telecommunications, the head of the 
Communications Authority reports to the Minister of Transport and Communications.  
In the Czech Republic, both the energy and the telecommunications sectors lack independent 
regulatory bodies. This is not surprising in view of the hostility the government (or, more accurately, 
the prime minister) publicly expressed toward specialist regulatory agencies during the early years 
of transition. Thus, in the energy sector, the Ministry of Finance has the final authority to regulate 
the prices for gas and electricity, while the Energy Regulation Administration is located in the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. Similarly, the primary regulator in the telecommunications sector, 
the Czech Telecommunications Office, is located within the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. In the Polish power sector, in contrast, the Office of Energy Regulations meets 
most of the formal prerequisites of independence. In Latvia, the multisectoral regulatory agency, the 
Public Utilities Commission, enjoys financial independence from the state budget and has shown 






A. Are regulatory meetings required by              





B. Are regulators required to provide 
written explanations of their decisions? 
Source  :World Bank (2001). 
Fig. 2.1 Results from a Survey of 
Telecommunications Regulators 
compromised by the close affiliation of its board members with the political parties that nominate 
them.  
In Romania, the regulatory structure in the telecommunications sector lacks coherence (see Box 
2.3), and the gas regulator, the National Regulatory Authority in the Natural Gas Field, lacks any 
semblance of independence: the chair and vice-chair are appointed by the Minister of Industry and 
Trade, who can also appoint three civil servants to the board, ensuring complete day-to-day 
ministerial control over the regulatory agency. In electricity, however, both Romania and Bulgaria 
have taken bold steps to create independent regulatory bodies. In Romania, the National Electricity 
and Heat Regulatory Authority was designed a U.K.-style, independent regulatory office, while in 
Bulgaria, the State Commission for Energy  Regulation incorporated several elements of the 
independent U.S.-style commissions (Stern 2000).  
A recent survey of telecommunications regulatory agencies of DTEs indicates that the majority 
(36 of the 41 agencies surveyed, including those of such advanced reformers as Chile) are not 
required by law to hold open meetings, an important 
element of transparency (Figure 2.1, panel A).  These 
findings suggest a limited tradition of even  formal 
transparency in regulatory institutions and perhaps a 
continuing lack of appreciation of its enormous 
importance (World Bank 2001).  It appears, however, 
that in practice many of these agencies (27 out of 41) 
open at least some of their meetings to the public. 
Furthermore, the majority of these agencies (22 out 
of 41) do not have a statutory obligation to provide 
written justifications or explanations for their 
decisions, another important element of regulatory 
accountability and transparency (see Figure 2.1, 
panel B). A similar survey of energy regulators 
uncovered an even weaker commitment to 
transparency: more than half reported not opening 
their meetings to the public (World Bank, 2002).    43
Table 2.1  Rankings of Asian Regulatory Framework, 1998 
Categorization by Criteria  Country  
& 
sector  Coherence  Independence  Accountability  Transparency  Predictability 
Bangladesh           
  Electricity  B  B  B  A  A 
India           
 
Electricity, 
Federal  B  C  B  C  A 
 
Electricity, 
Orissa  D  E  D  E  B 
  Gas  A  A  A  C  A 
  Telecoms  C  D  D  E  C 
Indonesia           
  Gas  A  A  A  A  A 
  Transport  A  A  A  A  A 
Malaysia           
  Telecoms  C  C  B  A  A 
  Transport  C  C  B  A  B 
  Water  C  B  B  A  B 
Pakistan           
  Electricity  C  D  C  C  B 
Philippines           
  Electricity  C  C  B  B  C 
  Water  C  C  C  C  B 
Source: Stern and Holder (1999).       
 
Case-study appraisals of the regulatory governance structures in the infrastructure sectors of six 
Asian developing economies (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Philippines) 
identified significant weaknesses in coherence, transparency, and accountability. On a qualitative 
progressive ranking from A (highly unfavorable basis for private investment) to B, C, D, and E (best 
practice), only two sectors were ranked better than C on transparency or accountability: the Orissa 
electricity and telecommunications sectors in India. Only one sector (Orissa electricity) received a 
ranking better than C on coherence (Table 2.1). In  general, the rankings are uniform across the 
various industries within each country, perhaps signifying the importance of country-specific 
characteristics in regulatory design. Other countries in the region provide clear examples of 
governments’ reluctance to cede control over previously legitimate government functions to new-
fangled independent regulatory agencies. For example, in the first phase of Sri Lanka’s 
telecommunications reforms (1991–1996), the government insisted on keeping the regulatory 
agency as a government department, despite clear evidence that it was unable to attract the needed 
technical expertise (Samarajiva 2001).  

















































Algeria 1 2.3 2 1.7 1.5
Angola 1 1 1 1 1
Benin 1 1 1 1 1
Botswana 2 3 2 3 2.3
Burundi 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon 1 1 1 2 1.1
CAR 1 1 1 2 1.1
Cote d'Ivoire 1 3 2 3 1.8
Gabon 1 1 1 2 1.1
Ghana 1 2 2 1 1.4
Guinea 1 2 2 1 1.4
Kenya 1 2 2 1 1.4
Libya 1 1.7 1 1.7 1.2
Madagascar 1 2 2 2 1.5
Malawi 1 1 1 1 1
Mauritius 3 2 3 3 2.8
Mozambique 1 2 2 2 1.5
Namibia 2 2 2 2 2
Nigeria 1 1 2 2 1.3
Senegal 1 2 2 2 1.5
Sudan 3 2.7 3 2.7 2.9
Tanzania 2 2 2 1 1.9
The Gambia 1 1 1 1 1
Togo 1 1 1 1 1
Tunisia 1 2 2 2.7 1.6
Uganda 1 2 2 1 1.4
Zambia 1 2 2 1 1.4
Zimbabwe 1 1 2 2 1.3
1=lowest; 4=highest
Source: Pyramid Research.




  Many countries in Africa have established regulatory agencies for their utilities. These agencies 
face several important challenges, such as obtaining adequate financial resources, technical 
expertise, and clear statutory authority. In many cases, these agencies are mere extensions of their 
respective sectoral ministries, which continue to keep a tight grip on the regulated sectors and still 
perform key oversight functions. A recent report analyzing the telecommunications regulatory 
frameworks of 29 countries in the region underscores the problems of independence and 
transparency (EIU–Pyramid Research 1999). On a ranking of 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest), 23 of the 29 
countries examined received the lowest score of 1 on autonomy, and only 2 countries (Mauritius and 
Sudan) received a score of more than 2 (Table 2.2). Although the rankings on transparency were 
somewhat better, still 10 countries received the lowest 
score of 1, and only 2 countries received a score of more 
than 2 (again Mauritius and Sudan). 
An Institutional Mismatch? Or Just the First Stage 
of an Evolutionary Process? 
The label “independent” is somewhat exaggerated in the 
case of new regulatory agencies in DTEs. In many 
instances, for all practical purposes these agencies report 
to sectoral ministries and are filled with government 
representatives. Moreover, good regulatory practice for 
transparency is quite limited in most of these countries.  
Still, one’s assessment of regulatory governance in the 
developing world is closely determined by one’s attitude 
toward regulation itself. At one extreme, an optimistic 
observer would point out that the developing countries’ 
regulatory structures have been created from scratch; they 
are still in the early stages of development; and at least in 
terms of formal regulatory arrangements, the trend is in 
the right direction—greater independence, accountability,   45
and transparency than under state ownership (for telecommunications, see Table 2.3).We should 
also keep in mind that it took many years for the agencies of advanced economies to attain the 
various attributes of regulatory effectiveness. 
At another extreme, a pessimistic observer would insist 
that the widespread reluctance of governments to give up 
regulatory control is more than a symptom of the early stages 
of an evolutionary process. Instead, it represents a deliberate 
attempt to use the regulatory process to protect certain 
favored interest groups whose status quo benefits under state 
ownership would be threatened by market liberalization and 
privatization (Noll 1999). Alternatively, it could be argued 
that any expectations of regulatory independence and 
transparency were simply too unrealistic. In many instances, 
under pressure from the international financial institutions, 
countries, especially in Eastern Europe and Africa, adopted 
regulatory structures that were not consistent with their 
political, institutional, and human resources and endowments 
(Laffont  2001). One could not reasonably expect strong 
regulatory independence to rapidly emerge in countries where the separation of powers and the 
concomitant checks and balances are not preeminent elements of the political and legal structures. It 
is therefore an open question whether these countries will in practice honor the commitments they 
made (especially those made under pressure) to regulatory arrangements (Box 2.9). 
 
  
Country  1980-1989  1991-1997 
Argentina  0.34  0.72 
Barbados  0.48  0.48 
Belize  0.36  0.69 
Bolivia  0.34  0.50 
Brazil  0.34  0.53 
Chile  0.70  0.72 
Colombia  0.34  0.67 
Costa Rica  0.14  0.40 
Dominican Republic  0.62  0.63 
Ecuador  0.14  0.63 
El Salvador  0.14  0.25 
Guatemala  0.34  0.44 
Guyana  0.28  0.80 
Honduras  0.14  0.36 
Jamaica  0.48  0.66 
Mexico  0.34  0.49 
Nicaragua  0.14  0.34 
Panama  0.14  0.24 
Paraguay  0.14  0.36 
Peru  0.34  0.67 
Suriname  0.14  0.14 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.64  0.85 
Uruguay  0.24  0.37 
Venezuela  0.34  0.61 
Source: Gutierrez (2002). 
Table 2.3  The Regulatory Framework  
Index for Telecommunications 
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Table 2.4  Alternative Approaches to Structuring Regulatory Agencies 
     
Industry-specific                                      
(for example electricity, gas) 
Sectoral   (energy, 
communications, transport) 
Multiple 
Argentina  Brazil (federal)  Australia (state) 
Chile  Canada (federal)  Bolivia 
India  Guatemala  Brazil (state) 
Nicaragua  Colombia  Canada (state) 
Perú  Hungary  Costa Rica 
United Kingdom   México  El Salvador 
Venezuela  United Kingdom (energy)  Italy 
   United States (federal)  Panama 
      United States (state) 
     
Source: World Bank staff     
Box 2.9 Bulgaria: Regulatory Independence in Practice 
 
In September 1999, as a condition of the IMF’s stabilization package, the State Commission on Energy 
Regulation (SCER) was established in Bulgaria; it had to start functioning as an independent regulatory 
commission by July 1, 2000. SCER’s statutory authority included price regulation and the issuance of licences 
and permits, and it was to exercise this authority independently, free from political interests . 
In June 2000, the Council of Ministers voted to remove all but one of SCER’s members barely one month after it 
completed its first major task. Although members of the independent commission could be removed only by the 
prime minister, for serious misconduct, the government gave no explanation for replacing the five board 
members. The members of the board themselves also refused to comment on their own removal; however, one 
observed that it was not his place to criticize the decisions of his superiors. 
The truth probably lies between these two extremes. Some of the asserted deficiencies of the 
regulatory systems of DTEs are arguably characteristic of economic regulation as we have observed 
it in the advanced industrial economies (Kahn 1996). 
 
The Structure of Regulatory Institutions 
Several important decisions need to be made regarding the organization of regulatory governance: 
(a) demarcation of regulatory responsibilities among national and subnational tiers of government; 
(b) industry-specific versus multisectoral regulatory agencies; (c) allocation of functional 
responsibilities (for regulation of prices, licensing, quality, environmental effects); and (d) 
relationship with sectoral ministries and with competition or antitrust authorities. The economic and 
technological characteristics of the regulated industry, as well as the country’s available resources 
(including human resources), will affect the institutional architecture of regulatory governance. 
Moreover, effective regulation requires both an administrative body (to execute it) and a political 
institution (to ensure its legitimacy) (Aubert and Laffont 2000). Formal regulatory structures that 
seem optimal in theory may be impossible to implement when political constraints are taken into 
account.  
  Different countries have arrived at different institutional structures for regulating their network 
utilities (Table 2.4). 
Vertical Location 
The theory of institutions, as well as regulatory-design experiments, in industrial countries and, 
more recently, developing countries points to the need to make several important tradeoffs in   47
Box 2.10. India: Competition Between the 
States 
 
A lack of investor interest in the Haryana 
Power Project in 1997 was exacerbated by the 
fact that other Indian states were competing for 
a small pool of international investors. As a 
result, Haryana decided to provide an attractive 
regulatory environment, taking into account the 
privatization plans of other states. Part of 
Haryana’s strategy was to reduce the financial 
exposure of the private sector by redesigning 
the privatization contract. Such an approach 
could certainly have adverse long-term 
consequences if an attractive regulatory regime 
for the company results in the transfer of 
financial risk from the private sector to the state 
government.  
 
Sources: World Bank (1997),Bayliss (2001) 
designing the structure of regulatory governance (Smith 2000b).  
Potential Advantages of Decentralized Responsibility 
Assigning responsibility for utility regulation to lower tiers of government has several advantages. 
Decentralization allows regulation to be shaped by local conditions and preferences; it brings the 
regulator closer to the front line of service delivery, thereby allowing the regulator to gather better 
information on firms and consumers; it can promote creative competition among subnational 
regulators to innovate and improve the quality of regulation to attract private investment (Tiebout 
1956; Oates 1999); and it may permit more effective enforcement of regulatory decisions (Laffont 
and Zantman 1999).  
Potential Advantages of Centralized Responsibility 
Decentralization also has disadvantages that support 
arguments for centralizing regulatory responsibility. 
A national-level regulatory structure makes most 
efficient use of scarce regulatory expertise, which has 
a high  opportunity cost, and spreads out the fixed 
costs associated with regulation. Centralization may 
also reduce the risks of destructive competition 
among regulatory jurisdictions and of a race to the 
bottom (Box 2.10). Centralization may be necessary 
when subnational jurisdictions are too small to 
encompass the efficient scale or scope of operation of 
particular utility industries.  
Regulatory decisions in some jurisdictions may have spillover effects in others; for example, 
effluent discharges into rivers can have implications for downstream users. Regulatory policies 
introduced at the subnational level can also impede interstate trade (for example, impediments 
caused by differing technical standards among jurisdictions), protect local monopolies, or create 
subsidies for local producers. These situations would call for a higher regulatory authority to protect 
social welfare and ensure efficiently harmonized regimes.   48
Box 2.11 Russia: Regulatory Structure in the 
Energy Sector 
 
The Russian Federation created the Federal Energy 
Commission (FEC) in 1992 and made it formally 
independent of other government bodies in 1994. 
The FEC has a mandate to regulate wholesale 
electricity rates and wholesale gas prices; set tariffs 
for the use of the transmission grid; determine 
prices for access to the gas pipeline by firms not 
associated with the dominant gas entity (Gazprom); 
set prices on dispatcher and other services sold by 
Gazprom and affiliates of the dominant electricity 
entity, RAO UES; and develop long-term 
investment priorities for the industry. Regional 
energy commissions (RECs) were formed at the 
oblast level by the regional authorities in 1991. The 
RECs set retail tariffs for electricity, heat, and gas 
within guidelines and boundaries set by the FEC. 
The FEC has the authority to compel the RECs, as 
well as enterprises, to give it information; and it 
serves as an appeals board for regional tariff 
disputes. However, the RECs are not subordinated 
to the FEC. 
 
Source: IEA, Russia Energy Survey (2002). 
  Finally, decentralized regulators may face a higher risk of becoming captured by industry 
interests or by local politicians, who are often perceived as being more populist than higher level 
political authorities.  
Striking a Balanced  
The benefits and costs of centralizing and decentralizing regulatory oversight activities cannot be 
determined in the abstract. Much will depend on the size of the country and its institutional 
structure, as well as on the technological characteristics of the particular industry (Box 2.11). 
Several normative conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. 
Country Size. Very small countries may only 
one effective tier of government. Countries as 
large as Brazil, India, China, and the Russian 
Federation, however, have potential for far more 
decentralization and more room for debate about 
the allocation of roles among subnational tiers of 
government. 
Nature of the Industries.  Spillover effects 
associated with the alignment of jurisdiction and 
industry boundaries will depend in part on the 
nature of the industry, as illustrated for the three 
main utility industries: 
•  Electricity—Distribution utilities most closely 
resemble water utilities, as some operate 
solely within subnational boundaries. But as 
with water, there may be exceptions. 
Transmission grids are usually designed to operate nationally, and the salient characteristics of 
electricity generation may vary. While some assets operate solely within subnational boundaries, 
some investments may serve multiple subnational jurisdictions, and some generation 
technologies (such as hydro, coal, and nuclear) may give rise to spillovers affecting much wider 
jurisdictions. The increasing trend toward competition in generation may also involve cross-
border trade, which may suggest benefits for regulating some issues at the national level.   49
Box 2.12  Mexico: Decentralization in Water and 
Ports 
 
Mexico has a highly centralized governmental structure. 
However, several water supply functions have been 
decentralized. As a first step, public irrigation systems 
were transferred to user groups. By 1996, an area of 2.9 
million hectares—representing 87 percent of the area 
under major and medium -level irrigation and 46 percent 
of the total area under all irrigation—was transferred to 
386 water-user associations. Water resource management 
remained the responsibility of the central government, but 
the management of many supply tasks was transferred to 
local authorities. 
Extensive decentralization was also undertaken 
at ports. In 1992, the Mexican government began 
relinquishing control over port administration, terminal 
operations, and other port services. All oversight 
functions were transferred to port authorities, which 
manage their ports in accordance with concession 
contracts. 
 
Source: Saleth and Dinar (1999); Aubert and Laffont 
(2000). 
Box 2.13. Morocco: Decentralization and 
Functional Specialization in the Water Sector 
 
Morocco has a strongly centralized government. However, 
its water sector has a highly decentralized regulatory 
structure, with considerable functional specialization. The 
Directorate General of Hydraulics under the Ministry of 
Equipment plans and develops the water resources. The 
National Office of Potable Water, under the same ministry, 
acquires and distributes water on  a retail basis to 
households and industries and on a bulk-supply basis to 
local governments. The nine regional authorities for 
agricultural development, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, develop and maintain water distribution 
networks and collect water c harges. In smaller systems, 
local governments and farmers play a stronger role in 
water distribution and system maintenance. 
 
Source: Saleth and Dinar (1999). 
Reflecting these considerations, 
transmission and at l east some aspects 
of generation may be best regulated at 
the national level in smaller countries, 
while in larger countries it may be 
feasible to regulate distribution at a 
subnational level (Smith 2000a). 
•  Water—In most countries, 
responsibilities in the water sector have 
been extensively decentralized. Many 
water utilities operate solely through 
local networks, with limited 
interconnection between networks (Box 
2.12). However, many other utilities 
serve several contiguous municipalities 
or draw on water resources that do not 
respect political boundaries. For these reasons, municipal, state, and even national governments 
may dispute water regulation.  
•  Telecommunications—Of the three main utility industries, telecommunications has made the 
most progress in  introducing competition. Telecommunications networks are national (and 
indeed international) in reach, and 
major firms tend to operate on a 
national level. Firms based in different 
subnational jurisdictions should in 
principle be subject to consistent 
regulatory treatment insofar as this 
affects their competitive position. 
Reflecting this, virtually all countries 
locate responsibility for regulating 
telecommunications at the national 
level.    50
  Regulatory Capacity. The more acute the constraints of regulatory capacity, the stronger the 
arguments for centralizing regulatory responsibility, at least at first. The potential benefits of 
decentralization can then be acquired through other strategies; for example, national-level regulators 
can tailor their approach to suit local conditions, and they can establish regional offices or adopt 
other mechanisms to shorten the distance to firms and other stakeholders (Box 2.13). 
Regulatory Issues. Different regulatory issues may be assigned to different tiers of government. 
To illustrate, in a federal system, electricity distribution utilities may be regulated primarily at the 
state level, some technical standards may be mandated by national-level authorities, and land-use 
decisions may be made by municipal governments. Multitiered approaches are the norm in mature 
regulatory systems in large industrial countries, but they add to the complexity of establishing new 
arrangements in developing countries. 
Horizontal Location 
Even assuming that regulatory responsibilities have been assigned to a single tier of government, the 
question remains whether the government should establish a series of industry-specific regulatory 
agencies or a single agency with a broader mandate. 
Potential Advantages of Industry-Specific Agencies  
Establishing separate regulatory agencies for each utility industry has several advantages. 
Separation recognizes the unique challenges of each utility industry. Each regulator can then 
develop its own industry-specific expertise and focus, which may improve the  quality of its 
regulatory decisions. Creating a series of regulatory agencies also helps to distribute the risk of 
institutional failure and can result in experimentation and more innovative approaches to regulatory 
problems.  
Potential Advantages of a Single Agency with Multi-Industry Responsibilities 
The potential weaknesses of establishing separate agencies at one tier of government strengthen the 
case for consolidating several industries under one regulator. For example, competition that 
increases private investment in one utility industry over another at the same tier of government may 
create unintended distortions—such as if the regulator for telecommunications allows higher rates 
of return than the power regulator.    51
Box 2.14. Latvia: The Public Utilities 
Regulation Commission 
 
Until 2001, the regulation of public utilities in 
Latvia was the responsibility of several 
institutions: the Energy Regulation Council, 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy 
(energy sector); the Telecommunications Tariffs 
Council, under the Ministry of Transportation 
(MoT) (telecommunications sector); the Railway 
Administration Department of the MoT (rail 
sector); and the Communications Department of 
the MoT (postal sector). In January 1997, the 
government decided to combine regulatory 
oversight activities in the energy, 
telecommunications, post, and rail sectors under a 
single agency. The Public Utilities Regulation 
Commission took over these regulatory 
responsibilities in October 2001. The stated 
rationale for this organizational change included 
the need for regulatory consistency across the 
various utility sectors; technological convergence; 
the blurring of industry boundaries; and the need 
to make efficient use of human and financial 
resources. 
 
Source: www.sprk.gov.lv  
  Creating a multi-industry agency allows scarce talent (economists, accountants, lawyers), 
other resources, and fixed costs (such as maintaining regional offices) to be shared. Consolidation 
builds expertise in the cross-cutting economic issues of regulation: administration of tariff 
adjustment rules, introduction of competition into traditionally monopolistic industries, and 
management of relationships with stakeholders.  
  The broader responsibilities of a multi-industry agency reduce its dependence on any one 
industry and thus provide a potentially useful additional safeguard against capture. A multi-industry 
agency may also be in a better position than industry-specific agencies to resist political pressures 
because its broader constituency raises the stakes of political interference and g ives it greater 
independence from sectoral ministers.  
  In any event, the traditional notion of distinct utility industries is itself under threat. 
Deregulation and evolution in business strategy have seen electricity, gas, rail, and water companies 
entering the telecommunications business; gas companies entering the electricity business; energy 
companies entering the water business; and water and electricity companies merging. A multi-
industry regulator can coherently address the new 
and challenging issues emerging with these multi-
utilities. In addition, a multi-industry regulatory 
agency is in a better position to guard against 
distortions caused by the inconsistent regulation of 
utilities either competing with each other directly 
(such as electricity and gas) or competing for 
investment capital (Helm 1994).  
Striking a Balance 
Deciding on the breadth of the industry coverage of 
utility regulators involves a number of tradeoffs, 
given the following considerations (and no single 
approach will be superior in all circumstances).  
Country Size. For small countries with limited 
financial and human resources, there is a strong 
argument in favor of merging regulatory   52
Box 2.15  Bolivia: A Compromise between 
Coordination and Specialization 
 
Bolivia’s regulatory structure is a creative 
compromise between the industry-specific and 
multisectoral regulator options. The hybrid model 
seeks to capture the main benefits of the two 
options. The system has sector-specific branches, 
each with its own autonomous superintendent and 
dedicated staff. They are subject to common 
rules, under the supervision of a general 
superintendent. The structure is similar to that of 
a multisectoral agency with specialized bureaus, 
though these branches enjoy more independence. 
The general superintendent serves as an appeal 
body, with a mandate to foster coherence in the 
system. The hybrid approach was taken because 
the sectoral authorities were reluctant to cede 
their regulatory powers to an independent 
multisectoral agency. 
 
 Source: Laffont (2002). 
responsibilities under a single agency (Box 2.14). However, the larger the economy, the greater the 
possibility that the advantages of a multi-industry agency may be outweighed by concerns over 
insufficient industry focus and potential diseconomies of scale. In this issue, the most appropriate 
reference point is arguably the number of consumers, rather than the total population, as the two can 
be very different in developing countries. Several multi-industry agencies in fairly small economies 
have dealt with these challenges successfully, such as the national regulators in Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
and Panama and the state-level regulators in Brazil. It is not clear where the upper limit may be. The 
California Public Utilities Commission has responsibility for regulating power, water, gas, and 
aspects of telecommunications and transport in an economy with a population of more than 30 
million. However, a jurisdiction of the same size may be more challenging for a less-experienced 
regulatory agency.  
  Scope of Regulatory Responsibilities.  Regulatory agencies in developing countries typically 
have more limited discretionary authority than their counterparts in industrialized countries.  In 
general, the narrower the scope of the agency’s responsibilities in relation to any industry, the less 
should be the concern over inadequate industry-focus or potential diseconomies of scale with multi-
industry agencies. 
Nature of the Industries. The risk of economic distortions arising from inconsistent approaches 
to common issues may be greater where market substitution can occur between the outputs of 
regulated industries, most notably between electricity and gas, but potentially between various 
transport or communications modes as well. The case for consolidating regulatory responsibility for 
some industries may thus be stronger than for others. For example, fairly little controversy arises 
over merging of responsibilities for electricity and 
gas in a single energy agency. The more-
monopolistic power and water industries may 
also share more common features than a 
competitive telecommunications industry does, 
although the advent of competition in electricity 
is eroding this distinction (Joskow 1998b).  
Regulatory Capacity.  With the acute 
constraints of scarce expertise and  vulnerability 
to political and industry capture in the DTEs, the   53
Two pillars form the basis for the 
strategy of development: building 
an investment climate that 
facilitates investment and growth, 
and empowering poor people to 
participate in that growth. 
Stern (2001). 
arguments become stronger for a multi-industry approach. The potential benefits of industry-
specific agencies can then be gained through other strategies, including the creation of industry-
specific departments or cells within an overall agency (Box 2.15).  
Reform Strategies. Alternative reform strategies may place different demands on newly created 
regulatory agencies, affecting their ability to develop and apply expertise and to maintain sufficient 
focus. Two main strategies might be contrasted:  
•  Staggered reform—Under this approach, the government reforms one utility industry after 
another, over a period of time. For example, it might first focus on the telecommunications 
industry and follow this with power and then water. This strategy would allow a newly created 
regulatory agency to focus initially on one industry and build up some experience. The agency 
might then be better prepared to assume responsibility for additional industries as they emerge 
from the reform process. This was the approach adopted by state-level regulatory agencies in the 
United States, which were initially responsible only for railways and acquired mandates for 
additional industries over time. 
•  Concurrent reform—Under a “big-bang” approach, the government seeks to privatize and 
reform all or most utility industries more or less simultaneously. This strategy could place 
significant demands on a newly created multi-industry agency. Governments intent on this 
strategy might give more weight to the potential advantages of creating industry-specific 
agencies initially and perhaps merging them subsequently. Another approach, adopted in 
Bolivia, is to establish a hybrid structure that captures some of the benefits of both industry-
specific and broader approaches (Criales and Smith 1997). 
Effective Regulation to Improve the Investment Climate 
Regulatory policies designed to encourage sustained private investment in infrastructure do more 
than merely serve the narrow interests of investors: they also widen access to basic services and 
promote competition. After all, arguably the most important reason for privatizing infrastructure in 
the DTEs has been the public sector’s inability to 
continue financing the maintenance, modernization, and 
expansion of this infrastructure. If adequate private 
investment does not flow into these sectors, the goals of 
universal service and increased access to services by the   54
poor will inevitably suffer; and if investment is stifled by restrictive regulatory policies, entry and 
consequently competition will not materialize. 
Any lack of clarity in economic regulation and entry decisions (licenses, privatization 
agreements) can deter infrastructure investment. To address such concerns the regulatory agencies 
could issue public documents (white papers) concerning the policies and procedures that will guide 
their decisions in the future (see the discussion below). A perhaps more pragmatic approach would 
be to set up a consultative industry forum where interested operators, service providers, and 
potential investors could openly discuss issues affecting competition and other policy matters. Some 
regulatory bodies in the DTEs have adopted consultative approaches to regulation. The 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India regularly updates its website with consultation 
papers and input from operators, investors, academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders. 
Botswana is regularly singled out for its public consultation processes. Also, Anatel, the Brazilian 
regulator, regularly publishes its consultation and discussion documentation electronically (Bruce 
and Macmillan 2002).  
The Importance of Regulatory Commitment 
Network utilities entail large fixed costs that are long lived and mostly sunk (that is, they have few 
alternative uses). When a utility is making decisions regarding the incremental costs of adding a 
service (or the avoidable costs of eliminating a service), given existing capacity, it typically 
considers only the additional costs of production imposed by that service and not the full measure of 
the long-run fixed costs. Because fixed costs are large, the ratio of the operating to total costs—and 
hence the revenue needed to cover current cash expenditures as a proportion of total costs—is much 
lower in infrastructure than in the other sectors of the economy.    55
Box 2.16 India: Reversal of Tariff Rise 
in the State of Kerala 
 
Following violent public and political 
opposition, the Kerala state government, in 
India, decided to reverse its September 2002 
decision to raise tariffs by 60–100 percent. 
Protesters ransacked power utility offices, 
and the opposition called for a general strike 
in Kerala. The failure of the monsoon rains—
which affected hydro production—and the 
deepening financial troubles of the Kerala 
State Electricity Board had prompted the 
government to raise tariffs. 
 
Source: Platts Power in Asia, 19/9/02.  
The services delivered by the infrastructure 
industries are massively consumed and are regarded as 
essential, both to the public and for the effective 
functioning of the economy. Cost-based prices for 
many households can represent a substantial proportion 
of their budgets. Price changes can therefore have a 
considerable impact on the level and distribution of real 
incomes. Infrastructure services are essential 
intermediate inputs for other sectors of the economy, 
and the service levels and prices can have major effects 
on industrial costs and i nternational competitiveness. 
Moreover, the presence of only a few utility operators in each locality raises immediate concerns 
about concentrated and exploitative market power, excessive prices and profits, and restricted 
freedom of choice. These characteristics create significant opportunities for political mobilization, 
consumer and special-interest-group activism, and populist manipulation (Spiller and Savedoff 
1999). Cultural attitudes toward paying the full cost of these services change fairly slowly, and price 
increases frequently generate considerable public opposition (Box 2.16).  
Because a large portion of the infrastructure costs are fixed and sunk, once the investment is 
made the utility will continue operating as long as operating revenues exceed operating costs. This 
motivates governments to behave opportunistically when dealing with the privatized utilities. For 
example, after the investment is made, the government can lower the regulated prices the utilities 
charge for their services, impose special taxes, disallow some of the costs, restrict procurement and 
employment practices, require special investments, and restrict the composition and movement of 
capital (Box 2.17).  
If private utilities are vulnerable to administrative intervention, they can be expected to invest 
less than the optimal amount and to make disproportionately low investments in activities with large 
sunk costs, because once sunk investments are made, the balance of bargaining advantage generally 
shifts from the private investors to the regulator (Hart 1995). Understandably, then, the owners of 
private capital will be unwilling to undertake the sunk investments needed to supply the 
infrastructure services unless the government can credibly commit to regulatory stability—frequent   56
changes in the regulatory regime can have the same effect as outright expropriation of their sunk 
investment. 
The extent of the commitment problem depends on both the country’s political institutions and 
the nature of the technology underlying the industry’s production. In sectors like 
telecommunications, where technology is changing rapidly, the rate of asset depreciation is high, 
and therefore sunk costs and the risk of expropriation will be    57
 
Box 2.17 Examples of Alleged Government Opportunistic Behavior 
 
Hungary: Electricity Distributors Threaten Legal Action 
Hungary’s six electricity distribution companies (EDCs), which are majority owned by Eon and RWE of Germany and 
EdF of France, have threatened legal action against the government. The dispute is over tariffs that the EDCs are allowed 
to charge end users. The government had restricted the tariff increase to 6 percent, which was the expected inflation rate. 
However, actual inflation is closer to 10 percent, and the price that the EDCs pay to the state-owned electricity wholesaler, 
Magyar Villamos Müvek Rt., has increased by 13 percent. The companies denied allegations that they made excessive 
profits under the pricing regime in force from 1996 to 2000 and claimed that their average return on equity had been only 
7.8 percent, below the 8 percent promised under the privatization agreement. In the week following the government’s 
decision, the share prices of the two largest distribution companies, Elmu and Edasz, fell 15 percent on the Budapest stock 
exchange.  
 
Source: Financial Times, 7/2/01. 
 
Argentine: Electricity Regulator Cuts Penalty for Failure to Pay Bills on Time 
The National Electricity Regulatory Authority in Argentina (ENRE, Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad) ordered 
the distribution companies—Edenor, Edesur and Edelap—to reduce the penalty for failure to pay electricity bills on time 
from 10 percent to 1.2 percent. The distribution companies said that this order changes the agreed rules and they feared that 
ENRE would try to change its other agreements with the industry.   
Source: El Clarin, 8/6/99. 
 
Ghana: A New Telecommunications Tax 
In January 2002, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) imposed a new tax of 50,000 cedi per mobile telephone 
subscriber and 20,000 cedi per fixed line subscriber in Ghana.<Author: add (8,569.40 cedi = US$1.00)?> The dominant 
mobile operator, Scancom Ltd. (Spacefon), estimated that this tax would increase its costs by $1 million  per year. In 
December 2002, the AMA sealed the offices of the two mobile operators, Millicom Ghana and Scancom, because of their 
failure to pay these taxes. Workers and customers that came to transact business with the companies were prevented from 
entering the offices. Subsequently, the companies filed a writ challenging the legality of AMA’s new tax.  
 
Source: Haggarty and Shirley (2002). 
 
Kazakhstan: The Government Reverses the Tariff Policy 
In 1996 Tractebel—a wholly owned subsidiary of Suez Lyonnaise—acquired Almaty Power Consolidated, the producer 
and distributor of electricity and heat in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan. The government promised to raise 
tariffs in return for an investment of $300 million by Tractebel in the distribution company. The nationalist government 
that took office in 1997 reversed previous policies and refused to allow the tariff increases. When Tractebel claimed breach 
of contract, it became the target of demonstrations. The row over tariffs contributed to the eventual withdrawal of Tractebel 
from the market and the return of the assets to state ownership in November 2000. 
 
Source: Bayliss (2001). 
 
Ecuador: The Leading Private Utility Sues Government 
In 1992 Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador (Emelec) was awarded $51.9 million in international arbitration because for a 
decade the government had refused to set rates that would allow Emelec to achieve the contractually guaranteed 9.5-
percent rate of return on its investment. The government refused to pay the award, and in 1995 Emelec sued the 
government to abide by the arbitration decision. The 1995 lawsuit prompted the government to agree to a settlement. 
However, in a lawsuit filed in July 1999, Emelec sought substantial additional damages because it alleged that the 
government had failed to honor its obligations under the 1995 settlement. Despite the fact that Emelec has had its position 
vindicated by at least three tribunals and the Ecuadorian courts (up to the supreme court), the government has steadfastly 
refused to honor its contractual obligations to the private company. 
 
Source: PR NEWSWIRE Reuter, 7/14/99.  
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correspondingly low. By contrast, the commitment problem can be severe in the water sector, where 
assets depreciate slowly. The risk of expropriation is high as well in countries where the 
government’s formal or informal regulatory procedures are weak or absent, the judiciary has little 
authority or capacity to r eview administrative decisions, and elections are frequent, highly 
contested, and dominated by well-organized constituencies (Spiller 1992).  
  Opportunistic behavior is not the exclusive domain of the government. Some firms also behave 
opportunistically, and the outcome of such behavior crucially depends on the relative bargaining 
power of the regulated firm and the regulator (or the country). A major imbalance in bargaining 
power can occur when low-income developing countries are dealing with large foreign investors 
and multinational corporations. Private investors could demand post-privatization tariff and contract 
adjustments in their favor, and countries might cave in because of their critical need for foreign 
investment and because any legal action, regardless of its merit and eventual outcome, might result 
in caution among all foreign investors. 
Getting the Economics Right 
Much of the discussion of infrastructure reform in the DTEs has properly focused on the 
institutional foundations of regulatory effectiveness and nondiscretionary governance.  Clearly, the 
establishment of institutional mechanisms that impose restraints on arbitrary administrative 
intervention would signal to potential investors that the value they add to infrastructure will not be 
expropriated. This type of commitment, which flows from the country’s legal and regulatory 
systems, reduces investment risk and consequently the discount rate applied to net present value and 
cash flow calculations.  
The fundamental sector economics must be right for any business investment plan to be feasible. 
After all, a pricing policy that does not allow adequate revenue, even if transparently implemented 
by an independent regulator, will still repel investors.  For example, as of 2000, in almost all CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, household electricity prices covered less than 50 
percent and industrial prices less than 70 percent of long-run marginal costs (von Hirschausen and 
Opitz, 2000).  It would be difficult to imagine that even a  truly independent and transparent 
regulatory regime would be able to facilitate private investment under those pricing conditions. 
Similarly, a regulatory regime that interferes with competitiveness by disallowing flexible prices 
and terms or by imposing social service obligations on only some of the competitors will not   59
promote efficient investment, even when institutional mechanisms provide a credible commitment 
to policy stability. Thus, the mantra of international advisers that stresses the importance of 
institution building and regulatory independence is far from sufficient. Especially given the 
extraordinarily adverse financing climate, in this second stage of the reform process it is imperative 
that policymakers in the DTEs  focus on the substantive c ontent of regulation, to create an 
economically attractive investment environment for investors. 
Perhaps the single most important element of an investment-oriented policy is pricing reform. A 
key priority in attracting private investment is moving to cost-reflective tariffs, which would permit 
the privatized operators to earn enough revenue to compete equally with firms elsewhere in the 
economy for available financing to maintain, replace, modernize, and, where appropriate, expand 
their facilities and services. The interests of users and the economy can be better served if the 
privatized operators are not unduly constrained by price controls that no longer reflect the 
competitive realities in these markets. The operators should be accorded pricing flexibility without 
leaving the way open to either cross-subsidization or monopolistic pricing.  
Regulatory Commitment through Concession Contracts 
In some infrastructure sectors (telecommunications, electricity generation, and gas production), 
ownership was transferred to the private sector through outright divestiture. In others (water and 
sewerage, transport, the transmission and distribution components of electricity, and the 
transportation and distribution components of gas), legal, political, and constitutional restraints have 
hindered the outright transfer of ownership to the private sector. Instead, many countries have 
devised innovative strategies to facilitate private sector participation in those sectors (Table 2.5). 
Concessions or franchise agreements and, to much lesser extent, management contracts have 
emerged as attractive alternatives to outright privatization (Guasch, Kartacheva, and Quesada 2000).  
A concession contract grants a private company, typically through competitive bidding, the 
exclusive right to provide a service for a specified period by using existing facilities and developing 
new ones. The contract defines the obligations (in terms of service rollout and performance 
standards) and rights of the concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, 
including pricing arrangements (Klein 1998a). By establishing an explicit contractual relationship, 
concessions place limits on the discretionary powers of the government and can reduce the risk of 
political expropriation. Contracts that also include certain regulatory principles (for example, the   60
basis for revising tariffs and that for settling disputes) can minimize the need for discretionary 
decisions after the fact, thus providing some protection against regulatory opportunism (Crampes 
and Estache 1998; Stern and Holder 1999). If the concessions are granted through competitive 
bidding, they ought to contribute to allocative and productive efficiency, and the periodic re-
auctioning of concessions would create competition for the market. With well-written concession 
contracts and rebidding, the practice of periodic re-auctioning could effectively solve the natural-
monopoly problem (Demsetz 1968, Klein 1998b). 
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  One of the main challenges of infrastructure concessions is writing time-consistent, enforceable 
contracts that cover all the contingencies that might arise with such technically complex activities 
and economic uncertainty. Frequently, assumptions that seemed reasonable when planners 
developed the key economic parameters of a contract have proven highly inaccurate after the fact. 
Thus, allowing some room for renegotiation and regulatory adaptation may seem appropriate and 
socially desirable in the face of new problems, changed circumstances, and additional information 
and experience. However, contractual incompleteness could lead to opportunistic renegotiation. In 
industrial countries, such renegotiation is not a big concern, though, because adherence to contracts 
can be enforced by high-quality institutions (Laffont and Tirole 1993). The absence of such 
institutional mechanisms in the DTEs makes renegotiation a serious public policy issue.   61
  Using explicit long-term contracts as a substitute for separate regulatory institutions is likely to 
be problematic. Without an independent mediating regulator, any  adaptations would have to be 
renegotiated with the government, and this would increase the risk of harmful political interference. 
If, however, concessions are lodged within a separate regulatory framework that defines the basis 
and criteria for contract revision, socially desirable, dynamic adaptations would be feasible and less 
likely to place significant strain on concessions facing uncertain economic conditions. This would 
apply to concession contracts for roads and railroads, for example, as demand for such services is 
subject to large fluctuations, and cost estimates are frequently inaccurate. 
  Since the late 1980s many concessions have been awarded to private infrastructure operators 
throughout the world; in the Latin America and Caribbean region alone, more than 1,000 concession 
contracts have been signed. Despite its early promise, however, this form of private sector 
participation has often produced mixed results. Serious doubts have arisen about its efficacy, and 
there have been acrimonious disputes over contract compliance, complaints about excessive tariffs, 
frequent bankruptcy claims by the concessionaires, poor service delivery, and in particular, 
opportunistic renegotiation. Excluding telecommunications, more than 40 percent of concessions 
are renegotiated before they expire, and 60 percent of these are renegotiated within three years, 
despite contractual periods of 15–20 years (Guasch 2001). As noted above, some occasional 
renegotiation can be for the good. However, the excessive proportion of  renegotiated contracts 
(more than 80 percent in the water and transport sectors) and the early renegotiations (less than three 
years into the contract, on average) strongly suggest opportunistic behavior and seriously flawed 
regulatory design. 
  Early and frequent renegotiation affects sector performance; it also undermines the credibility of 
the process and the reputation of the country, especially when the renegotiation favors the operator, 
as is often the case. A bidder who knows that early renegotiation is possible may submit a low-ball 
bid, with a view to renegotiating better terms, without competition, shortly after securing the 
concession; and that bid might be accepted, irrespective of efficiency or value. 
  Recent empirical work suggests that the high incidence of concession renegotiation can be 
attributed to politics, weak regulatory governance, and flawed contract design (Guasch, Laffont, and 
Straub 2002). Setting up a separate regulatory body appears to significantly reduce renegotiations. 
Contingencies occurring during the lifetime of the concession can then be dealt with through the 
normal revision process inside the regulatory framework, reducing the need for disruptive   62
renegotiation. Having a regulatory body can also signal a commitment to enforcement and may 
signify experience in dealing with complex design issues and contracts. There is also evidence that 
price caps are conducive to renegotiation, perhaps because, relative to cost-plus rules, price caps 
shift more of the risk from consumers to the operating entities. This finding is especially important 
for policy in Latin America, where price caps regulate 75 percent of concessions. 
  As a result of political-economic factors, renegotiations often favor the operators. Once a 
concession is awarded, the government typically claims it is a great success and points out the large 
amounts of promised investment. Rejecting a request from the operator to renegotiate soon after the 
concession is awarded may result in abandonment or suspension of the concession, which could be 
seen as a failure and might require the issuance of a new concession, at potentially large transaction 
cost. Confronted with this dilemma, governments usually concede, demonstrating the leverage of 
the incumbent operator. 
Commitment Versus Flexibility in Regulatory Architecture 
A good regulatory system must be responsive to changes in demand and supply, in industry 
technology, and in the competitiveness of the directly regulated and adjacent markets. If the system 
is to provide incentives for efficient performance, it must be able to adapt its mandates and rules in 
response to new problems, circumstances, information, and experience. Such flexibility is especially 
imperative in sectors experiencing rapid technological and market changes. 
The goal of regulatory dynamics argues in favor of putting discretion in the hands of well-
intentioned and skilled regulators. Still, discretion can be misused, whether by government (to 
advance short-term political goals) or by regulators (to benefit themselves). The owners of sunk 
assets under regulatory control may see such discretion as a mortal threat. The value of investment 
in those assets can be destroyed by aggressive regulation that disallows revenues beyond those 
needed to recover short-run variable costs. The fear that regulatory discretion might result in the 
expropriation of private assets would predictably override any incentives to invest in the market. 
Where concern over the misuse of regulatory flexibility is significant, the government can reduce 
discretionary power by introducing rigid and specific rules. For example, Chile introduced a law 
with detailed rules that significantly reduced the scope for regulatory opportunism in the electricity 
sector (Spiller and Martorell 1996). However, the resulting rigidity completely undermined the    63
Box 2.18. Chile: Regulatory Rigidity 
 
Chile introduced a new electricity law in 1981–
1982 to assure potential investors that the 
regulator would not expropriate their 
investment. The power to make decisions was 
therefore taken away from regulators and 
embedded in law. The law was therefore 
extremely comprehensive and complex, 
incorporating details normally left to regulatory 
determination. At the time, this revolutionary 
approach seemed a good bargain: in the early 
1980s, Chile needed to convince investors that 
the rules of the game would not change 
according to regulatory whim. This mechanism 
attracted investment when the sectors were 
eventually privatized, but it had the undesirable 
effect of making the regulatory regime rigid 
and unadaptable.  
The system’s inflexibility could become quite 
costly when the environment changed, as 
shown by the 1998–1999 drought. During that 
crisis, the whole governance system collapsed, 
and the country was subjected to avoidable and 
prolonged blackouts, without any compensation 
to users. This caused an estimated $300 million 
in damages to the economy.  The failure of 
regulatory governance during the crisis was due 
in part to the lack of flexibility embedded in 
law, which reduced the ability of the regulator 
to respond quickly to the drought. 
 
Source: Fischer and Serra (2000). 
 ability of the regulatory body to creatively adapt to 
market changes (Box 2.18). Such a solution 
therefore generates new and substantial risks for the 
public interest. Actual or perceived regulatory risk 
can also be reduced substantially if the privatization 
or concession agreement stipulates the regulations 
in great detail. Indeed, tight privatization contracts 
are now common in many developing countries. 
  A proper balance between regulatory flexibility 
and commitment is a precondition for attracting 
sustainable private investment. But a more creative 
solution is needed to appropriately limit regulatory 
discretion while avoiding the rigidity and paralysis 
of micromanaged privatization or concessions. 
Willig (1999) proposed a process for limiting the 
government’s discretionary powers in a socially 
desirable way: the regulatory body publicly sets out 
the fundamental economic principles that it will use 
as the basis for its policy analysis and decisions. 
These economic principles could be included in a statute or a concession agreement and should be 
the continuing guidepost for ongoing postprivatization governance. They must cover issues ranging 
from safeguarding the value of investments in infrastructure (without going so far as to shield 
investors from market-driven risks) to consumer protection and tariff-setting processes (Box 2.19). 
Mechanisms to Regulate Prices 
Regulators must typically strive to achieve a multiplicity of explicit or implicit goals in the face of 
numerous constraints. These goals include (Joskow 1998b) the following:  
•  Rent extraction—Setting just and reasonable rates that strike a socially acceptable compromise 
between the interests of investors and those of consumers.  
•  Supply-side efficiency—Providing signals and incentives for suppliers and investors to improve 
efficiency   64
Box 2.19. Guiding Principles for 
Public Utility Regulation 
 
  Preserve the value of investments at a 
baseline established in the 
privatization agreement 
  Allow competition to function without 
distortion 
  Weigh the costs of regulatory 
mandates and rules against the benefits
  Ensure competitive service quality and 
price levels 
  Ensure that prices provide signals and 
incentives for consumers, suppliers, 
and investors to be efficient 
  Open access to bottleneck facilities on 
terms that reflect competitive parity 
  Attend to social goals without 
influencing competitive advantage 
 
Source: Willig (1999). 
•  Demand-side efficiency—Providing signals and 
incentives for efficient consumption of regulated utility 
services 
•  Revenue adequacy—Allowing the regulated firm to 
earn revenue just sufficient to attract the capital needed 
for maintenance, replacement, modernization, and 
whatever expansion is justified by demand for the 
service  
•  Fair income distribution—Ensuring income distribution 
that accords with society’s conception of justice. 
Two alternative mechanisms for regulating prices are 
cost-plus and price caps. In this section, we discuss and 
compare these approaches and their likely implications for 
tariff policies. 
Cost-Plus Regulation 
Until recently, cost-plus (or rate-of-return) regulation predominated in the utility industries of the 
United States and several other countries. Policymakers have been attracted to this mode of 
controlling the behavior of utilities, because conceptually it seems fair to both the regulated firm and 
its customers. It permits the firm to earn sufficient revenues to cover its costs, including a fair after-
tax return on its investment, by passing these costs on through the prices charged to consumers. It is 
also designed to protect consumers from monopolistic pricing distortions. 
Cost-plus systems have several shortcomings. The firm has an incentive to engage in accounting 
contrivances and to pad its costs to convince the regulator to approve a higher price to the consumer. 
These systems allow considerable scope for this: the conventions for calculating depreciation, the 
procedures for allocating joint costs between regulated and nonregulated outputs, and the 
procedures for calculating capital costs all admit a range of estimates. Unless the regulatory body 
has the expertise to audit the firm’s actual costs, the firm can get away with misrepresenting its 
costs. This will lead the regulator to set prices that are too high, thus frustrating its rent extraction 
goal. Moreover, the firm has weak incentives to keep its real costs down by being more efficient and 
innovative, as this form of regulation fails to distinguish earnings attributable to efficiency and those   65
attributable to the exercise of market power. Also, the firm has incentives to expand its rate base by 
adopting an excessively capital-intensive technology (the Averch-Johnson effect). These features of 
cost-plus systems clearly conflict with the goal of supply-side efficiency. 
One of the attractions of cost-plus systems is that they are likely to attract capital investment to 
the regulated sector, because investors know they will recover their operating and investment costs, 
perhaps with a return exceeding their cost of capital. Cost-plus systems effectively shift a variety of 
firm- and market-specific risks from the regulated firm to the consumers (Joskow 1998b). Thus, the 
goal of revenue adequacy is easily satisfied. By holding revenues close to costs, cost-plus systems 
keep utility services reasonably affordable. These are important considerations, given the 
socioeconomic characteristics of many DTEs and their generally substantial requirements for 
investment in infrastructure. 
The pure cost-plus system (whereby prices are continuously tied to accounting costs) is largely a 
straw man today, and no one would deliberately choose it for the public interest. But perhaps it has 
gotten a worse reputation than it actually deserves. In practice, under rate-of-return regulation (a 
variant of cost-plus), prices are set in public hearings that evaluate cost data on the basis of specific 
accounting criteria. Once set, prices remain fixed until they are reviewed by the regulator again. 
This regulatory lag should be viewed as an advantage, because it restores some of the incentives for 
efficiency that are lost under a pure cost-plus system. Freezing prices for the period of the lag 
imposes penalties for inefficiency and wrong guesses, while it rewards efficiency by permitting the 
firm to keep the profits it reaps from superior performance. Similar benefits are obtained if the 
regulator restricts profits to within a range or zone of reasonableness, allowing adjustments in prices 
only when returns fall outside that range (Kahn 1988). 
Price-Cap Regulation 
Price caps are designed to protect consumers by limiting the prices that a firm with market power 
can charge. At the same time, they offer the firm wide freedom to make decisions. Aggregate index 
ceilings are placed on prespecified groups of services, called baskets. The regulated entity can freely 
set the price of any service, so long as it violates no index ceiling constraint. Index ceilings are 
adjusted during periodic reviews to allow for expected cost inflation (easily observable changes in 
costs, generally beyond the entity’s control) and a precommitted rate of productivity improvement 
(the X factor). The price-cap system allows no transfers from the regulator to the regulated firm. In   66
fact, the main instrument available to the regulator is the price, or more accurately, the rate of 
increase of the price index, and so it cannot offer an optimal solution to the incentive compatibility 
problem discussed in the incentive regulation literature (Laffont 2001, 2002). Nevertheless, in the 
set of practicable regulatory systems, it is regarded as having desirable properties. 
In principle, the regulator is not supposed to intervene in the pricing decisions of the enterprise 
within the review period. This implies that the firm has an incentive to reduce its costs at a faster 
rate than was envisaged when the value of X was set, because it can keep the resulting profits. It also 
implies a tradeoff in setting the length of the review period: the longer the period, the greater the 
benefits for the firm; the shorter the period, the greater the benefits for the consumer (because 
consumers do not benefit from these cost reductions until the price cap is reset). As well, it implies 
that the regulator, when setting the price cap, has to forecast future costs and revenues, to ensure that 
the firm will be financially sustainable, at least with a probability that is acceptable to the firm 
beforehand. The source of information for this exercise is of course the firm itself, and so this 
system does not entirely escape the problems related to rate-of-return regulation. There are grounds 
for expecting a ratcheting-up effect in the price-cap system: as the end of the review period 
approaches, the firm will ease off in its cost-reducing activities so that the reset caps will reflects its 
higher cost levels. 
Various choices are available to the regulator: Which services will be subject to a price cap? 
Which services will be used to construct the price index? Will certain cost increases be 
automatically passed on to the consumer, and if so, to what extent? Different utilities will require 
different detailed designs, so the introduction of price-cap regulation can be costly in terms of 
information requirements and human capital. Nevertheless, the price-cap system is sufficiently 
superior to rate-of-return regulation, in terms of both incentives for cost reduction and ongoing 
regulatory costs, to be worth the set-up costs. 
Comparative Information Requirements 
Cost-Plus. Given typical inflation rates, regulatory hearings would be an ongoing process. The costs 
of information and of regulatory proceedings will be high. 
Price Cap. Similar information as for cost-plus, together with forecasts of the relevant variables 
over the future review period, is required at the end of each review period. However, for typical 
review periods of 3 –5 years, this is likely to imply a substantially lower total information   67
requirement. Within review periods, the regulator needs only to monitor compliance with the price-
cap regime. 
Comparative Human Capital Implications 
Cost-Plus. For information collection, processing, and presentation in rate hearings a firm requires 
accountants, engineers, economists, and lawyers on an ongoing basis. Similar professionals are 
required by the regulatory agency. These are of course scarce in developing countries and would 
have high opportunity costs, owing to the loss of their involvement in actually running the utility. 
Price Cap. The process of setting price caps requires the same types of professionals as the cost-
plus system. However, the within-period monitoring requires far less professional input because it 
involves just a comparison of actual and permitted rates of increase of a well-defined price index. 
Thus, within periods the utility professionals would be available to run the business. Additional 
inputs required by the utility and the regulator when the price cap is being reset could be determined 
by consultants. 
Comparative Risks of Capture 
Cost-Plus. The incentive for capture in the cost-plus system is high, because the regulatory agency 
has a lot of discretion. Capture (which of course is a type of corruption) seems to have been quite 
prevalent in the U.S. regulatory system. It could also be expected to be high in developing countries. 
Price Cap. There is also of course a strong incentive for capture under the price-cap system, but the 
possibility of it could be made less than under cost-plus, first, by limiting the discretion of the 
regulatory agency to intervene within the review period; and second, by using one-off consultants 
for setting future price caps. 
Comparative Risks of Political Intervention 
Political intervention has been a major problem with the operation of utilities as public enterprises in 
developing economies (and not only those; compare, for example, Italy) and will probably continue 
to be so. The  World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development argued that 
establishing the utilities as commercial enterprises and giving them autonomy within a framework 
of clear targets and accountability would contribute greatly to their economic performance, as well 
as to the economy as a whole. That is surely right. It could further be argued that having them   68
regulated by outside regulatory agencies, rather than government departments, would contribute to 
transparency and would establish an arm’s-length relationship in their dealings with government. 
That said, it is not clear that a case can be made on political grounds for one type of regulation over 
the other. The more frequent regulatory hearings in the cost-plus system present more opportunities 
for intervention. On the other hand, developments within a review period in the price-cap system 
(for example, high profitability because the utility is more successful than expected in cutting costs) 
could also provide populist politicians with irresistible grounds for intervention. 
Incentive Regulation 
A theory known as incentive regulation provides important insights into the design of regulatory 
systems, but it does not supply a specific regulatory framework that can be implemented 
immediately (Laffont and Tirole 2000). 
Incentive regulation refers to the implementation of rules that grant a regulated firm some, but 
not complete, discretion and encourage it to achieve desired goals. Regulation becomes essentially a 
principal–agent problem. If the regulator’s information about all  aspects of the regulatory 
environment is as good as the firm’s, then there is no problem: the regulator (the principal) can 
simply instruct the firm (the agent) to implement the efficient rules. If the firm's costs are 
endogenous (that is, it can reduce production costs by incurring other costs—managerial effort, for 
example), then the regulator can specify that the firm undertake the optimal level of this activity 
(that is, the marginal benefit, in terms of cost reduction, is just equal to its marginal cost). The 
regulatory problem is, however, essentially one of asymmetric information: the regulator does not 
have the information it needs to implement the efficient policies, but it knows the firm does. Thus, a 
mechanism is needed to motivate the firm to use its superior information to achieve certain goals. 
Three key assumptions underlie incentive regulation. First, the regulator is able to make money 
transfers to the firm. This means the regulator has an instrument, in addition to the price (or 
equivalently, output), to solve the adverse selection problem arising out of the information 
asymmetry. Second, the regulator places a higher weight on consumer’s surplus than on producer’s 
surplus. Third, as is usual in discussions of pricing, if the regulator’s concern is the sum of these 
surpluses and not the values of its components, the adverse selection problem can be made to 
disappear. By offering the firm a transfer that gives it the same net profit whatever the information it 
reveals, the firm has no incentive to provide false information, and efficient pricing and cost-  69
reducing policies can be implemented. This can, however, leave the firm with large rents and is not 
optimal if the regulator places a higher weight on consumer’s surplus than on producer’s surplus.  In 
that case, rent extraction becomes an objective of regulatory policy. 
The literature developing this approach is large and sophisticated, but the question remains: What 
does it all imply for utility regulation in practice, especially in the DTEs? The general answer seems 
to be that its contribution is not to supply a specific regulatory framework or process to be 
implemented immediately but to give insights and ideas that can be taken into account in the design 
of any actual system: 
•  The regulatory system should give regulated firms incentives to supply accurate information but 
should place constraints on how this information can be used. 
•  The regulatory system should give regulated firms incentives to reduce costs. 
•  Cost increases should not automatically be passed on to consumers when firms can influence the 
size of those increases, but the firm should not be penalized for cost changes outside its control. 
•  The regulator should commit to a policy of never taking advantage of a firm’s sunk costs after 
the fact or of revealed information. 
Toward More Promising Regulatory Mechanisms 
The task of designing effective regulatory mechanisms in the DTEs is especially daunting for 
several reasons. Some of the difficulties are endemic to infrastructure regulation everywhere, and 
some are oddly shaped shadows cast by the stubborn complexities of underdevelopment (see Box 
2.1). 
In the face of scarce technical expertise, severe information problems, lack of well-developed 
accounting and auditing systems, weak separation of powers, lack of checks and balances, weak 
legal systems, high incidence of corruption, and low levels of commitment, the U.S.–U.K. 
regulation models are likely to prove too challenging for many DTEs. Most developing countries 
are ill-suited to the traditional quasi-judicial, command-and-control techniques of regulation, with 
their elaborate and complex procedural requirements. More appropriate regulatory mechanisms for 
most DTEs would 
•  be simple, decentralized, flexible, and less formal 
•  effectively streamline procedures 
•  empower consumers with information   70
•  generate creative, win–win outcomes through collaborative processes that bring all the 
stakeholders to the table.  
Radical Competitive Restructuring  
Undeveloped administrative and regulatory capacity, scarcity of technical expertise, and political 
interference substantially raise the risk of regulatory failure in the DTEs. This situation calls for a 
aggressive program of competitive restructuring and market liberalization, introduced to the fullest 
extent permitted by each industry’s underlying economic and technological characteristics and the 
small size of the markets in some developing countries. The regulators must accept an ordinance 
that prevents them from intervening in the regulated firm’s activities that relate to competitive or 
contestable markets. Under this principle, competitive restructuring would minimize the domain of 
regulatory interference and substantially reduce the need for scarce expertise and regulatory 
capacity. Elegantly simple regulatory systems that take into account the severe information 
problems and limited technical expertise in the DTEs and use the most basic, even if not most 
efficient, instruments of intervention are more likely to succeed. The proposed approach would 
require much greater attention to the fundamental sector economics early in the reform process.  
Decentralizing Decisions to the Firms 
The pursuit of pricing and other regulations to elicit optimal industrial performance in many DTEs 
is hindered by the lack of proper accounting systems and by the dearth of information on marginal 
costs, demand elasticities, and other pertinent attributes of demand and cost relationships. Under the 
traditional command-and-control regulatory model, any prices calculated without such information 
are apt to be inconsistent with economic efficiency and be damaging to economic welfare. The 
information available to the firms themselves is also highly imperfect in many DTEs. Still, it seems 
likely that the firms will have better and more up-to-date estimates of cost and demand conditions 
than the regulators (Baumol and Sidak 1994). 
How can regulators in the DTEs acquire a realistic chance of becoming effective in the face of 
severe information problems? One promising policy direction would be to decentralize the decisions 
on pricing and other key variables to the firms that have the necessary information. The role of the 
regulator would be limited to imposing floors and ceilings on prices (to protect against predation 
and monopolistic pricing). The bounding magnitudes would be based, in a rough and ready way, on   71
economic analysis of costs or appropriate international benchmarks. The price-determining process 
then would be left to the firm, which would be free to select prices within the floor–ceiling limits; 
the firm’s self-interest would motivate it to adopt prices that best serve the public interest. Such a 
framework could meet the dual regulatory objectives of giving the infrastructure entities an 
opportunity to obtain adequate revenue (an important issue in many sectors in the DTEs) and 
protecting consumers from monopolistic pricing. 
Bottom-up Regulation through Information and Negotiation 
The primary objective of the traditional command-and-control regulatory system is to protect 
consumers from monopoly abuse, while respecting the property rights of firms. However, as 
competition enters utility markets, consumers should no longer be considered helpless pawns of 
infrastructure monopolies. With the spread of competition, consumers will be better able to protect 
themselves against monopolistic exploitation, and the public interest will be well served by 
informed negotiations or public debates between utility suppliers and consumers. The regulatory 
body could play a constructive role in such d eal-making by empowering consumers with 
information, in lieu of limiting the power of utility monopolies. Indeed, if properly constituted, the 
provision of information may create an effective system of self-regulation (Willig 1999; Wirick 
1999).  
The enormous financing needs of most infrastructure sectors in the DTEs and the extraordinarily 
adverse climate for generating such financing at the present time urgently call for a new creative 
partnership between private enterprise and the public. However, when state-owned utilities are 
transferred to private ownership, they often find themselves suspect. Their goals are generally taken 
to be the exploitation of the public and the subversion of competition, and they are widely judged to 
have the power to attain those goals. Thus, the regulators frequently have an adversarial relationship 
with the privatized utilities. As well, the traditional regulatory culture has often viewed utility policy 
as a zero-sum game, and this regulatory culture is unsuitable for most DTEs, in view of their unique 
investment requirements. 
Foreign private investors weigh a wide range of generic and regulatory-specific risks in assessing 
investment opportunities in the DTEs. Regulatory-specific risks include lack of clarity on end-user 
and access pricing policy, uncertainties about the timing and scope of market liberalization, and 
burdens related to universal service goals. The lack of historical precedents and policy experience in   72
the DTEs, owing to their legacies of state ownership, exacerbates investors’ anxiety. There is a need 
for a process that 
•  encourages participation, debate, and open discussion 
•  facilitates exchange of information and benchmarking experiences 
•  develops long-term relations with stakeholders, based on mutual trust and commitment to public 
policy outcomes 
•  makes it easier for regulators to consult with industry participants 
•  builds operators and investors into the regulatory process itself.  
The privatization of utilities in the DTEs creates consumer expectations for improved services 
and fair prices. This naturally leads to disputes between consumers and operators, as well as 
between the incumbent operators, new entrants, and other service providers. Such conflicts between 
competitors are inevitable and healthy. However, excessive litigiousness and prolonged delays in 
resolving disputes can seriously impair commercial markets. The regulatory body could help the 
parties reach negotiated settlements and could resolve such disputes in a timely manner. When the 
regulatory body regulates by negotiation, however, it must ensure that the public interest is protected 
in these negotiations. Unless the process includes the public interest, there is a risk that in acting as a 
platform for negotiations among competing suppliers the regulatory body might become a venue for 
chilling competition (Willig 1999). Still, by allowing contesting parties to reach voluntary, 
uncoerced agreements, these consultative mechanisms could generate creative, win–win outcomes 
and overturn unduly combative relationships between stakeholders in the regulatory environment 
(Wirick 1999). Some of the DTEs are hostile to international arbitration, though not to consensual 
methods of dispute resolution; and corruption is endemic to their official administrative 
mechanisms. In these countries there might be considerable scope for private dispute-resolution 
mechanisms (Bruce and Marriott 2002).   73
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CHAPTER THREE 
Private Participation in Transportation 
hroughout the world, the transportation sector has been one of the most extensively 
regulated sectors. Price, entry, exit, financial structure, accounting methods, vertical 
relations, and operating rules have all been subject to some form of governmental 
control.  In recent years, however, the restrictions placed on competition and 
ownership in this sector have been viewed as inimical to consumer and industry interests alike. 
Following the deregulation of airlines, trucking, and railroads in the United States in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, many other advanced industrial economies reviewed their regulatory policies in the 
transportation sector and liberalized their transportation systems. Many developing and transition 
economies (DTEs), facing serious fiscal pressures and poorly performing state-owned enterprises, 
also undertook substantive policy reforms and sought to realign the private and public sectors’ roles 
in transportation (Estache and de Rus 2000).  
  Much of the recent experience and analysis in infrastructure deregulation and privatization has 
related to the traditional natural-monopoly network utilities. This chapter is concerned with the 
exercise of social control over privately provided transport infrastructure and services. It focuses on 
railroads and ports, two areas in which the private sector has recently begun to play a large role in a 
large number of DTEs. The chapter identifies distinguishing characteristics of the transport sector 
that have determined the forms of private participation, and it l ooks at the implication of these 
characteristics and industry forms for regulation.  
Distinguishing Characteristics of the Transport Sector  
Historically, state agencies directly provided much of the transport sector infrastructure and services 
in many countries (Shalizi 1996). Rail transport, for example, was seen as a natural monopoly; in 
other parts of the transport sector, direct public provision was related to special modal 
characteristics. Private participation in the sector, and the need for residual regulation, has to be 
structured to reflect these special characteristics, the main categories of which are described below.   74
Social Objectives 
Many governments have traditionally treated passenger transport as a merit good: that is, a 
minimum provision of this good has been seen as a social imperative. For the most part this 
philosophy has been applied to local transport (though in maintaining low railway passenger fares 
and forced cross-subsidy of air services to the remoter regions, the Indian government has applied it 
more broadly). Social objectives have tended to apply to local bus and passenger rail services but 
not to intercity or international transportation. 
Three major instruments have been used to support this policy: general control of fares, 
obligations to carry particular categories of passenger at concessionary rates, and obligations to 
maintain unremunerative services. In richer countries, these obligations have been directly financed 
through government payments to operators. In most developing countries, in the absence of direct 
financing they have been supported by internal cross-subsidy. None of these obligations could be 
sustained in a competitive private market (because competition would eliminate the sources of 
cross-subsidy). Thus, any residual commitment to them in developing countries constrains the forms 
of competition and regulation. This gives the role of internal cross-subsidy a particular importance 
in the transport sector. 
Separation of Infrastructure and Operations 
Unlike most public utilities, in transport (except rail) the provision of infrastructure has historically 
been separate from the provision of services on that infrastructure. Neither in sea nor in air transport 
has this created any great problems: although port and airport charges are subject to regulatory 
control, they are usually nondiscriminatory and do not significantly distort competition between 
modes or locations. 
The most controversial issues have arisen in road and rail transport and in the relationship 
between the two. In most cases road users do not pay direct charges. Taxes on road-user inputs 
(particularly fuel, and to a lesser extent vehicles) are controversial in terms of modal split (rail 
operators claim they are disadvantaged because road users have free use of infrastructure) and 
choice of vehicle technology (diesel tax versus gasoline tax, different license duties, etc.). Attempts 
to introduce competition in rail service by separating infrastructure and operations are complicated 
by serious problems in determining access charges. 
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Product Heterogeneity 
Transport demand is spatially and temporally specific; that is, it is demand for a trip between a given 
origin and destination at a given time. While clearly some substitutability of both trip destinations 
and timings can occur, any unit of supply (in the passenger market, at least) is likely to bundle a 
wide range of diverse products. Forecasting demand for any particular transport service or 
infrastructure is especially difficult and m ust take into account a wide range of potential 
substitutions. Private suppliers of transport infrastructure are therefore likely to perceive market risk 
as high. 
On the supply side the product is also heterogeneous, with possible differences in timing, 
frequency, speed, comfort, reliability, and safety to reckon with. Moreover, some product mixes are 
difficult to sustain (for example, passenger and freight rail services on congested lines). While an 
individual supplier may use product differentiation and price discrimination to exploit consumer 
surpluses and increase revenue yields (as exemplified by the air transport market), it is common for 
dominant suppliers to seek protection against competition from new, differentiated entrants 
(particularly in the urban passenger transport market). Because of inefficient road pricing (owing to 
congestion externalities), the regulation of competition has been particularly difficult and 
contentious. 
Externalities 
The two major externalities that affect the transport sector are environmental impacts and traffic 
congestion.  
Regulation must protect the environment from the effects of the transport sector. This sector is 
responsible for about 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in the richest countries and for as 
much as 80 percent of health-damaging suspended particulate matter in many megacities. Direct 
interventions have been undertaken to suppress some types of emission at source (elimination of 
lead from gasoline, mandatory use of catalytic converters on road vehicles, noise regulations on 
aircraft, regulations on ship discharges). Indirect interventions have taken the form of measures to 
discriminate between more and less polluting modes to reduce the overall environmental impact of 
the transport sector (Shalizi  and Carbajo1994,  Gwilliam, Shalizi and Thompson 1994).  
Congestion occurs where the addition of one user to the flow of traffic adversely affects the 
performance of other users. It is a particular problem for road traffic in urban areas, and it also   76
affects the performance of major ports and airports. In rail systems, overall performance is highly 
sensitive to the mix and management of flows of fast passenger and slower freight trains. 
Congestion has implications for optimum prices, which are not always easy to reconcile with 
commercial operations, especially where infrastructure and operations are separated. And where, as 
is usually the case, urban road use is not optimally priced, it generates calls for second-best physical 
interventions, which may restrain competitive entry (for example, the current resistance to using 
small buses and vans to provide services in Argentina and Brazil). 
Information Inadequacy: The Costs of Shopping Around 
Because passenger demand is heterogeneous and services are speculatively bundled to capture this 
demand, transport users often face significant information costs in identifying how best to satisfy 
their needs. For some repetitive trips—for example, the peak-hour journey to work—the passenger 
is probably well informed. For other trips, off peak or occasional, the passenger may have limited 
experience. In a fragmented, competitive market, transport users have no central source of 
information to rely on. It may be in the interests of a new entrant to run just ahead of the known 
schedule of the incumbent, and it then becomes in the interest of the incumbent to hang back a little 
to allow passengers to congregate. Such irregularity of service may also be caused by bunching of 
buses on congested roads. Even if passengers prefer to use buses of a particular company they won’t 
know how long they will have to wait for one and will therefore tend to use the first service to 
arrive. This results in inefficient market processes, with a tendency of firms to compete on 
frequency, rather than price, and leads to smaller vehicles, informal operations, and the breakdown 
of scheduled service. 
Strategic Considerations 
A final complication is that transport is often considered of particular strategic importance, both for 
military operations and for national development. National governments thus typically wish to 
determine infrastructure provision. Where the vehicle is internationally mobile, such as a ship or 
aircraft, governments may also believe that national ownership of at least part of the fleet is of 
strategic importance, though they are usually wrong, of course. Right or wrong, though, a move to 
private provision must take account of these considerations.   77
Figure 3.1.   Reduction of Railroad Cargo in the Transformation Period, 1985–1997  
















Railroads: Restructuring Regulation for the Public Interest 
Since the early 1950s an alarming decline has occurred in the performance of the railroad industry 
in both industrial and developing countries. In centrally planned economies, heavy industry and 
policies that accorded railroads most-favored status postponed the decline. However, after the 
abandonment of central planning the rail industry experienced an even steeper decline in those 













Several factors contributed to this decline in performance: increased competition from more 
technologically advanced modes of transport; monolithic industry and rigid management structures 
unresponsive to customer needs and demands and to marketplace opportunities for innovation; 
excessive political interference; overstaffing; and regulatory regimes poorly suited to promoting the 
public interest. In most countries, the technological imperatives and locational patterns of a 19th-
century economy had determined the design and construction of the rail network. With the 
emergence of alternative technologies and modes of transportation and shifts in the locations of 
industry and the consuming population, much of the rail network in many countries became almost 
obsolete. Advances in jet technologies and cost-saving innovations in automobiles significantly 
eroded the railroad’s competitive position in passenger markets. In freight, the railroad’s historical 
dominance was undermined by a shift away from bulk commodities toward high-value products,   78
increasing the importance of service quality and on-time delivery—not common characteristics of 
traditional rail systems. 
Over the years, the railroad industry has had difficulty adjusting to these changes in its market 
environment. Misguided regulatory policies exacerbated the industry’s problems, reducing its 
incentives and ability to respond. For example, cross-subsidies from freight to passengers 
accelerated the loss of rail’s freight market share to trucking. The combination of public ownership 
and exclusive monopoly dulled incentives to control costs.  
Most rail operations in the DTEs have had extraordinary levels of excess employment: the ratio 
of labor costs to revenues has typically exceeded 50 percent, and in many cases it has been well 
above 100 percent (the only notable exception being China, with a ratio of less than 20 percent). 
Political pressures on prices and governmental control over investment decisions, suspension or 
termination of services, and construction of railway facilities contributed to the deterioration in 
performance. Governments often imposed investment programs that did not reflect the railroads’ 
true developmental priorities (World Bank 1994). More attention tended to be given to the 
achievement of physical targets (such as tonne– and passenger–kilometers) than to sound economic 
and financial planning. The industry’s chronic revenue shortfall impaired its ability to attract capital 
for maintenance, replacement, and modernization. Government intervention through ownership and 
regulation has, therefore, been responsible in large part for mediocre service, the poor financial 
condition of the railroads, deterioration of physical plants, suppression or delay of cost-saving 
innovations, and misallocation of freight traffic between competing transport modes. 
The first serious signs of financial distress appeared in the United States, where public policy on 
the privately owned railroads largely ignored the emerging intermodal competition and the 
government continued to tightly regulate the industry. The bankruptcy, or virtual bankruptcy, of 
several major railroads in the1970s threatened service in important areas of the country. A series of 
financial crises also affected British Railways from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. The rail 
systems of continental Europe experienced substantial erosion of market share in both freight and 
passenger traffic. Their dire financial condition was in major part due to high labor costs: the ratio of 
labor costs to revenue ranged from 80 and to more than 200 percent. A serious financial crisis also 
confronted the Japanese rail system, which experienced operating losses in excess of $15 billion per 
annum, leading to a staggering cumulative debt of more than $337 billion (Kopicki and Thompson 
1995). The railways in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and other DTEs had reached a similar   79
state of physical and financial collapse by the early 1990s. The flow of traffic in many countries was 
impeded by undermaintained track, and locomotives were often unavailable. In Brazil, for example, 
in the early 1990s more than 40 percent of the track was in bad condition, and 35 percent of 
locomotives were immobilized in the workshops at any one time, typically awaiting parts or funds 
for repair (World Bank 1994). The drag of railroad subsidies and financial losses on government 
budgets also exacerbated the fiscal crises confronting many DTEs. In Poland, the railroad suffered a 
major financial loss in 1998, amounting to $300 million on a turnover of  $1.8 billion, owing to the 
losses on passenger traffic. The Ugandan Railways Corporation was consistently ranked among the 
top three public-enterprise recipients of subsidies from the Government of Uganda (PPIAF 2001). 
In the early 1990s, the Brazilian railroad required continual support from the public treasury, 
amounting on average to more than $250 million a year (Estache et al. 2000). 
These problems led to a profound reassessment of public policy towards railroads in both 
advanced industrial and developing countries. Although the reforms vary across countries, they 
include several important common elements: (a) altering the vertical and horizontal structure of the 
industry; (b) rebalancing the roles of the private and public sectors in supply; and (c) restructuring 
the relationship between the railway and the state and modifying the character of railroad regulation. 
In the United States, the objective of policy reform was to free the industry from many arcane 
regulatory constraints that proved ruinous to its performance and to replace regulation with 
competitive market forces. In 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the Staggers Act, which substantially 
deregulated the railroad industry. The Act granted the Interstate Commerce Commission expanded 
authority to give the railroads pricing flexibility and to allow abandonment of unproductive and 
redundant track and other facilities. A program to extensively restructure Japanese National 
Railways was launched in 1986, creating nine new enterprises (six vertically integrated passenger 
railways, a freight operator, an infrastructure holding company for part of the track, and a settlement 
corporation). This privatization lasted through to the late 1990s. In the early 1990s, the United 
Kingdom restructured British Railways, vertically and horizontally. The government subsequently 
privatized 6 freight businesses and the entire infrastructure and competitively awarded 25 franchises 
in the passenger segment. At the beginning of the 1990s, virtually all the rail systems in Latin 
America and Africa were owned by the state. A decade later, most of those in Latin America and 
several in Africa were concessioned to private operators (Thompson 2002).    80
Box 3.1. Economies of Scale, Scope, and Density in the Railroad Industry 
 
There are substantial economies of scale in the provision of some rail services—whether focused on 
particular routes or types of freight and other movements—which result from the heavy fixed costs 
associated with rail operations. To transport even small amounts of freight or passengers, a railroad must 
generally incur the costs of track, right of way, locomotive power, crew, and certain facilities. These costs 
do not rise proportionately with traffic volume. 
 
Another pertinent feature of the railroad industry is that there are substantial economies of scope, which 
result from the common costs of rail operations. O utlays on rails, ties, right of way, yard facilities, 
locomotion, and train crews are among many common costs  incurred in carrying passengers and various 
types of freight between a variety of origins and destinations. These shared costs confer economies of scope 
on carriers offering a multiplicity of transportation services: a carrier that provides an array of services can 
do so at a lower cost than a set of carriers producing each service separately. 
 
Comparing the average costs of railroads that have different sized route networks does not provide 
information directly relevant to economies of scale, because such railroads are likely to offer quite different 
collections of services as a result of their different route mileages and architectures. The correct and relevant 
measure in railroading is the degree of scale economies relating to traffic volume on each particular route—
economies of density—rather than to the extent of the traffic on an overall and possibly growing system.  
 
 
Current Issues of Public Policy 
The same economic characteristics that make the rail industry a natural target for government 
intervention also render it particularly difficult to regulate in the public interest. The old 
regulatory systems failed to solve the central regulatory problem in railroads and certain other 
network utilities (for example, telecommunications and electric power): the mixture of 
competition and monopoly elements in supply (Baumol and Willig 1987). 
The Regulatory Problem 
Pervasive economies of scale and scope (Box  3.1), high costs of entry, and small numbers 
competition in the railroad industry are all consistent with the likely persistence of prices in excess 
of marginal cost. However, while scale economies go hand in hand with natural monopoly, a 
railroad may or may not have the price-setting discretion of a textbook monopolist. It all depends on 
whether the activities characterized by economies of scale and scope are shielded from other 
sources of competition and have protective barriers to entry.  
In the railroad industry, extensive capital sums must be sunk in way, structures, and ancillary 
facilities, to create new rail lines. These large sunk costs may suggest that the railroad industry is not 
structurally competitive or contestable. However, railroad services are far more contestable than   81
these impediments to rail entry would suggest, because there are often strong competitive pressures 
from other modes of transportation. 
The basic patterns of railroad regulation, established many decades ago under wholly different 
market conditions, are simply obsolete. Their premise was that railroads had a collective monopoly, 
or near monopoly, on long-distance land transport. This condition disappeared long ago, if indeed it 
ever existed. Nearly every sphere of rail service now faces intense competition. Rival products and 
rival sources of supply—including trucks, barges, buses, airplanes, pipelines, and even alternative 
rail routes—are likely to impose effective competitive constraints on many rail activities. In Brazil, 
for example, the railroad’s pricing power in petroleum transportation declined in recent years 
because of the new pipelines (Estache et al. 2001).  In those activities where the railroad shows no 
evidence of market dominance, it should be offered freedom in pricing. Still, in other instances the 
competitive checks of intra- and intermodal, geographic, and product competition might be weak or 
nonexistent (such cases might include the long-distance movement of commodities and minerals in 
countries such as Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation). In these cases market forces 
may fail to prevent excessive pricing. The resulting monopoly power is the basic justification for 
regulation of rail rates and earnings and defines the basic task with which regulation must grapple. 
In practice, effective competition can assume a variety of subtle forms. In freight, for example, 
coal shipped by rail competes with oil and natural gas shipped by pipeline. Thus, competition from 
petroleum products can limit the price railroads can charge for carrying coal. Therefore, 
policymakers should never proceed in haste to undermine the workings of the market through 
special intervention.  
Structure and Ownership of the Railroad Industry 
The historical model of railway operations in the DTEs is a single, state-owned monolithic 
organization controlling all facilities, operating and administrative functions and determining what 
services to provide to a significantly captive market. But the conditions that generated this model no 
longer exist in most countries, and governments have had to consider fundamental restructuring of 
the railway entity itself and the relationship between the railway and the state. The objectives for 
such restructuring have properly included injection of more innovative and efficient management, 
reduction of railway deficits and the burdens of public subsidies, increased competition with other 
transport modes, and more responsiveness to the needs of emergent private enterprises.   82
Options for Vertical Structuring. Three generic options can be identified for the vertical 
structuring of railways, addressing the set of relationships between the railway and other 
transportation entities (both rail and other), the markets served, and the functions performed (Figure 
3.2). These functions include ownership; improvement and maintenance of the fixed facilities; 
control of operations, such as dispatching and freight classification; train movement; equipment 
provision and maintenance; marketing; and financial control and accountability. Determining which 
of these options is the best choice is a complex policy decision. 
•  Option 1: The monolithic railway—The status quo is frequently the traditional monolithic, 
integrated entity, owning and operating all its own facilities and vehicles. In theory, this 
approach should maximize production efficiency by exploiting the economies of scale and 
scope of rail operations. In practice, the monolithic entity, lacking financial incentives and 
desegregated information on profitability, is, at best, production oriented, unresponsive to 
market demands for services, and hierarchical (if not bloated) in organizational architecture. 
Some Latin American and African countries are developing spatially separated but completely 
vertically integrated private companies. In most countries using this model, competition comes 
primarily from road (or sometimes waterway) haulage. For example, most of the nonurban 
concessions in Latin America and Africa (including those of Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, and Gabon and those in preparation in Senegal–Mali) are vertically integrated, 
predominantly freight carriers competing with the deregulated road freight sector. In the U.S. 
case, competition occurs as well between the rail companies for major traffic flows. 
•  Option 2: Competitive access—Competing railway companies have exclusive control over 
some trackage but also exchange rights of competitive access with other companies. Some 
forms of competitive access include joint terminal agreements or conferrals of trackage rights, 
whereby one railway obtains the right to use the freight-handling facilities or line-haul tracks of 
another railway at a particular location or along a particular route. Another arrangement may be 
to hand off interlining traffic between distinct railroad entities in preference to the use of 
trackage rights. In the United States, railroads do a great deal of largely unregulated interlining, 
perform reciprocal switching under regulated terms, and exercise trackage rights as a result 
sometimes of free negotiation and sometimes of regulatory mandates (mostly achieved in 
settlements of disputes over rail mergers).   83
•  Option 3: Vertical separation—The ownership of track and other fixed facilities is separated 
from other rail functions, with the track assets held by government, a consortium of operators, or 
a regulated private entity. A recent example is the joint terminal company in Mexico that was 
created to give the three major freight concessionaires nondiscriminatory access to Mexico City 
and to ensure access to the track by future suburban passenger operators. 
 
Figure 3.2   Market Structure and Ownership Options in Railroads 
 
 
Comparing Vertical Separation with Competitive Access. The primary virtue of separating the 
ownership of track and trains is that it may permit active or potential competition to reign among 
rail operators. Under this option, operators need not be subject to regulation, as they would have all 
the powerful incentives of competition to be efficient and responsive to the needs of shippers and a 
growing entrepreneurial economy. However, separation may create serious coordination problems, 
loss of economies of scope, and otherwise unnecessary transaction costs. The investment incentives 
of the track owner might not be compatible with those of the rail operators. Clearly, the investment 
incentives of the infrastructure monopolist will depend critically on whether it is a state-owned 
entity, or, if it is in the private sector, on the character of its regulation. Serious contractual and 
investment coordination issues arose, for example, in the vertically unbundled British railway 
system: Railtrack and the operating companies frequently could not agree on the timing of needed 
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(Yvrande 2000). This problem could be especially serious in many DTEs, where significant new 
investments are required to rehabilitate the track and other fixed rail installations.  
Separation of operations from infrastructure in a railroad system is no panacea for regulatory 
problems (Box  3.2). As a policy direction, it must be compared with the leading alternative: 
competitive access. This option differs most clearly from the vertical separation option in allowing 
integrated operations by the rail entity. Competitive access may include a requirement that the 
integrated carrier make its facilities available to other entities on a fair and equal basis. However, if 
the integrated carrier has strong incentives to keep other entities out, it is unclear how effective such 
equal-access mandates are likely to be. The rail industry, like other regulated industries (for 
example, gas pipelines, telecommunications, and electric power), has seen many disputes, with 
claims of unfair and unreasonable exclusion from a carrier's facilities despite rules of equal access 
(Rosellon and Halpern 2001).   85
Box 3.2.  Disadvantages of Vertical Separation 
 
The provision of many innovative and market-responsive rail services may require specific investment in 
infrastructure, such as maintaining or upgrading way and structure facilities, constructing loading and 
transshipment facilities, and building spur tracks to reach a shipper’s location. It may be difficult and 
inefficient for any operator to coordinate, as necessary, with the infrastructure-monopoly entity, especially if 
their investment incentives are out of harmony. 
Efficient, safe, and delay-minimizing use of track and yard facilities requires close coordination of the 
priorities of both operators and shippers. Competing operators will compete vigorously and acrimoniously 
over scarce or congested infrastructure facilities, and constantly sorting out their claims will be important for 
the overall efficiency and responsiveness of the rail system. This would be difficult enough for an unintegrated 
system with a monopoly-infrastructure entity, but it seems virtually impossible while having to deal with rules 
against discrimination and tightly regulated or (for a state enterprise) politicized infrastructure pricing.  
For competition to be powerful, the entering operators must believe they can avoid heavy sunk investments in 
rolling stock and specialized facilities. Locomotives and freight cars may indeed be an example of capital on 
wheels, so long as they can be transported to alternative points of gainful use without substantial costs. While 
this is likely to be the case for services provided in the middle of a landmass with a rich rail network ready to 
accommodate the cars, it may not be the case for more specialized cars or for a more isolated market. Also, the 
entering operator may not have yard, loading, car maintenance, or spur facilities available unless new and 
significant sunk investments are made.  For these to be equally available to the entering operator and the 
incumbent operator, the infrastructure entity will have to have made the needed investment as part of its role in 
the system. But the more the infrastructure entity has to supply the entrepreneurship and risk-taking 
investment, the less is gained by the separation, as the infrastructure entity is either a state-owned or a tightly 
regulated private sector monopoly. 
Efficient pricing to cover replacement costs is made more difficult by separation.  Where economies of scale 
are important, efficient pricing to cover replacement costs requires that shipments of different commodities on 
various origin–destination routes bear prices with different relationships to marginal costs. If the operator 
firms can readily evade price discrimination by the infrastructure entity so that the entity cannot collect these 
different prices for use of the facility to ship various commodities, it will be difficult if not impossible to 
defray the costs of the infrastructure efficiently. 
 
Source: Kessides and Willig (1995). 
 
 
Clearly, if the regulations permit the integrated carrier to charge higher prices to captive shippers 
when it does more business, it would have incentives to exclude other participants (this effect arises 
under rate-of-return regulation). Likewise, if the regulations constrain the amount an integrated 
carrier can earn from the portion of access services it provides when it does cooperate with another 
entity, it has incentives to undermine or avoid efficient cooperation, to enlarge its own portion of 
service (Ordover et al 1985). The carrier might also be motivated to exclude an efficient participant 
to weaken, in a predatory manner, that participant’s competitive impact in another market. An 
integrated carrier would have an incentive to undermine efficient cooperation under classic rate-of-
return regulation or under a system of regulated divisions that specifies what an  
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Figure 3.3.   Cumulative Investment in Rail Projects with Private Participation in 
Developing Countries, 1990–1997  
integrated carrier can earn from a cooperative movement. Both were features of U.S. rail regulation 
at one time and should be avoided in the DTEs.  
  Ownership Options. In response to the declining financial and physical condition of the railways 
during the past decade, many fiscally constrained DTEs sought to restructure their rail systems and 
increase private sector participation in their operations. Thus, the 1990s marked the reemergence of 
private railways, after more than half a century of public ownership and management. By the end of 
1997, fourteen DTEs had taken some steps to move railway activities from governmental to private 
control. In these countries, private companies entered into 37 new contracts for the operation and 
management of railways and committed to investing more than $14 billion for rehabilitation or 
construction of infrastructure (Figure 3.3).  
  Only a few countries have fully privatized their railways. As Figure 3.2 indicates, there has been 
a multiplicity of approaches, combining various degrees of private–public ownership and 
competitive restructuring. Figure  3.2 also makes it clear that the monolithic, fully vertically 
integrated, state-owned railway option is becoming obsolete and is no longer a preferred or feasible 
option. The dominant form of private participation in the DTEs is the concession (franchise) to 
manage and operate existing railways, with obligations for major capital expenditures to refurbish 
assets. In some cases this is a complex arrangement. For example, in the Sitarail concession in Côte 
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Table 3.1  Private Rail Projects and Investment by Region, 1990–1997  
d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso, the ownership of the infrastructure and operating assets remains formally 
with two national patrimony companies. The concessionaire must make a payment into their 
investment and renewal funds and must service the debt on any investment they make from their 
own resources on behalf of the concession. In Mexico, in contrast, the state-owned railway was split 
into a number of route-based companies, each of which was awarded a 50-year concession. The 
government immediately put to auction 80 percent of the shares of the concessionaire companies 
and eventually sold 100 percent. 
 
 
Source: Tynan (1999) 
 
Latin America has clearly led the way in railway privatization (Table 3.1). Seven countries in the 
region awarded a total of 26 contracts to private entities during 1990–1997. Latin America’s 
dominance in private railway projects can be attributed to the region’s generally positive experience 
with private sector participation in other infrastructure sectors. Countries in East Asia and Pacific 
awarded fewer privatization contracts, but their total investment exceeded that in Latin America, 
owing to the different nature of these projects (greenfield projects involving heavy metropolitan 
systems and build–operate–transfer contracts). Only a few privatization projects reached financial 
closure in Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia. Countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa have yet to transfer any railway operations to the private sector. 






East Asia and Pacific 7 7,959
Europe and Central Asia 1 0
Latin America and the Caribbean 26 6,458
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 0
Total 37 14,417  88
Figure 3.4.  Class I Railroad Performance, 1964–2000 


















The new regulatory regime in the United States has produced a dramatic renaissance in the physical 
condition and market responsiveness and orientation of the railroads (Figure 3.4). Since the 
Staggers Act came into force, rail productivity gains have exceeded those of nearly every other U.S. 
industry (Braeutigam 1993; Wilson 1997). From 1981 through 2000, labor and locomotive 
productivity increased by 317 and 121 percent, respectively. Lower rail rates—on average, down 59 
percent in real terms from 1981 to 2000—have saved shippers and their customers more than $10 














tended slowly upward, from 35.2 percent in 1978 to more than 40 percent today.   89
Figure 3.5.  Rail Labor Productivity Before and After Concessioning 
Source: Thompson and Budin (2001). 
The magnitude of the effects of restructuring, deregulation, and private participation in the DTEs 
has also been significant. Several policy dimensions previously closed to state enterprises 
contributed to these gains. First, as part of their privatization agreements, the new operators could 
resolve the issue of excess employment, one of the most vexing problems that had plagued the state 
owned railroads. Second, the freedom to change price structures (up to a specified maximum rate) 
allowed the concessionaires to attract traffic for which they had a comparative advantage. Third, in 
some cases freedom to withdraw from unremunerative activities (including passenger services) 
enabled them to concentrate on more productive ones. Fourth, low expenditure on equipment 
investment and maintenance had been damaging to performance (for example, in mid-1995 the 
Brazilian railways were only able to put out half their locomotives and were even refusing traffic on 
this account), so the physical refurbishment that in some cases preceded the concessioning helped 
restore the railways’ capability to serve their chosen markets. 
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The privatization significantly reduced the labor force in almost all cases, varying from a 7.6 
percent reduction in Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso to a 92.1 percent reduction in Argentina. These 
reductions have not usually been due to withdrawals of service but were accomplished primarily 
through programs dealing with labor redundancy. The Argentine railways reduced staff from 94,500 
in 1989 to 12,900 today. In Estonia, Mexico, and Poland, the labor reductions were 44, 66, and 20 
percent, respectively. 
The rationalization of the labor force, especially when combined with traffic growth, led to 
dramatic increases in labor productivity. In all but one case (Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso) the 
railway’s output (expressed as the sum of tonne–kilometers plus passenger–kilometers) per 
employee has at least doubled. In fact, it has more often tripled or even quadrupled (Thompson and 
Budin 2001). As Figure 3.5 indicates, the productivity improvements in relative terms have been 
rather similar for the Argentine and Brazilian freight railways. The explanation for the lower 
proportionate change in Bolivia is that its low wages for labor reduced the incentive to decrease 
employment. The Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso concession experienced fairly low labor productivity 
gains for the same reason. In absolute terms, the differences can be explained largely by the nature 
of the markets served. In Brazil, the Rede Ferroviaria Federal S.A. (RFFSA)–MRS Logistica S.A. 
line of business mostly carries large volumes of iron ore downhill to the sea. Such traffic can be 
highly productive, as the experience of Latin America and elsewhere clearly demonstrates. 
Caused in large part by poor service, lack of technological progress, and ineffective management, 
the decline in the railroads’ traffic base (for example, in Argentina, between 1965 and 1990 the 
railroad’s share of freight traffic declined by 50 percent) was stemmed and reversed after 
concessioning. Better service, combined with greater pricing flexibility and declining freight rates, 
led in most concessions to a significant increase in the volume of freight carried (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6.  Volume of Freight in Latin America, 1986–2001 




The post-reform pricing behavior in several DTEs has given significant benefits to rail users. 
Table 3.2 presents estimates of the tariffs charged at the beginning of each concession and those 
charged in 1999 (all calculated in 1999 purchasing power parity dollars). In Latin America, freight 
rates declined between 7.7 and 53.6 percent.  Similarly, in Côte d’Ivoire, freight rates fell by almost 
14 percent between 1995 (the year the concession was granted) and 1999. Of the 16 cases of 
privatized railroads presented in the table, 14 had lower tariffs in 1999 than at the beginning of the 
concession. These tariff reductions led to annual savings of about $1 billion in transport costs for the 
six countries in the table; moreover, these estimates understate the true magnitude of total savings, 
because they do not account for the competitive pressures that lower rail tariffs exerted on trucking 
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Côte d'Ivoire 1995 0.123  0.106  523  8.9  13.8
Argentina broad gauge 1993 0.039  0.036 6,898  20.7  7.7
Argentina standard gauge 1994 0.032  0.043  495  (5.4) -34.4
Bolivia FCO 1996 0.147  0.123  626  15.0  16.3
Bolivia FCA 1996 0.061  0.098  557  (20.6) -60.7
Brazil
FCA 1996 0.051 0.032  7,268  138.1  37.3
Novoeste 1996 0.043  0.027  1,588  25.4  37.2
Nordeste 1996 0.056  0.026  709  21.3  53.6
MRS 1996 0.027  0.022  26,837  134.2  18.5
ALL 1996 0.044  0.033  10,285  113.1  25.0
Tereza Cristina 1996 0.120  0.101  259  4.9  15.8
Bandeirantes 1998 0.038  0.023  5,984  89.8  39.5
Chile Fepasa 1994 0.089  0.053  1,189  42.8  40.4
Chile Ferronor 1996 0.072  0.046  743  19.3  36.1
Mexico TFM 1997 0.054  0.043  17,256  189.8  20.4
Mexico Ferromex 1997 0.041  0.036  20,638  103.2  12.2
Total  990.4 
Note:   PPP, purchasing power parity 
a.  Calculation of savings from lower rates 

















During most of its history, the Brazilian railroad system generated negative returns on its 
operations. In the early 1990s, the Brazilian railroads obtained higher unit revenues than most of the 
freight railroads in the continent (in 1994 their tariffs ranged between $0.47 and $0.67 per tonne–
kilometer, compared with $0.27 per tonne–kilometer charged by Conrail in the United States). Still, 
the railroads were experiencing substantial financial losses. In 1995, Rede Ferroviaria Federal 
(RFFSA) lost $308 million, and its accumulated debts reached $4 billion  (Estache et al. 2001).  
These persistent financial losses reflected pervasive organizational inefficiencies and low 
productivity; failure to rationalize operations by shedding low-density lines, excess capacity, and 
redundant labor; and government-imposed obligations that fettered the railroad in the face of 
intensifying intermodal competition. 
As part of the restructuring process, which started in 1995, Brazil divided RFFSA into six freight 
concessions, reduced total labor from about 110,000 in 1975 to 42,000 in 1995 (leading to 
significant increases in labor productivity), completely removed subsidies for public service 
obligations, and accorded the new operators considerable pricing flexibility. Operators were 
permitted by regulation to engage in demand-differentiated pricing and negotiate shipper contracts    93
 
with confidential terms and conditions. RFFSA’s losses fell progressively, and its net operating 
profits turned positive in 1996 (Table 3.3). 
Patronage of the suburban passenger rail sector has also grown after concessioning. In Argentina, 
where Buenos Aires unbundled its metropolitan rail and metro services into seven concessions, this 
increase was quite substantial (Figure 3.7), suggesting significant consumer benefits. The main 












   Table 3.3.  Financial Performance of Rede Ferrovaria Federal S.A. 
Before and After Privatization, Selected Years, 1993-1999 (US$ million) 
    
   
 
Note:  PSO, public service obligation. 
Source: Estache, Goldstein and Pittman, 2001a. 
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reason for this appears to have been increased service reliability and passenger safety, although 
increased attention to fare collection may have resulted in some overstatement of the real level of 
patronage increase. What is clear is that fare reduction was not initially part of the explanation. 
The Need for Residual Post-privatization Regulation 
Economic regulation in railroads should be confined to two basic functions: protecting captive 
customers (those who have no competitive alternatives) and ensuring that competing railroads have 
nondiscriminatory access to the track and other bottleneck rail facilities. 
Two basic principles should guide the reform of railroad regulation. First, the competitive market 
should serve as the model for regulation. Market forces will generally constrain pricing in most rail 
activities in the majority of countries. An important source of this constraining influence is 
obviously intermodal competition, especially from trucking and barges in freight; and buses and 
airplanes in the passenger segment. Regulatory restraints should be imposed or continued only 
where market forces are insufficient to enforce competitive behavior. Second, regulatory 
impediments to earning adequate revenues should be eliminated. This should mean, not a guarantee 
of profitability, but an opportunity to obtain competitive earnings. Indeed, in a regime of 
deregulation without general subsidies, a key element in protecting the public interest is eliminating 
any residual regulation that interferes with the financial viability of the rail network. Regulatory 
reform should, therefore, give railroads substantial flexibility in the areas of pricing and industry 
structure. 
The regulatory issues identified below—regulatory protection for captive shippers, cost 
allocation, and access to rail infrastructure—are cross-sectoral, that is, they also arise in electricity, 
telecommunications, ports, and to a lesser extent water.  Chapter 6 offers a more detailed treatment 
of these issues and suggests approaches and solutions consistent with the unique characteristics of 
many DTEs and their infrastructure sectors.  
Regulatory Protection for Captive Shippers 
In some countries (for example, countries in Africa and large countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Poland, and the Russian Federation), the railroad might have a strong competitive 
advantage in moving commodities and minerals over long  distances, especially when the road 
system is in poor condition. For example, about two-thirds of the traffic of RKP, the Polish state   95
railway, consists of hard coal, metal, ores, brown coal, and coke (Ordover and Pittman 1994). In the 
Russian Federation, the railroad carries more than 90 percent of shipments of coal, ore, ferrous 
metals, and cement; 80 percent of chemical and mineral fertilizers; and 70 percent of construction 
material. Competition from road transport is growing for containers, perishables, and high-value 
goods, but this competition is largely limited to west of the Urals and the Far East, where the 
highway sector is well developed. Most of the Russian Federation’s industrial customers continue to 
depend on the railways, which effectively enjoy a monopoly. Without rail-to-rail competition, the 
strength of intermodal competition may fail to restrain monopoly pricing under these circumstances. 
In Brazil, several mining companies are captive users of Ferrovia Sul Atlântico, Ferrovia Centro-
Atlântica, and Ferrovia Novoeste, as they lack meaningful competitive alternatives. Many captive 
shippers of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce protested in 2000 that the railroad unfairly pressured them 
to carry out specific investments before being allowed to use its services (Campos 2002). 
Long-term contracts for rail service offer shippers protection from the exploitation of future 
captivity by a single railroad, particularly if these contracts can be negotiated when the shippers are 
making their investment and locational decisions. Regulatory policy should properly focus on 
shippers caught in the transition to a privatized and less-regulated rail system. Some of these 
shippers may have made investment and locational decisions before the reform. The costs of such 
decisions are often sunk, making it more difficult for the shippers to make competitive adjustments 
when facing higher rail rates. This type of situation reveals the conflict between rate protection for 
shippers and increased rate flexibility for railroads and highlights more than any other the need for 
regulatory intervention to achieve the proper balance. 
Cost Allocation 
The substantial fixed and common costs in the railroad industry create a number of problems for 
government regulation. Perhaps the most troubling is the fact that it is impossible to allocate these 
costs in a mechanical fashion that is unique and has any foundation in economic logic. Accounting 
and arbitrary cost allocation rules can have pernicious effects on the efficiency of utilization of 
transport resources, cause misallocation of traffic among competing modes, and seriously conflict 
with the financial viability of railroads, as the U.S. experience clearly indicates.    96
Access to Rail Infrastructure 
Rail infrastructure remains a natural monopoly, regardless of the option adopted for the industry’s 
structure. Any operator seeking to run services between two points in most countries has the choice 
of only a single provider of infrastructure. Thus, it is generally accepted that regulations are needed 
to govern the terms and conditions of access to bottleneck rail facilities (Nash and Toner 1998). The 
access problem is especially vexing when several railroads compete in the sale of final services 
while one of these firms is the monopoly owner of the track and other essential infrastructural 
facilities (competitive access option). In a variety of market settings, the holder of bottleneck rail 
facilities has incentives to behave anticompetitively and create artificial handicaps for its rivals. 
Vertical separation mitigates, but does not entirely eliminate, the need for access policy, as the U.K. 
experience clearly indicates. 
Lessons Learned 
During the past decade, the railroad industry experienced some of the most sweeping structural 
changes ever observed in the transport sector. However, in most DTEs, the process of railroad 
restructuring and privatization is at too early a stage to permit a clear assessment of long-term 
impacts. Still, the experience to date offers some general insights into the reform process: 
•  The restructuring of railroads raises several difficult policy questions with no clear-cut or 
universal answers: Is the organizational separation of track ownership and train operations 
conducive to economic efficiency? How much pricing freedom should the infrastructure entity 
have to efficiently recover its replacement costs? What regulatory restrictions should be 
imposed on the pricing of a dominant service provider facing weak intra- and intermodal 
competitive pressures?  
•  Injecting competition into the railroad industry is not an easy task. It requires the introduction of 
new and rather complex regulatory mechanisms. Although many DTEs might lack the expertise 
needed to implement these regulatory schemes, maintaining the status quo (that is, a monolithic, 
state-owned railroad) is arguably the most costly option. 
•  A wide variety of approaches can be taken to bring more competition into the domain of 
railroading and its vertical relations. However, few reforms have significantly enhanced 
intramodal competition. Most of the benefits of structural reorganization seem to derive from   97
Figure 3.8.  Rail Share of Total (Rail + Truck) Traffic versus Average Length 
of Haul, 1998 
unsettling the embedded business culture and providing management with the needed flexibility, 
independence, and incentives to become efficient and fiscally responsible and to respond to the 
growing intermodal competition. Thus, public policy in the DTEs may appropriately focus on 
freeing the rail entities from all unnecessary regulatory restraints and creating a level playing 
field between rail and other transport modes, rather than attempting to create rail competition 
through aggressive structural remedies. This is especially important in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, where rails shares of freight traffic are 
still unusually high (Figure 3.8). While physical impediments (such as underdeveloped and 
poorly maintained highways) to the use of alternative transport modes and a continued emphasis 
on extractive and heavy industries are the most likely explanation, policies favoring the rail 
industry have also played a major role.  
•  Ownership and market structure options form a continuum in the rail industry. To choose one of 
these options is a complex policy decision: many important country- and industry-specific 
characteristics need to be considered. Countries differ significantly in size, level of 
development, institutional capacity, density of the rail network, condition of the fixed rail 
facilities, strength of intermodal competition, and efficacy of public finances. In view of these 
differences, the uncritical choice of extreme options (totally private or totally public; full vertical 
integration or complete vertical separation) could be an indication of ideology, rather than a 
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Ports: Alternatives for Organizing a Multiproduct Activity 
Historically, ports have played a vital role as the gateways for economic trade and commerce of 
most nations. Shipping remains by far the main mode of international transport of goods, and more 
than 80 percent of trade with origins or destinations in developing countries, in tonnage, is 
waterborne (al Khouri 1999). As an important determinant of maritime transport costs, seaport 
efficiency is critical to the success of any strategy to integrate a country into the world trading 
system (Clark, Dollar, and Micco 2001). Excessive port costs reduce the competitiveness of a 
nation’s products in world markets and can impede economic growth and development. 
In recent years, technological innovation and changes in the content of international trade have 
led to a far more integrated model of operations in international transport. Ports have become nodes 
in a seamless global logistics supply chain. The globalization of economic activity and strong 
competition in the capital-intensive liner shipping industry have increased the demand for optimal 
capacity utilization and effective delivery of integrated logistics services. Moreover, total port 
container throughput is forecast to reach 270 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent units) by 2005, a 
55 percent increase over the figure for 1998. Even accounting for productivity improvements, there 
is considerable need for investment in new port facilities: roughly 200–300 additional full-fledged 
container terminals. Port operators and authorities are, therefore, under more pressure to adapt their 
roles and functions and to improve their efficiency and labor productivity, in particular (Juhel 1998). 
This will require a fundamental internal reorganization of ports, a rebalancing of the roles of the 
private and public sectors, and regulatory reform aimed at eliminating the arcane administrative 
constraints that stifle productivity and investment in ports. 
In response to these pressures, many countries have taken important steps to reorganize the 
operation and management of their ports. These reform efforts have increased private sector activity 
in ports dramatically, especially in developing countries, where the public sector could no longer 
finance the substantial investments needed for system expansion and modernization of existing 
installations. However, there was also a widespread belief that, regardless of financing constraints, 
private sector management would lead to improvements in port strategy and operations, decrease   99
  
Figure 3.9.   Port Infrastructures 
excessive government control, and more effectively deal with restrictive labor practices. The 
magnitude of the efficiency gains from increased private sector activity will depend, to a large 
extent, on the efficacy of the port regulatory system. Failure to provide an adequate economic 
regulatory framework could result in inefficient and high-cost port services.  
Key Economic Characteristics of Ports  
From a technical perspective, the port sector may be characterized as having a large, indivisible 
initial basic capacity requirement that is immobile (sunk) and has a long life. From an economic 
perspective, port operations are characterized by large fixed costs, especially in the case of container 
terminals, where up to 80 percent of total costs are fixed; strong economies of density (unit costs fall 
as more ships and cargo are handled through the existing port facilities [Walters 1979]); and 
increasing returns to scale (costs per unit of traffic handled decline as the size of the port increases 
[Button 1993]). Ports have therefore traditionally been viewed as exhibiting natural monopoly 
characteristics, justifying direct public sector involvement both in provision (for capital availability 
reasons) and in operation (for monopoly control reasons).  
The Multiproduct Character of Ports 
The above simple characterization breaks down on elaboration, however, as ports are multiproduct 
organizations, encompassing diverse activities with entirely different economic characteristics. 
Port Infrastructures. A port typically needs several types of capital assets (Figure 3.9). It needs  
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Source: Trujillo and Nombela (2000). 
infrastructure for maritime access (channels, protective works, sea locks, lights, and buoys) and for 
land access (roads, railways). Activities within the port need the basic port infrastructure (berths, 
quays, docks, storage areas) and the so-called superstructure (fixed assets, such as sheds, office 
building, and fuel tanks; and fixed and mobile equipment, such as cranes and van carries).  
The maritime and land access infrastructures entail long-lived assets, largely sunk, whose costs 
cannot be easily assigned to specific users. These assets therefore are not an attractive proposition 
for private investors and are typically held by the government. Conceivably, they could also be held 
by a consortium of port operators. Many of the assets of the basic port infrastructure and 
superstructure are long-lived assets, too. However, their costs can be assigned to specific users 
without too much difficulty. There is, therefore, much greater scope for private participation and 
investment in those infrastructures. 
  Port Services. In addition to infrastructure and superstructure, ports provide a multiplicity of 
services (Table 3.4). For example, the movement of freight traffic through a seaport generally 
involves the following sequence of technically distinct 
activities: On arrival (or before) a vessel is allocated a 
berth and typically requires tug assistance and piloting 
to navigate safely through the appropriate channels into 
and within the port. On berthing, the vessel requires 
cargo handling, onboard (stevedoring) and on land. The 
cargo also normally requires stacking or storing (not 
least for customs purposes) before being released for 
land transport out of the port area. Other value-adding 
activities often take place in the port. The vessels 
themselves require a range of services while in port, 
including bunkering, tank cleaning, and repairs and 
maintenance. The appropriate form of private 
participation, and hence of regulation, may differ by 
function. 
The Scope for Unbundling. As with other network utilities, natural monopoly conditions are 
likely to characterize most port infrastructure, which is long-lived and costly. Unlike the other 
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•  Mooring 
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•  Stevedoring 
•  Wharf-handling 
•  Transfer to land transport 
•  Storage 
•  Processing  (consolidation,  
bagging, mixing) 
•  Cargo tracking and EDI 
•  Security 
•  Rental of specialized 
equipment 
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utilities, as noted above, a port provides a wide variety of services, rather than a few specific 
products (see Table 3.4). The operation of most of these services may be conducive to competition. 
Although there are economies of scale and inevitably some sunk costs associated with the provision 
of these services, they are smaller than those associated with the infrastructure. For example, the 
bulk of the capital costs involved in towage and related services amounts to the purchase of tugs. 
There is an active international market for tugs, including second-hand tugs, and modifying second-
hand tugs for use in a different port is cheaper than buying new ones. The capital costs of acquiring 
tugs cannot be considered a material barrier to entry, as only a small portion of such costs is sunk. 
Towage is therefore a contestable activity. 
Considerable opportunities exist for introducing competition and lessening the need for 
regulatory oversight in ports through unbundling—that is, by separating those activities that are 
naturally competitive or seem to entail no inherent structural impediments to contestability 
(arguably most of the services and parts of the superstructure) from those that exhibit global or 
extensive scale economies or perhaps only those inextricably associated with heavy sunk costs 
(such as access and basic infrastructure). In the naturally competitive segments, all interference with 
the market mechanism and any truncation of property rights should be ruled out, and the scope for 
introducing competition should be fully exploited. The public sector should regulate or even run 
those segments with an unavoidable natural monopoly or substantial amounts of sunk capital.  
Seaports have also gotten more involved in providing, within their curtilages (surrounding 
premises), logistics services (storing, order-picking, packing, and distributing) that add value to a 
product. The possibility that the private sector can profitably develop such activities has become an 
important consideration.   102
Box 3.3. Organizational Structures of Ports 
 
Service port, publicly owned 
•  Public sector owns land, infrastructure, and equipment 
•  Public sector provides services 
Tool port 
•  Public sector owns land, infrastructure, and equipment  
•  Public sector leases its equipment and space to private service providers on a short-term basis 
Landlord port 
•  Public sector owns the land and the infrastructure 
•  Private sector provides services on a long-term basis through concessions or build–operate–transfer 
contracts 
Service port, privately owned 
•  Private sector owns all land, infrastructure, and equipment and provides services 
•   
Source: NERA (2001). 
Models of Port Organization 
A multiplicity of activities occur simultaneously at any given port as ships constantly enter; unload 
and load, get serviced, and exit. Thus, all ports have a need for a coordinating agent to ensure the 
proper use of common facilities, oversee safety, and perform systemwide planning. In most ports, a 
public institution called the port authority performs these functions. 
The four main port models (in order of decreasing public sector involvement) are public service 
ports, tool ports, landlord ports, and private service ports. What services they provide depends on 
the role of the port authority and the degree of private sector participation (Box 3.3). 
 The trend in the DTEs has been to move from the public service and tool models to the landlord 
model. However, many ports in developing countries (for example, India and Sri Lanka) still adopt 
the publice landlord model is already common in the largest ports: more than 90 percent of the top 
100 container ports can be classified as landlord ports (NERA 2001). 
Strategies for Introducing Competition in Ports  
Experience suggests that most of the benefits of private sector participation in port activities stem 
from competitive pressures. Strong competitive forces also considerably reduce the scope of needed 
regulatory oversight. Thus, the critical question is, What can governments do to enhance 
competition in line with the unique characteristics of ports and marketplace opportunities for 
innovation? They can foster or stimulate competition in a number of ways:   103
•  Interport competition can be fierce, as it is, for example, between the major container hub ports 
of East Asia. The major shipping enterprises are intensely demanding and expert at playing off 
one port against another. The effectiveness of a particular port in these contests may depend 
critically on its ability to process traffic quickly and reliably and integrate its activities with 
inland or feeder networks. Such external competition may be the most important determinant of 
the degree of internal regulation that a port requires. 
•  Intraport competition between terminals is an option allowing technically efficient integration of 
the in-port functions, without sacrificing competitive pressure within the port for more local 
captive traffic. Terminal operators have total jurisdiction over their own terminal area, from 
berth to gate. This is the device adopted to great effect in the liberalization of the port of Buenos 
Aires.  
•  Intraterminal competition between service suppliers is encouraged by many ports. Competition 
in stevedoring, warehousing, forwarding, etc., is highly desirable wherever it can be physically 
accommodated. From a port authority’s viewpoint, this may be influenced by licensing 
requirements, which limit the number of competitors but make the concessions attractive for 
competitive tendering.  
•  Competition for the exclusive right to provide services is an extension of the competitive 
tendering of licenses and may be the only way to attract private participation in the finance of 
new developments in small ports. Where local monopoly rights are granted, the usual question 
arises: To prevent subsequent monopoly exploitation, should contracts be used or should a 
discretionary regulatory authority be established?   104
  Figure 3.10.  Decision Framework for Port Competition    
 
 
  Source: World Bank Port Reform Toolkit ( 2000). 
 
Governments and port authorities can take a number of actions to enhance competition. These 
structural remedies include introducing new berths or terminals; dividing an existing port into 
competing terminals (terminalization); dividing port operations within terminals; and introducing 
short-term operating lease or management contracts. The choice of form of competition and the 
choice of residual regulatory requirements are interrelated and depend to a large extent on the size 
of the port, the extent of external competition, and the degree of captive traffic that needs protection. 
Figure 3.10 presents a diagnostic device for assessing strategies to enhance port competition. 
The Effects of Restructuring, Deregulation, and Privatization 
The results of private participation in ports have been impressive. In the DTEs, private investment 
has accelerated: more than $12 billion was invested in 127 projects during the 1990s. Latin America 
and East Asia have led the trend in private involvement in port operations, with five countries 
accounting for two-thirds of the investment. Economies with  recent port privatizations include 
Brazil, China, Colombia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Tanzania. 
One of the key hypotheses underlying the privatization movement is that, compared with private 
owners and operators, public owners and operators are less able (and have fewer incentives) to   105
control costs; are slower to adopt new technologies and modern management practices; and are less 
responsive to the needs of users. One of the earlier tests of this hypothesis came with the 1986 
divestiture of the container operations of Kelang Port Authority (Port Kelang is Malaysia’s largest 
port). Privatization led to significant efficiency gains. The improvement in the rate of crane handling 
from 19.4 containers an hour in 1985 to 27.3 containers an hour in 1987 brought Kelang’s 
performance close to Singapore’s 28.0 containers an hour (Tull and Reveley 2001). Total return on 
fixed assets (at current market prices) grew at an annual average compound rate of only 1.9 percent 
from 1981 to 1986, but at a rate of 11.6 percent from 1986 to 1990. The higher return on fixed assets 
was due to improvements in productivity and greater throughput, not to higher prices. Workers also 
benefited from the gains in productivity. By 1990, they were paid 60 percent more an hour in real 
terms, put in 6 percent more hours, and produced 76 percent more than before privatization (Galal 
and others 1994).  
Similar improvements in the physical performance of ports were brought about by privatization 
and deregulation in several other countries. Colombia concessioned its four main public ports in 
1993 to separate regional port societies, established under company law. These societies do not 
provide services directly but contract with operators, who use the facilities. New laws also abolish 
restrictive labor practices and allow stevedoring services to compete freely at each port. Although 
the initial concessioning involved little investment, the main element in its success seems to have 
been the development of effective competition, not only within each port, but also between ports. 
These reforms led to significant improvements in operating performance (Table 3.5).    106
Table 3.5.  Colombia: Operating Performance Before 1993 and After Reform, 1996 
Source: Puertos (Colombia General Port Superintendent, July 1997). 
Port reforms in Argentina have demonstrated the powerful impact of deregulation and the 
effectiveness of inter- and intraport competition. Before the reform, port operations were costly and 
inefficient, because of restrictive labor practices, overregulation by a multiplicity of agencies with 
no clear demarcation of responsibilities, and inefficient structural organization. As a result, the ports 
were losing market share to the road sector and to the more efficient Chilean ports (Estache and 
Carbajo 1996). 
In the early 1990s, the  Argentine government introduced several substantive reforms to 
deregulate and decentralize port operations and increase private sector participation and 
competition. It deregulated pilotage and towing services, lifted all regulatory controls on contractual 
agreements with stevedoring companies, permitted Argentine ship owners to temporarily register 
their ships under foreign flags, allowed foreign ships to practice cabotage, and gave operators 
freedom to set tariffs. One of the most important reforms was authorizing private sector entities to 
build and operate ports for public use. Actual and potential entry by private entities would inevitably 
undermine the market power of existing ports. The government also reorganized the largest port, 
Buenos Aires, into three areas with separate functions and administrations. One of these areas was 
further split into six terminals, which were to be concessioned to the private sector and compete 
with each other. Thus, the primary objective of this structural reorganization was to facilitate inter- 
and intraport competition (Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus 1999). 
The effects of deregulation and privatization on port investment and performance were dramatic 
(Table 3.6). Between 1991 and 1997, in the port of Buenos Aires, annual container traffic jumped 
from 300,000 to more than 1 million; the number of cranes increased from 3 to 13; labor 
Indicator Before 1993 1996
Average vessel waiting time (days)  10 No wait or hours, 
depending on the port
Working days per year 280 365
Working hours per day 16 24
Tons per vessel per day
Bulk cargo 500 2,500 minimum
General cargo 750 1,700
Containers per vessel per hour (gross)  16 25  107
  Table 3.6  Selected Performance Indicators for the Port of Buenos Aires, 
Selected Years, 1991 –  1997   
  
 
Note:  TEU, 20-foot equivalent unit. 
a. Public operations in italics. 
Source: Estache, Carbajo, and de Rus (1999). 
 
 




It is important to note that some port services in Argentina were supplied by the private sector 
before the reform program was initiated in 1990. For example, the private sector managed 
stevedoring at the public port of Buenos Aires. However, no significant improvements in 
performance were obtained in the early years of private sector participation, primarily because of 
excessive regulatory control and lack of competition. This signifies the importance of substituting 
competition for regulation wherever feasible. This i s relevant for many DTEs, where competition 
within or between ports has not been an important element of the overall reform program (Estache 
et al. 2001). 
The substantial improvements in performance that were brought about by deregulation and 
private sector participation have allowed the port of Buenos Aires to successfully compete with the 
biggest port in South America, Santos, in Brazil (Figure 3.11). In fact, after 1977, the throughput of 
the Buenos Aires port surpassed that of Santos (Micco and Perez 2001). 
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Figure 3.11.  Container Throughput in Buenos Aires and Santos, 1990–1998  
Source: Micco and Perez (2001). 
 














In Mexico, an aggressive program of decentralization in the mid-1990s led the way to the 
concessioning of the country’s major ports to private operators. These reforms are too recent to have 
produced their full impact. Still, preliminary evidence indicates notable improvements in efficiency 
and productivity, and the deregulation of prices has led to significant tariff reductions: tariffs are 
now equal to, or lower than, those of U.S. competitor ports. 
In 1993, the port of Veracruz was handling 43 containers an hour per ship. This figure now has 
risen to 84. Similar improvements occurred at the Manzanillo and Altamira ports. The total capacity 
in Veracruz for loading and unloading agricultural bulk cargo increased from 2,000 to 9,000 tons a 
day between 1995 and 1998. Similar capacity improvements were obtained in Progreso and other 
ports, indicating that privatization induced significant new investment in infrastructure. 
The reform program accorded the port operators considerable pricing flexibility. Firms can now 
freely set prices, so long as there is sufficient competition in the market. In ports where competition 
is inadequate, regulatory intervention takes the form of maximum rate ceilings or price caps. To 
provide operators with the maximum incentive for efficiency, caps are to be revised every five   109
Note: N.D., no data. 
a.  In 2003, 10.889 pesos=US$1.00 
Source:  Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte 
Note: Financial figures in thousands of pesos. 
API: Administración Protuaria Integral (Integral Port Administration). 
Thousands of pesos. 
Source: Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte. 
Table 3.7.  Change in Cargo-Handling Tariffs in Mexican Ports, 1995 and 1998  (1998 pesos)
a 
years. The improvements in ports’ physical performance were passed on to users in reduced costs 





















1995  Dec 1998 
Jan 
 1995 
Veracruz  34.0  56.3  46.7  77.1  64.5  96.9  1,467.5  1,554.9 
Manzanillo  25.0  41.4  25.0  39.8  57.0  75.1  1,554.0  1,466.0 
Lázaro Cárdenas  27.7  31.7  36.3  45.0  58.2  72.2  1,247.4  1,655.8 
Altamira  N.D.  49.3  N.D.  67.5  68.0  81.7  1,315.0  1,655.8 
Tampico  41.3  49.3  57.2  67.5  69.2  81.7     968.9  1,143.6 
Weighted average reduction  -34.5 %  -24.5 %  -21.7 %  -5.6 % 
The fiscal impacts can also be significant. For example, in the five years before privatization, in 
1995, the Mexican port system received an average of 665 million pesos per annum in government 
support. Following privatization the port system has been able to cover its costs and has actually 
begun to generate substantial tax revenues for the government (Table 3.8). This improvement in the 
system’s financial condition has allowed the port authorities and the concessionaires to undertake 
substantial investment in system expansion and modernization. 
Table 3.8.  Financial Position of Mexican APIs, 1995–1998 
  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Revenues  510,832  951,048  1,263,572  1,718,832 
Expenses  436,107  781,009  1,022,690  1,340,723 
Profits  74,725  170,039  240,882  378,109 
Taxes  24,833  64,399  96,993  137,560 
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The Need for Residual Post-privatization Regulation 
The primary objective of port policy is to assist national development. Although some emphasis has 
recently been put on port services that add value to the products, the development objective is 
usually best served by securing cheap and expeditious movement of traffic through the ports. To this 
end, the landlord port model introduces competitive pressures either in the market for provision of 
port services (between terminals or within terminals) or for the exclusive rights to provide services 
where the market is too small to support multiple providers. This may require structural controls to 
secure or maintain an appropriately competitive framework or, where structural measures are 
insufficient, then some control to prevent monopolistic exploitation or distortion. 
Structural Approaches 
The most complete form of privatization involves the transfer of ownership of whole ports or 
terminals to a single private operator. When there are many competing seaports, complete 
privatization may generate the most cutting competition. But where external competition is absent, 
severe problems arise.  This is often the case in developing countries. In such circumstances the 
ability of the private owner to exploit its monopoly position may be a strong reason for stopping 
short of full privatization. It is likely to be easier to regulate a port concession, albeit for a monopoly 
location, than to protect the assets critical for national development once a country has formally 
transferred their ownership. 
In recent years, global carriers have sought to entrench their competitive power with long-term 
contracts for dedicated terminals in strategically located ports. Such vertical integration of terminal 
operations with shipping activities can ensure competition in the largest ports. But in smaller ports, 
this can damage competition by enabling the integrated company, as the terminal operator, to use its 
monopoly power to favor its associated shipping activities, as in the case of APL’s (American 
President Lines’) operation at the Karachi International Container Terminal in Pakistan. In the 
recent round of concessions in Chile, no more than 40 percent of a concessionaire may be owned by 
any shipping company, exporter, or importer operating more than 25 percent of the transfers at the 
concessioned terminal or more than 15 percent of the transfers in ports in the region in the previous 
year (Foxley and Mardones 2000)  
Horizontal integration can be equally threatening. A limited number of global stevedoring 
companies emerged during the 1990s, including Hutchison Port Holdings (Hong Kong),   111
International Container Services Inc., and PSA Corporation Ltd. (Singapore). The threat here is that 
a company controlling a large proportion of the terminals within a region could manipulate port 
usage to its own advantage, against national interests. For example, P&O Ports (Australia) has 
concessions for two of the five major container ports in India and may yet obtain two more: if 
successful they would control three-quarters of the container terminal capacity of the country. The 
European Commission actually refused permission for Hutchison International to buy a 49 percent 
share in ECT, Rotterdam on the grounds that as it already owned Felixstowe, Thamesport, and 
Harwich, it would have a dominant market position in northwestern Europe. 
Regulation of Behavior 
Seaports require many technical, environmental, social, and safety regulations. For example, 
technical oversight is needed to ensure safe movement, avoidance of environmental pollution 
through spillages, and so on; even social oversight is needed to ensure just treatment of workers and 
healthy working conditions. In most countries, these functions are regulated by sector agencies or 
by specialized agencies (health and safety, environmental pollution, etc.), usually attached to, or part 
of, the relevant line ministries. Agencies independent of port management should oversee technical 
regulation, whatever the degree of private participation. 
Regulation of tariffs is only important when there is no adequate competitive influence, either 
internally or externally. Judging that can be a difficult issue. In Mexico, for example, the Ports’ Law 
establishes that the Federal Competition Commission shall determine when to establish tariff 
regulation. Where the commission judges the competition as inadequate, it may stipulate either rate-
of-return or price control to prevent monopolistic exploitation. In such cases rates may be set on the 
basis of benchmarks from comparable ports in more competitive situations or a synthesis of rates 
from cost data. Both are difficult methods, and the ultimate problem is that the regulated bodies are 
almost inevitably better informed than the regulator. Hence, tariff regulation should be avoided as 
far as possible. One way of avoiding this, adopted in the port regulatory structure for Sri Lanka, is to 
involve the regulator only in cases of disputed rates. Adjudicating disputes between port operators 
or between port users and operators may be the most important function of a regulator in a 
liberalized seaport sector.  
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Box 4.1  Disillusionment slows reform 
momentum in India 
 
“The i mperative necessity of 
restructuring/reforming the electricity 
sector in India to overcome the financial 
ill-health and technical shortcomings of 
the electricity boards is being repeated 
ad nauseum…Just when the process 
appeared to be virtually unquestionable 
and unstoppable, the ‘consensus’ has 
been shattered by the unbelievable news 
of the California electricity crisis.” 
 
Source: Frontline, Volume 18-Issue 13, 
Jun. 23-Jul. 06, 2001. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Restructuring Electricity Supply 
lectricity is an essential input to almost all goods and services and is thus vital to the 
public interest. The reliability of the electricity system has steadily grown in 
importance as customers invest in sensitive electronics. In developing countries, 
especially, an adequate and reliable electricity supply is needed for modernization and 
for domestic growth and international competitiveness. Few challenges are more urgent in these 
countries than the promotion and safeguarding of citizens’ and industries’ access to reliable, 
competitively priced electricity. 
Until recently, the electricity industry was typically a vertically integrated statutory monopoly, 
owned by the national, state, or municipal government. The past decade, however, has seen a 
dramatic change in views about how the industry should be owned, organized, and regulated 
(Newbery 2000). Since 1980, when Chile began a radical program of restructuring and 
privatization, more than 60 countries have introduced reforms in the electricity sector (Bacon and 
Besant-Jones, 2001). With a growing list of experiments in restructuring and privatization to guide 
the design of future policy, we are in a better position to reflect on the lessons learned and to identify 
the most important issues and available options. A clear-eyed assessment is especially important 
now because of the crisis in California’s reform program 
and the challenges confronting the electricity systems of 
several developing and transition economies (DTEs). The 
recent events in California have alarmed policymakers 
around the world (Box 4.1) and could seriously impede the 
evolution of competitive electricity markets (Besant-Jones 
and Tenenbaum 2001; Joskow 2001). Some DTEs that had 
planned to introduce reforms might now defer them. Others 
will not consider further reforms until there is convincing 
evidence of the m erits of competitive restructuring and 
deregulation.   113
Background to Reform 
After several decades of structural immobility in the electricity industry, governments are allowing 
market forces to play a role in generation and supply. During the past decade, in particular, structural 
change has accelerated and is now a worldwide phenomenon. Although only a handful of countries 
have achieved truly substantive market liberalization, almost all countries have felt considerable 
domestic and international pressure to reform their electricity systems. 
 
Traditional Industrial Structures and Regulation 
The electricity industry has three components: generation, high-tension transmission, and low-
voltage distribution. (In recent years, as a result of sectoral reforms, the  supply or retailing 
function—power procurement, billing, and customer service—has increasingly been considered a 
fourth component.)  A wide variety of technologies and primary energy sources are used to generate 
electricity: nonrenewable sources include coal, petroleum, natural gas, and uranium; renewable 
sources include hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal energy, and biomass. The high-tension 
transmission grid is the “highway” for moving electricity from the generation sites to the 
distribution centers. From transmission substations, electricity is distributed to residences and 
businesses, at lower voltages, through wires and transformers. 
  Historically, the electricity industry has had a monolithic structure: a single entity owns the 
generating and transmission (G&T) capacity and performs all system controls and operations 
(Figure 1.1). The G&T entity transfers the power it produces to one or more distribution companies 
that hold exclusive rights to serve retail customers in specific geographic regions. In some countries, 
the distribution companies are independent entities with separate governance and legal structures, 
purchasing their power from the G&T entity under regulated tariffs. In other cases, there is a 
common ownership of the G&T and proximate monopoly distribution systems. In most countries 
except the United States, Germany, Japan, and Spain, these entities have been under public 
ownership (Joskow 1998).   114
Box 4.2  Characteristics of the electricity sector that create a rationale for structural integration 
 
The economic rationale for vertical and horizontal integration in electricity derives from the unique characteristics of 
the transmission network and the important operating and investment interrelationships between generation and 
transmission.  A key attribute of the transmission grid is its ability to aggregate the operation of geographically 
dispersed generating units into a stable synchronized network.  Such aggregation allows real-time substitution of 
increased production from facilities with low marginal cost for that of  facilities with higher marginal cost, thus 
improving system efficiency.  It also increases system reliability by providing multiple linkages between loads and 
generating resources, and it can economize on the reserve capacity required for any given level of system reliability.
1  
The aggregate generation  of electricity and its consumption need to be balanced continuously and almost 
instantaneously for the network to meet specific physical parameters (frequency, voltage, stability).  Unlike other 
switched networks, such as railroads or telecommunications, where the routing in the physical delivery of products 
can be specified, flows in electricity networks are very difficult to control.  The transmission network is largely 
passive and has few “control valves” or “booster pumps” to regulate electric power flows on individual lines—
electrons follow the path of least resistance and control actions are limited to adjusting generation output and to 
removing transmission lines from or adding them to service.  Moreover, every action can affect all other activities in 
the grid—failure of a single element in the system (e.g. the shutdown of a generation unit or a transmission line), if 
not managed properly, can endanger the stability of the entire electricity grid.  Similarly, large swings in load at one 
node affect the conditions at other nodes in the system.  Thus, electricity requires careful and deliberate system-wide 
coordination to achieve supply/demand balancing in real time. 
 
Source: Joskow (2000). 
   Complementarities in transmission and generation give rise to significant economies of scale and 
scope, which in turn are the main reason why the industry evolved with a vertically integrated 
structure (Box 4.2).  In most countries, the geographically dispersed generators are also horizontally 
integrated into a single firm.  Transmission and distribution are the quintessential natural 
monopolies, although recent technological change is weakening this characterization to some extent, 
as discussed later.  They entail substantial fixed costs that are largely sunk, and under these 
circumstances effective competition would inevitably lead to wasteful duplication of network 
resources.  It is not surprising, then, that in most countries a single entity governs the transmission 
network covering all or most of the country. Although economies of scale in generation have never 
been as pervasive, vertical integration between the generation functions and the network elements of 
the natural monopoly effectively limits competition in the generating service, even when numerous 
generating plants are connected to the network. 
  A number of additional features that distinguish electricity from the other network utilities limit 
the scope for competition or reliance on free market mechanisms.  Because of the hard physical 
constraints on electricity production, achieving real-time supply/demand balancing is difficult and 
requires intensive system coordination.  Electricity supply is rigid by nature. Electricity cannot be 
stored economically, as the existing storage technologies—for example, hydroelectric pump storage 
(pumping water uphill) or batteries—are very inefficient.  Thus, electricity is the ultimate real-time   115
product, with its production and consumption occurring at virtually the same time.  Moreover, 
generating units have hard capacity constraints that cannot be breached without risk of costly 
damage. As a result, the amount of electricity that can be delivered at any time is substantially 
constrained, and especially at peak times supply is very inelastic (Borenstein 2001). 
  The challenges due to the unusual properties of the supply side of the market are exacerbated by 
the lack of flexibility on the demand side.  Despite the availability of appropriate technologies, no 
electricity market today makes any significant use of real-time pricing—very few, if any, end-use 
consumers of electricity observe real-time prices.  Demand is almost completely inelastic in the 
short-run. Thus, little or none of the critical supply/demand balancing can be done on the demand 
side.  The combination of very inelastic short-run demand and supply (at peak times) with the real-
time nature of the market (costly storage and grid balancing requirements) makes the electricity 
industry especially vulnerable to the exercise of market power (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2001). 
Pressures for Electricity Reforms 
The driving forces behind the structural changes in the electricity industry differ between countries, 
especially between industrial and developing countries. Pressure for change in mature industrial 
economies has grown with the emergence of excess capacity and disillusionment with expensive, 
capital-intensive generation projects precipitated by the oil crisis of the 1970s. The reform agendas 
of developing countries, in contrast, have been driven by the poor operating and financial 
performance of their state-owned electricity systems, lack of public funds to finance badly needed 
investments in the sector, and government desire to raise immediate revenue through privatization 
(IEA 1999; Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001).  
Excess Capacity in Industrial Countries 
In mature industrial countries, growth in demand, which had been remarkably high and steady for 
30 years, was suddenly interrupted in the 1970s and never resumed its past trend. The 
understandable response to the oil shocks was to try to reduce dependency on oil for power 
generation. This renewed an interest in options such as nuclear power and large, supercritical coal-
fired generating stations. Budgetary pressures, rapid inflation, and attempts by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to keep the prices of their goods down as part of a counter-inflationary strategy   116
squeezed the profits of the sector, delayed the completion of investment, and led to a crisis of 
confidence in the previously smooth-running planning system. 
Fate conspired to produce a benign conjunction of circumstances. The development of high-
efficiency combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) undermined the case for tightly integrated G&T 
systems based on economies of scale. The rapid development of gas pipelines and the increasing 
availability of cheap gas in western Europe and the United States made the new CCGTs more 
attractive than existing technologies. Dense, well-meshed electricity grids, the abundance of power 
stations, and excess capacity made competition between generating companies both feasible and 
attractive. 
The reform and privatization of the electricity industry in the United Kingdom (UK) starting in 
1990 demonstrated that it was possible to replace state-owned vertically integrated franchise 
monopolies with privately owned, unbundled and regulated successor companies without the lights 
going off.  In short order, the European Union started pressing for liberalization in its member states 
and successfully passed the Electricity Directive forcing open access and liberalized markets 
starting in 1998.  Similar pressures for open access and liberalized markets were under way in North 
America.  In the United States, the reform process has been considerably complicated by ensuring 
that stranded assets would be compensated, though initially there was great confidence that a new 
deal could be struck that was beneficial to all parties.  With unfortunate timing, just when the 
European Commission was pressing for further reforms, events in California shook political 
confidence in the liberalization agenda. 
Need for Investment in Developing Countries 
The circumstances in developing countries have differed in important respects. Whereas investment 
needs have been low in mature industrial countries with excess capacity, they have been high in 
countries undergoing a stage of economic development when demand for electricity is expected to 
increase rapidly. Worldwide electricity consumption has been projected to increase at an average 
annual rate of 2.7 percent from 1999 to 2020 (Table 4.1). The most rapid increase is projected for 
the developing world: 4.2 percent per year over the forecast horizon (EIA 2002). 
In many developing countries, the electricity system has been under stress. The demand–supply 
balance is very tight, and the lack of spare capacity has led to frequent blackouts (Box 4.3). To 
redress this imbalance, significant new investments are needed in G&T and distribution. However,   117
Box 4.3  Power shortages in Southeast Asia 
 
In the Philippines, excess demand in 1992 corresponded to 
48 percent of total system capacity.  Brownouts often ranged 
from 4 to 10 hours a day.  Shopping malls were ordered to 
reduce their hours of operation by 2 hours and industrial 
areas faced 12-hour blackouts three times a week.  Of  512 
international firms that had or planned to open their Asian 
headquarters in Manila, 123 closed their operations and 226 
cancelled their registrations.  In Thailand, reserve margins 
fell from approximately 40 percent in 1995 to just over 10 
percent in 1989.  
 
Source: Henisz and Zelner (2001) 
the pre-reform governance structure in this sector—typically the vertically integrated, state-owned, 
and centrally planned model that the developing countries willingly adopted or retained in the era of 
independence after World War II—has proven ill-suited for mobilizing the long-term capital needed 
for securing an adequate and reliable supply of electricity 
 
Table 4.1  World Net Electricity Consumption by Region, 1990–2020 
(kilowatt hours, billions)                 
                     
History    Projections    Region 




Industrialized economies  6,385  7,517    8,620  9,446  10,281  11,151    1.9 
  United States  2,817  3,236    3,793  4,170  4,556  4,916    2.0 
  EE-FSU  1,906  1,452    1,651  1,807  2,006  2,173    1.9 
Developing economies  2,258  3,863    4,912  6,127  7,548  9,082    4.2 
  Asia:  1,258  2,319    3,092  3,900  4,819  5,858    4.5 
       China  551  1,084    1,523  2,031  2,631  3,349    5.5 
       India  257  424    537  649  784  923    3.8 
       Korea, Rep.  93  233    309  348  392  429    3.0 
       Other  357  578    724  872  1,012  1,157    3.4 
  Central and South America  449  684    788  988  1,249  1,517    3.9 
Total world   10,549  12,832    15,183  17,380  19,835  22,407    2.7 
Note: EE-FSU: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.         
Source: Data under History are from EIA (1999); under Projections, from EIA (2002b). 
. 
In the early days of rapid growth and 
young plant, prices could be set at cost-
recovery levels and even allowed to fall 
with the rapidly decreasing costs as 
economies of scale and new technology 
were exploited. Thus, initially the state-
owned integrated electricity systems 
performed reasonably well. Over time, and 
especially as inflationary and budgetary 
pressures increased, the margin between revenue and costs was squeezed. The average price of 
electricity in most developing countries was not covering costs on a historical accounting basis and 
was often far below the long-run incremental cost of expanding the system. Such pricing made it   118
difficult to finance new investment and to adequately maintain existing facilities. As a result, system 
adequacy and reliability declined, and supply shortages inevitably increased. Still, underpricing to 
favored groups became politically more noticeable and more difficult to reverse. Moreover, political 
interference led to extraordinary levels of excess employment (Figure 4.1) and management 
deterioration, and the lack of effective monitoring led to theft and losses that further undermined the  
Figure 4.1  Customers per Employee in Selected African Countries, 1998 
Source: Kerekezi and Kimani (2001). 
financial sustainability of the sector. The sector was in far worse crisis than experienced by 
industrial countries, and for different reasons. 
Technological Innovation 
Recent technological advances have dramatically altered the cost structure of electricity generation. 
They are also changing the network economics of the electricity grid in both mature industrial and 
developing economies. 
From the beginning of the 20th century until the early 1980s, technological developments led to 
larger and more efficient fossil-fueled power plants, built farther and farther from cities and 
factories. In recent years, however, technological improvements in gas turbines and the 
development of CCGTs have recast economies of scale in electric power and caused a complete 
reversal in the 50-year trend toward large, centralized power stations (Figure 1.2) (Bayless 1994; 

















scale (50–500 megawatts) than coal or nuclear plants (5–10 years and 1,000 megawatts). Aero-
derivative gas turbines can be efficient at scales as small as 10 megawatts (Balzhiser 1996). 
Although natural gas and light oil distillates are the preferred fuels for gas turbines, a wide variety of 
low-calorific, contaminated fuels have also been used successfully (for example, the Kot Addu plant 
in Pakistan and the Paguthan plant in India have, respectively, accumulated 60,000 and 19,000 
hours of successful operation burning heavy oil and naphtha.). Thus, gas-turbine technology is of 
growing importance, even for DTEs that lack natural gas resources (Taud et al 1999). 
These small-scale generators are already being used by traditional utilities for peaking, as well as 
other purposes. They can also be used to bypass utility operations. As demand becomes sufficient 
for economies of mass gas-turbine production to be realized, the cost of producing electricity from 
small-scale generators is likely to decline, making it easy to add efficient capacity of 1 –10 
megawatts, the range needed for many factories, large housing developments, and other institutions 
(Figure 4.2). Small-scale combined heat and power production is also becoming economical, even 
at the level of individual households. 











  Gas-turbine and other small-scale generating technologies will have an important effect on 
market structure. The ability to install small-scale, low-cost capacity will make it possible to move 
the industry away from the paradigm of the large-scale central station to a new distributed-
generation model. With many small-scale generating units operating at or close to load, the 
historical reliance on transmission and even distribution facilities will clearly diminish. The 
development of new electricity-storage technologies could further reduce reliance on transmission   120
Box 4.4 Opening the market – photovoltaic systems in Kenya 
 
Where a formal utility fails to provide network services to many households, simply allowing entry may be 
sufficient to encourage entrepreneurs to fill the gap.  In Kenya, the formal utility fails to provide an electricity 
connection in more than 98 percent of the rural population.  Rural households have started to fill the gap by turning 
to alternative systems.  Between 1982 and 1999 the market for photovoltaic units grew into a US$6 million a year 
industry. 
In the 1980s, demand for photovoltaic systems came from NGOs installing demonstration systems in schools and 
missions, and from off-grid community leaders and medium-income households.    Each year, the household 
market accounted for well over 50 percent of photovoltaic equipment sales. 
Photovoltaic retailers realized that ongoing sales required an expansion of the market.  The availability of smaller, 
lower-cost modules helped on the supply side.  Local innovation in extending the marketing from lighting to 
television raised demand.  In 998, local entrepreneurs were selling over 22,000 modules each year.  Competition 
had brought the retail price down from US$100 a module in 1990 to US$65 in 1998.  The introduction of hire-
purchase options  has extended the market further.  Since 1990, 60 percent of the 2.5 megawatts of photovoltaic 
capacity sold has been in the household market.  
 
Source: Hankins, 2000 
and distribution (Thomas and Schneider 1997). Although small-scale generators are not expected to 
displace large thermal plants, at least in the foreseeable future, any new generation capacity is likely 
to come from a range of smaller units. 
  The distributed-generation framework enhances the ability of the natural gas pipeline network to 
compete with the electricity transmission network. Small-scale generating plants delivering power 
at or near the point of consumption would place an upper ceiling on the price that the existing 
generators and transmitters could charge in combination. Gas-turbine capacity could have a 
disciplinary effect on transmission pricing without even being installed. The mere threat of bringing 
such capacity on-line would be sufficient to constrain the behavior of the transmission monopolist 
(Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1988). 
Small-scale electricity generation is altering the service landscape in several developing 
countries where there is no regulation or where entry to the sector is formally allowed. In the 
Republic of Yemen, small-scale operations supply rural towns and villages that are not served by the 
public utility. These operations range from individual households, generating power for themselves 
and a few neighbors, to larger generating units supplying up to 200 households (Ehrhardt and 
Burdon 1999). In Kenya, because the rural population is so sparse, expanding coverage from the 
national grid would be very costly, so some rural households are being served by private companies 
offering a different technology: photovoltaic systems.  (Box 4.4)  Since 1990 more than 2.5 
megawatts of photovoltaic capacity has been sold, providing power to more than 1 percent of the 
rural population of roughly 25 million people (Hankins 2000). Stand-alone photovoltaic systems are   121
also being used in Brazil, India, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand to power water 
pumps, streetlights, solar lanterns, and telecommunications relay stations. In Hargeisa, Somalia, 
following the destruction of the public electricity facilities during the civil war, private owners of 
generators with surplus power have been supplying 10,000 households at a flat daily uniform rate of 
approximately $0.35 (in current U.S. dollars). Some generators have formed an association and are 
seeking outside assistance to set up a more formal infrastructure for power supply (Marchal and 
others 2000). 
  Recent technological trends are also changing the economic characteristics of the transmission 
grid and raising the specter of future inter- and intra-network competition (Kunneke 1999). 
Advances in semiconductor technology offer the possibility of adding intelligence to the 
traditionally passive transmission network. The routing of electricity would be more actively 
managed if switches were attached to the grid to control access to specific lines. This would allow 
route-based access, reducing the need to treat the transmission grid as a single technical system. 
Markets for line-specific electricity transport could be created, and competing suppliers would offer 
line capacity to electricity traders or final consumers. These advances on the horizon suggest a 
radically different industry paradigm: facilities-based competition in network services. Meanwhile, 
rapid advances in materials science and high-temperature superconductivity could dramatically 
enhance the capacity of the grid, reduce losses, improve reliability, and shrink the infrastructure 
footprint. The deployment of high-temperature, superconducting cables would provide new 
solutions for high-current  distribution in urban areas, offer new approaches to long-distance 
transmission, and render long-distance power exchanges and competition more feasible. Increased 
interconnections could reduce global capacity requirements by taking advantage of noncoincidental 
peaks. 
Addressing the Systemic Problems of State Ownership 
One problem with capital-intensive electric utilities is that operating costs (mainly fuel) are only 
about half the total costs, so utilities can underprice while still covering operating costs. With state 
ownership, managers and politicians alike have a shared interest in underpricing to stimulate 
demand and secure political support. Excess demand signals the need for investment, which 
managers desire and politicians take as a sign of development. Maintenance has less appeal than 
new investment, which can be sought to remedy poor performance and worn-out plant. If the plant   122
breaks down, employment to keep it struggling on can be defended, and power companies are often 
remarkably overstaffed as a result. The costs of overstaffing appear modest compared to fuel and 
capital costs, so there is little pressure to reduce staff and political incentive to increase it.  But 
overstaffing tends to lead to inadequate salary levels, making it harder to recruit competent staff to 
manage maintenance and operations efficiently. 
  In the prereform era, international agencies were happy to fund power sector investment, as 
electric utilities were a visible sign of successful transfer of technology and obviously had high 
social returns. The cost of unserved power, even in poor countries, was high. Covenants on tariffs 
were agreed upon, only to be abandoned as inflationary pressures encouraged suppressing public 
sector prices. The result was that over time real electricity prices declined, as did profits (and hence 
the ability to self-finance investment). A 1989 survey of 360 electric utilities in 57 World Bank 
countries found that the rate of return on revalued net fixed assets had declined to below 4 percent 
(World Bank 1993), well below the 10 percent rate of return that international agencies normally 
take as the test discount rate. The revenue covered only 60 percent of power sector costs (Besant-
Jones 1993). Self-financing ratios fell to only 12 percent of investment requirements in 1991 (World 
Bank 1993).  Newbery (1993) noted similar problems for Asian developing countries. Underpriced 
electricity resulted in a heavy fiscal burden, estimated at $90 billion annually, or about 7 percent of 
total government revenues—larger than the annual power investment requirements of about $80 
billion.  Technical inefficiencies caused true economic losses of nearly $30 billion annually (World 
Bank 1994). 
  Several decades of studies of tariff reforms, covenants to improve pricing, and reports arguing 
that underpricing electricity was inefficient, fiscally harmful, and distributionally unjust appeared 
had little effect. Without an alternative source of investment, countries persuaded aid agencies to 
continue support, and the soft budget constraint reduced incentives to make politically unpopular 
pricing decisions. When Chile and then Britain and other countries demonstrated that privatization 
works, it seemed like the obvious answer to the problem—bringing financial prudence, competent 
management, and operational efficiency into the industry, at the same time relieving the government 
of heavy investment costs. 
  Power shortages are caused by inadequate investment and inefficient operation. The two 
requirements of providing incentives for efficiency and a mechanism for adequate investment are 
both satisfied in normal competitive markets with private owners pursuing profit. The obvious   123
problem with the electricity supply industry is that the transmission and distribution businesses are 
natural monopolies and cannot be operated as competitive undertakings. The logical solution is to 
separate the potentially competitive generation and supply (or retailing) from the core natural 
monopoly networks. Generation and supply might then operate in competitive markets, and the 
natural monopoly would be regulated to imitate the effect of competition. 
  The crucial restructuring question is how best to introduce competition into generation (and 
supply). The standard answer to date is that competition requires a market, and generation will 
therefore need a wholesale electricity market, organized either as a power exchange or as a pool. 
That model has worked well, given adequate G&T capacity and enough independent generating 
companies to ensure competition. But these conditions are very demanding and may not easily be 
sustainable. Although many electricity industries have been restructured successfully, they all started 
with substantial spare capacity. As time passes, if prices remain low because of strong competition, 
entry will be unattractive and capacity will become scarce. In addition, existing generating 
companies may wish to merge to increase their market power and deter further entry by various 
means. 
  One should therefore be rather cautious about this solution. It may be sustainable where there is 
sophisticated regulation of competition and regulators can find a way of ensuring  adequate 
investment in transmission. However, California reminds us that sophisticated regulation is a scarce 
commodity, even in advanced countries. 
Restructuring the Market: Generic Options 
Four generic options can be identified for the structuring of electricity markets (Table 4.2). These 
options represent varying degrees of competition and customer choice (Hunt and Shuttleworth 
1996):  
(a) Monopoly—The traditional status quo:  a single entity produces all electricity and delivers it over 
the transmission network to distribution companies or final consumers. 
(b) Single buyer—A single purchasing agency chooses  sources of electricity from a number of 
competing generators.  It has a monopoly on the transmission networks and sells electricity to 
distribution companies and large power users without competition from other suppliers.   124
(c) Wholesale competition—Distribution companies purchase electricity directly from generators of 
their choice; deliver it under open-access arrangements over the transmission network to their 
service areas; and maintain a monopoly over electricity sales to final customers. 
(d) Retail competition—All customers have access to competing generators, either directly or 
through a retailer of their choice, and the transmission and distribution networks operate under 
open-access arrangements. 
 
Table 4.2  Structural Alternatives 
         
   (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
Characteristic  Monopoly  Single buyer  Wholesale competition  Retail competition 






generation; choice for 
distribution companies 
Competition in 
generation; choice for 
final consumer 
Competing generators?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Choice for retailers?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Choice for final consumers?  No  No  No  Yes 
Source:  Hunt and Shuttleworth (1996).       
 
  Option (a) is largely a straw man from today’s perspective—no one would deliberately choose it 
for the public interest. Options (b), (c), and (d) have the potential to progressively introduce more 
competition and market decisionmaking into the electricity industry and its vertical relations. 
Reform programs generally are designed to move from option (a) (the status quo) to options (c) and 
(d). Whether option (b) is a sensible transition to option (c) and at what stage option (d) is 
appropriate or feasible for a given country are complex policy decisions, with many important 
dimensions.  Options (b) and (c) are considered in more detail below. 
  There is wide agreement on the proper sequencing of electricity reforms.  Separating the network 
monopoly of distribution from the rest of the industry, with privatization and regulation, is a 
necessary first step to permit the tariff reforms that are essential to turning around the sector’s 
performance.  
Privatizing and Regulating Distribution 
The system of ownership, management, and finance where reforms have not taken place leads to 
unbalanced tariffs; unremunerative prices, often associated with a failure to collect bills or reduce   125
theft; excessive costs; and an inability to sustain efficient investment. The logical place to break this 
vicious circle is with the key mechanism that sustains non-cost-reflective tariffs—the distribution 
and supply end (usually combined), which collects revenue from final consumers. The best way to 
both start and sustain this reform is to separate the network monopoly of distribution from the rest 
of the industry, privatize it, and subject it to price- or revenue-cap regulation. 
  A related question is whether to separate out the supply (or retailing) function from distribution, 
or at least to signal that this will take place in due course. This partly depends on whether a supply 
franchise for smaller customers (perhaps all those taking less than one megawatt or possibly 100 
kilowatts) is expected to continue. For various reasons discussed below, the case for full supply 
liberalization is probably weak, even in industrial countries, and arguably even weaker in 
developing countries. If so, the natural supplier to the franchise market is the distribution company, 
and the main requirement is to ensure that other suppliers to eligible customers have 
nondiscriminatory access to the distribution network and meters. This should be written into 
legislation. 
  Privatization is not feasible without a commitment to cost-reflective tariffs, a commitment that 
needs effective and independent regulation to be credible. If the government is delaying irreversible 
reforms until the conditions are right, it should state its intention to privatize as soon as the 
regulatory institutions command the necessary private sector confidence. Price-cap regulation 
provides superior incentives for efficiency, but the cap requires periodic resetting if the efficiency 
gains are to be passed through to consumers. It may also need to be reset at the request of the utility 
if the utility is not able to finance needed investment. 
Rebalancing Tariffs: Developing countries in general face the same political opposition to 
increases in electricity prices as industrial countries do and have found it difficult even to maintain  
price rises in line with general inflation. Prices can be kept down by ignoring the capital embodied 
in the transmission and distribution networks and by covering the average, rather than the marginal, 
cost of generation, again ignoring most of the capital value of the equipment. 
  The margin between wholesale and retail prices can be squeezed in the medium run by 
effectively writing down the asset value and hence the regulatory asset base, but over time as new 
investment is added, the capital cost element in transmission and distribution will gradually rise. 
Such a gradual adjustment will be politically less painful than a sudden increase, but the cost will be 
reduced proceeds from the sale of the transmission and distribution companies.   126
  Better strategies are available to ease the transition to cost-reflective prices. Many countries offer 
a lifeline level of sales, under which consumers pay the first 50 kilowatts per month at a subsidized 
rate, but for higher consumption levels pay the marginal efficient price. That way the rents 
associated with past investment in the network can be transferred selectively to households without 
removing incentives for efficient consumption at the margin. In some countries, commercial, 
regulatory, and eventually political pressures conspire to eliminate this lifeline element (Hungary is 
the most recent example, in 1999). There seems to be no reason for subsidizing industrial and 
commercial customers, who together probably account for two-thirds of total demand. Agricultural 
users represent a politically intractable problem in some countries, such as India, where the 
inefficiencies of underpricing electricity are more serious: socially more expensive electric pumps 
for tubewells may displace perfectly adequate diesel pumps. 
Historically, electricity prices in developing countries included significant cross-subsidies from 
industrial and commercial  customers to households. With open entry, such cross-subsidies are 
unsustainable. Indeed, in recent years, as these countries have begun to liberalize their electricity 
markets, cross-subsidies have been reduced and in some cases entirely eliminated (Figure 4.3). 
Moreover, underpricing of electricity in poor countries is far less defensible on income-distribution 
grounds. The main beneficiaries are invariably the richer urban dwellers, and the costs are felt 
indirectly by the poor, who may be deprived of the chance to get electricity at all because of the 
country’s inability to finance the extension of the system. Electric light is substantially cheaper than 
kerosene or other alternatives, and consumers are willing to pay high prices for a minimum level of 
consumption that provides light and allows the use of a TV and modest appliances.  Political 
support may be concentrated in urban areas, where consumption is highest. Even here, 
improvements in quality (avoiding blackouts and brownouts) may more than compensate for 
increases in prices. 
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Figure 4.3  Average Residential to Industrial Electricity Price Ratio, 1990–1999 
 
Source: Jamasb (2002). 
Private Involvement in Generation  
The private sector can become involved in generation in two ways. The first and most common is 
for the government to sell a majority controlling share in existing generation companies, possibly 
retaining nuclear power stations or major multiuse hydroelectric dams, or both. If generation is to be 
privatized, the state electricity company or board will need to be subdivided into a large enough 
number of competing companies. The second way is for the government to invite tenders from 
independent power producers (IPPs) interested in supplying the (preferably restructured) state 
electricity company. This brings new private investment into the industry but requires only modest 
reform and restructuring. 
  In both cases, the logical first step is to separate transmission from generation and to create the 
conditions for regulated third-party access to transmission. Again, transmission will need to be 
regulated, and the principles that apply are similar to those in distribution. But fewer problems are 
likely if (at least for a transition period) transmission remains in public ownership. The arguments 
for separation (preferably ownership separation) of transmission from generation are by now 
standard. A transmission company that has ownership stakes in generation is likely to favor its own 
generation over that of other owners. This may not be so serious where all new capacity is put up to 













Czech Rep.  128
arise if the intention is to create a competitive and less heavily regulated wholesale market, with free 
and contestable entry (see, for example, the problems in Chile, discussed below). 
  There are two quite different approaches to introducing competition into generation. The first is 
the single buyer model (SBM), under which the transmission company (which may also be 
vertically integrated with generation and even distribution and supply) is the single buyer of all 
public electricity generated. Competition takes the form of periodic tenders for new capacity, and 
the winners sign long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with the single buyer. The second 
approach is to create a wholesale spot market (pool) or a power exchange, where generators can sell 
directly to suppliers or final buyers, or both. 
  Single Buyer Model: The standard SBM (Figure 4.4) is one in which the single buyer contracts 
directly with all generation companies for their entire output. In its extreme form, the single buyer is 
also the sole authorized seller of electricity, ruling out supply competition. The SBM provides the 
only feasible way for inviting IPPs to tender for long-term PPAs—a precondition for any private 
investment in generation in an otherwise not very reformed electricity sector. It can also work if the 
existing power stations are sold to a number of generation companies. 
 
Figure 4.4  The single-buyer model 
Source: Lovei (2000). 
  During the past decade, many countries in Asia, the Caribbean, Central America, and eastern 
Europe, and to a more limited extent in the Middle East and Africa, adopted some variant of the 
SBM. The obvious attraction is that it allows competitive tendering for PPAs. Long-term PPAs 
permit rapid entry of private finance to meet growing electricity demands, without the need for 
drastic restructuring of the rest of the industry. Indeed, in some cases, the tendering or negotiating 
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Box 4.5  Competitive tender for new power capacity in 
Hungary 
  
In 1997, Hungary invited tenders to build power stations 
of less than 200 MW for a total capacity of 800 MW.  
Twenty-five bidders submitted 63 offers with a total 
nominal capacity of 5245 MW, over six times the invited 
capacity.   Finally, two bid were accepted: the 191 MW 
CCGT Tisza plant, submitted by AES Fonix Kft, and the 
110 MW Kispest plant submitted by Budapest Power 
Plant.  The agreed average total production cost was 
HUF6.43/KWh in the AES project and HUF6.87/kWh in 
the Budapest Power Plant project.   The average price 
deflated by the Producer price Index to January 1997 was 
HUF5.69/kWh (3.38Uscents/kWh)—about 45 percent 
lower than that paid to the early CCGT entrants who were 
selected through bilateral negotiations with MVM, the 
national power transmission company.   
 
process has just been grafted onto a vertically integrated and otherwise unreformed electricity entity 
(for example, Pusat Tenaga, in Malaysia). 
An efficient PPA would specify the 
availability payment (payable per kilowatt 
capacity when available for dispatch, possibly 
at different rates at different times of the 
year); and an energy payment (linked to the 
fuel price, per megawatt generated). Given 
these and other technical parameters, the 
single buyer can determine which of the 
tenders represents best value or least cost 
(given various constraints, such as fuel 
diversity, import dependence, or foreign 
exchange exposure). Competitive tendering 
can considerably reduce the cost of generation, particularly compared with bilateral negotiations 
between the incumbent single buyer and a selected generation company (Box 4.5). 
Wholesale Competition: With wholesale competition (Figure 4.5), local distribution companies 
retain their exclusive service territories and are free to purchase power for their customers from any 
competing generator. Final customers within a service area still have no choice of supplier. 
However, electricity users taking more than a given threshold level of power may be eligible to 
contract with generators. In many countries, this may involve only a few hundred or a few thousand 
buyers, though clearly they account for a significant fraction of total demand.  By providing 
wholesale customers an opportunity to purchase less expensive power from alternative suppliers and 
by providing more customers for the IPPs, this option makes the market more competitive and more 
dynamic than the SBM does. 
  If eligible buyers are to buy from suppliers or generators, they will need a spot market or power 
exchange, where the buying and selling can take place, and a forward market, where market 
participants can contract bilaterally. Moreover, the parties will need access to the transmission and 
distribution systems to ensure delivery. For transmission prices to provide the needed incentives for 
efficient use of G&T resources, they must accurately reflect the generators’ full impacts on   130
transmission costs, including system congestion, stability, and reliability. Also, a system operator 
will need to keep the frequency and voltage of the system stable. 
 
Figure 4.5  Wholesale Competition  
Source: Lovei (2000). 
 
Contrasting the Single Buyer Model and Wholesale Competition: The risks with the SBM are 
considerable. If an existing single buyer also owns generation, it may preferentially select bids from 
its generation subsidiary or bias the competition in favor of the subsidiary. Existing single buyers 
are loath to face the test of competition—which may reveal the high costs of current operations—
and would be well placed to impede entry by loading unreasonable conditions on entrants. Knowing 
this, potential entrants may be reluctant to undertake the considerable costs involved in preparing a 
credible bid, and this reluctance would reinforce the power of the existing single buyer. The whole 
purpose of opening generation to outside investors would be defeated. 
  Even if the single buyer genuinely opens competition to new entrants, and even if bribery and 
corruption can be prevented from biasing the outcome, the SBM still has two fundamental structural 
flaws: it delays the adoption of prices consistent with adequate revenue, and it inefficiently allocates 
market risk. 
  Revenues are defined as adequate when they are sufficient to attract enough capital for 
maintenance, replacement, modernization, and whatever expansion is justified by demand 
conditions (that is, when they are sufficient to cover the replacement cost of the services demanded). 
However, governments have frequently shied away from adopting prices consistent with the aim of 
obtaining adequate revenues. In fact, they have typically imposed price controls that subject the 
state-owned single buyer to considerable financial distress. In that case, the IPPs would be selling to 
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a monopsonist, whose financial sustainability may be suspect. Moreover, a significant portion of the 
IPP’s investment is sunk. Understandably, the IPPs require strong assurances against ex post 
opportunism. Basically, the unwillingness to raise electricity prices to compensatory levels 
exacerbates the risks associated with making large sunk investments ( a financially distressed 
monopsonist is more likely to renege on its promises than one enjoying a compensatory revenue 
stream). This creates the need to bundle IPP contracts with long-term PPAs that typically commit 
the government to stepping in if the state-owned single buyer is unable to honor its contractual 
obligations (Klein 1999 ). The problem to which private investment by IPPs is the solution is, after 
all, the inability of the existing single buyer to finance the necessary investment, which must cast 
doubt on its ability to service the implicit debt. 
The PPAs effectively create a contingent liability for the government—the capacity availability 
payments typically included in the PPA have debt-like qualities. Unless these implicit or explicit 
contingent liabilities are managed carefully, they can undermine the government’s creditworthiness 
and, ultimately, the country’s macroeconomic stability. Thus, the SBM risks stranding contracts that 
complicate further restructuring, and it creates heavy debts instead of resolving the financial 
problems of the sector (Lovei 2000).  
The SBM generally misallocates risks between foreign investors and the domestic electricity 
company if the latter remains in state ownership. A critical feature of the PPAs is that they typically 
offload demand risk onto the government through guaranteed off-take or take-or-pay clauses. The 
IPPs are thus effectively insulated from market-driven risks of investment value (that is, the shift in 
prices and quantity of electricity consumed). Clearly, the removal of such investor risk would dull 
incentives to choose projects effectively and use assets productively. Moreover, equity and debt 
investors are contractually protected, whereas consumers or taxpayers, being much less able to 
diversify, ultimately have to bear the full risk. 
Contrast the effects of a currency crisis under the SBM with that under a well-functioning, 
liberalized electricity market in which the IPPs sell electricity in the spot market and under contract 
to distributors and large consumers.  If the IPPs have confidence in the continued competitiveness of 
the wholesale electricity market and the liquidity of the contract market, they will feel no need to 
protect their investments with long-term contracts. They would normally sign a sequence of short-
term contracts (one to three years) with franchise distribution and supply companies. These 
franchise holders would in turn contract for most if not all of their forecast demand, creating the   132
conditions for a sustainable contract m arket. Decisions about new capacity and the associated 
market risk could be left to private investors. 
  A financial crisis reduces the demand for power. A collapse in demand for electricity would 
almost lead to a fall in the (dollar) spot price of electricity, reducing the profits of the IPPs and 
possibly causing suppliers to attempt to renegotiate their contracts. If some suppliers declare 
bankruptcy, the financial plight of the IPPs would increase. Thus, the IPPs’ fuel-supply contracts 
and their long-term contracts with franchise distribution companies would lose their value. Losses 
would be allocated, first, to providers of equity; next, to speculators of derivative contracts; and 
finally, to the providers of various classes of debt. There is no obvious reason for the government to 
guarantee the terms under which the IPPs choose to enter the market or for taxpayers to ultimately 
foot the bill. Moreover, the fall in spot electricity prices would benefit eligible customers buying on 
short-term contracts, and this would reduce the deflationary effect on demand for electricity  (Klein 
1999). 
Reform Experience and Lessons Learned 
In most developing countries, electricity reforms are still at too early a stage to provide clear 
evidence of their impact on social welfare. Only a handful of countries could supply time-series data 
of sufficient length to permit a meaningful empirical assessment. Still, several lessons can be 
gleaned from the experience of the countries that have gone farthest along the reform path. 
Progress with Sector Reform 
The main driver of the electricity reform programs in the DTEs was fiscal pressure. Although 
increased private participation was the common denominator, the reform strategies and the degree 
of success in attracting private investment show substantial cross-country and cross-regional 
variability. 
Restructuring in the electricity industry is spreading across the developing world. Still, only a 
small number of countries have so far taken substantive steps to reform their SOEs. As of 1998, 
about 15 countries had substantially liberalized their electricity systems, and 55 countries had some 
liberalization under way or planned. A significant portion of these reforming countries were mature 
industrial economies. Of the 81 countries that had not taken any steps to reform the sector, many 
were developing countries (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001). Even in Latin America, the region that   133
led the growth in private sector participation in electricity, the reform movement is far from 
complete (Table  4.3). As of 2001, in many countries of that region, the state still controlled 
significant portions of the industry’s various activities (Millan, Lorca, and Mico 2001). 
  Table 4.4 presents a “scorecard” for regional reform as of 1998, based on a questionnaire (Bacon 
and Besant-Jones 2001) that asked how many of the following steps  had been taken in a given 
country: 
•  The electric utility has been commercialized and corporatized. 
•  An energy law permitting creation of a sector that could be unbundled or privatized, in part or in 
whole, has been passed by parliament. 
•  A regulatory body, separate from the utility and the ministry, has started work. 
•  The private sector has invested in greenfield sites that are operating or under construction. 
•  The state-owned utility has been restructured or separated. 
•  Any of the existing SOEs has been privatized (outright sale, voucher privatization, or joint 
venture). 
Table 4.3  Private Sector Participation in Latin America (percentage) 
    
   Generation  Transmission  Distribution 
Argentina  60  100  70 
Bolivia  90  90  90 
Brazil  30  10  60 
Chile  90  90  90 
Colombia  70  10  50 
Ecuador  20  0  30 
El Salvador  40  0  100 
Guatemala  50  0  100 
México  10  0  0 
Paraguay  0  0  0 
Peru  60  20  80 
Uruguay  0  0  0 
Venezuela  20  10  40 
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Table 4.4  Number of Countries That Have Taken Key Reform Steps, by Region, 1998 
(number of countries [percentage])   
   
   AFR  EAP  ECA  LAC  MENA  SA 
  (n=48)  (n=9)  (n=27)  (n=18)  (n=8)  (n=5) 
Corporate  15  (31)  4  (44)  17  (63)  11  (61)  2  (25)  2  ( 40) 
Law  7  (15)  3  (33)  11  (41)  14  (78)  1  (13)  2  ( 40) 
Regulator  4  (  8)  1  (11)  11  (41)  15  (83)  0  (  0)  2  ( 40) 
IPPs  9  (19)  7  (78)  9  (33)  15  (83)  1  (13)  5  (100) 
Restructuring  4  (  8)  4  (44)  14  (52)  13  (72)  3  (38)  2  ( 40) 
Generation privatization  2  (  4)  2  (22)  10  (37)  7  (39)  1  (13)  2  ( 40) 
Distribution privatization  2  (  4)  1  (11)  8  (30)  8  (44)  1  (13)  1  ( 20) 
Reform indicator  0.88  (15)  2.44  (41)  2.70  (45)  4.28  (71)  1.00  (17)  3.00  ( 50) 
Note: EAP: East Asia and the Pacific; ECA: Europe and Central Asia; IPP: independent power producer; LAC: 
Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SA: South Asia. 
Source: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program data.   
 
 
  Out of a maximum reform score of 6.00 (where all reform steps were taken) the average score 
was 4.28 for Latin America and the Caribbean, 3.00 for South Asia, 2.70 for Central and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, 2.44 for East Asia and the Pacific, 1.00 for the Middle East and North 
Africa, and 0.88 for Africa. 
  The degree of private sector interest has been markedly mixed across countries and regions, to a 
large extent reflecting the above differences in reform effort. Between 1990 and 1999, more than 
$160 billion was invested in private power projects in developing countries. Of this, almost 40 
percent went to Latin America and the Caribbean; about 35 percent, to East Asia and the Pacific; 
just more than 3.5 percent, to the Middle East and North Africa; and less than 2 percent, to Sub-
Saharan Africa. The considerably lower levels of private investment in the latter two regions reflect 
the lower levels of reform.  
  The trend of private sector participation during the 1990s was also rather uneven. Table 4.5 
reveals a clear divide between pre-1997 and post-1997 private investment, reflecting sensitivity to 
sudden changes in the economic climate, particularly currency fluctuations such as experienced in 
Asia and Latin America. From the beginning of the 1990s until 1997, electricity sector reforms and 
anticipated economic growth spurred private investment in the sector. After 1997, however, a series 
of financial problems in many countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America led to a sharp   135
decline in investment in these regions. Whether the decline will persist is difficult to predict (Jamasb 
2002). 
Table 4.5   Private Investments in Electricity Projects in DTEs, 1990–1999 
(1998 US dollars, millions)                 
                       
Region  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  Total 
SSA  49  0  27  1  84  42  1,014  503  709  455  2,884 
EAP  55  454  4,622  5,592  7,291  7,492  11,677  12,437  4,833  1,945  56,398 
ECA  85  0  1,041  0  1,332  3,369  3,507  2,128  504  688  12,655 
LAC  1,204  23  2,497  3,298  2,924  5,788  8,750  20,629  12,720  6,287  64,120 
MENA  0  0  0  0  225  0  217  4,679  0  715  5,837 
SA  169  735  37  1,186  3,081  3,193  4,934  2,319  926  2,227  18,805 
Total  1,562  1,212  8,225  10,077  14,936  19,884  30,100  42,694  19,692  12,317  160,698 
Note: DTEs: developing and transition economies; EAP: East Asia and the Pacific; ECA: Europe and Central 
Asia; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SA: South Asia; SSA: 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.       
  Significant cross-country and cross-regional differences can be seen in reform strategies adopted. 
Several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru) restructured 
and unbundled their electricity systems and created wholesale electricity markets. The same 
approach is slowly being adopted in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) and the former 
Soviet Union (Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova), although other approaches are also 
emerging: 
•  Reform limited to IPPs (Croatia, the Slovak Republic) 
•  Third-party access to a dominant utility (the Czech Republic) 
•  Restructuring with plans for major divestitures (Poland, the Russian Federation, Ukraine). 
  Asian countries have adopted variants of the SBM and invited private investment in generation 
through IPPs, with negligible restructuring and reform (Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam). 
The model of IPPs selling to state-owned utilities was adopted by countries  in Central America and 
the Caribbean (Belize, C osta Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama); in the Middle East and Africa (Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania); and in South Asia. As a result, 
about 80 percent of the private investment in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, 
and Central Asia have been in divestiture projects; and 80 percent of the private investment in the 
East Asia and Pacific region and South Asia has been in greenfield projects (Figure 4.6).   136
Figure 4.6 Types of Private Sector Participation in DTEs 
Note: EAP: East Asia and the Pacific; ECA: Europe and Central Asia; LAC: Latin America and the 
Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SA: South Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
  The top 12 countries listed in Table 4.6 accounted for about 83 percent of the $161 billion 
invested worldwide in the electricity sector during the 1990s. Some countries have had notable 
success in attracting private investment in all segments of the industry (for example, Argentina and 
El Salvador). However, private investors have shown little interest in purchasing SOEs or in 
financing  de novo infrastructure assets in Mexico, Turkey, and Ukraine, to name but a few 
examples. Indeed, some countries, including Hungary and Venezuela, have had to postpone planned 
privatization programs because of a lack of investor interest. Despite substantial state 
encouragement of private capital inflows, these countries have been unable to reverse sustained 
periods of underfunding. 
Table 4.6  Countries with Highest Private Investments in the Electricity Sector, 1990–1999 
(1998 US dollars, millions) 
       
Brazil  31,627  Malaysia  5,970 
China  19,049  Morocco  4,820 
Argentina  14,986  Korea, Rep  4,522 
Philippines  11,672  Turkey  3,710 
Indonesia  9,580  Peru  3,680 
India  8,881  Hungary  2,446 
Chile  6,836 
 
















OM projects  137
Pakistan  6,693  Kazakhstan  1,508 
Colombia  6,512  Czech Rep.  1,300 
Thailand  6,413 
 
Guatamala  1,296 
Source: Jamasb (2002).     
 
The Standard Reform Model and its Outcomes 
A standard reform model in the electricity sector has emerged, which separates potentially 
competitive parts from the core natural monopoly (transmission and distribution), with a regulatory 
agency setting the transmission and distribution tariffs. Competing generators offer electricity to the 
wholesale market, eligible customers are free to choose their supplier, and new entrants build new 
capacity with nondiscriminatory access to the grid and to final customers.  Latin America is not only 
where the first reforms started—in Chile—but also where the standard model has been most 
influential and far-reaching (Suding 1996; Millan, Lorca, and Mico 2001). The reforms in Chile 
(1982) were followed by reforms in Argentina (1992); in Peru (1993); in Bolivia and Colombia 
(1994); in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (1997); and more 
recently in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela (Rudnick and Zolezzi 2001).  How well has this 
system worked? 
Achievements of Liberalization in Latin America 
The sequencing of reforms in Chile is instructive: the creation of the regulatory framework and the 
restructuring of the sector occurred first, to give the reorganized enterprises some experience with 
the regulatory regime before privatization. Privatization proceeded slowly, avoiding some of the 
risks of underpricing with large transfers to shareholders, while wide share ownership created 
political support for the new system (Bitran and Serra 1998). Thus, Chile’s approach was sensibly 
cautious. Moreover, its progress has been of enormous significance in demonstrating the feasibility 
of private sector involvement in the electricity sector of developing countries, and has provided 
valuable lessons for subsequent reforms around the world. 
  The objectives of restructuring in Chile included vertical and horizontal unbundling; competition 
in generation; a centralized pool; open access to the transmission network; yardstick competition in 
distribution; and for large users, the freedom to purchase their power from any generating or 
distribution company. By 1991 Chile had 11 generating, 21 distribution, and 2 integrated   138
companies. However, a key exception to the unbundling was the retention by Endesa (Empresa 
Nacional de Electricidad, S.A., the largest generator) of the ownership and operation of the high-
voltage grid in the country’s main power system (Lalor and Garcia 1996). Endesa and its affiliates 
control more than 60 percent of that system’s installed generating capacity, and its parent owns the 
largest distribution company, accounting for more than 40 percent of distribution. 
  The post-reform market structure in Chile was not conducive to competitive neutrality—Endesa 
could handicap potential competitors through its control of the bottleneck transmission facilities. 
The other reformers learned from Chile’s mistakes, and most other reforming countries (for 
example, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) introduced restrictions on cross-ownership. Argentina and 
Bolivia sought to reduce horizontal market power by limiting the maximum market share in 
generation to 10 and 30 percent, respectively (Watts and Artizia 2002). Argentina, by the end of 
1993, had 70 firms trading in the bulk supply market; by 1997, it had 40 generating and more than 
20 distribution companies (Rudnick 1998). 
  One of the primary benefits of the restructuring is that political intrusion into price setting has 
been reduced. Prices are now aligned  with underlying costs and reflect resource scarcity, as 
efficiency requires, and have been on a downward trend in some countries as a result of the efficient 
exploitation of regional gas networks and new production technologies (mainly CCGT). In 
Argentina, for example, the monthly average price per megawatt hour in the wholesale electricity 
market fell steadily from about $45 (with peaks of more than $70) to about $15 in 1997.  Despite 
the fall in prices, 4,927 megawatts of net additional capacity was added to the system, while 
available capacity increased from 5,930 megawatts in 1992 to 13,530 megawatts in 1997. Similarly, 
in Chile, wholesale and final prices fell by 37 and 17 percent, respectively, between 1986 and 1996. 
Although prices are close to marginal costs, the companies have made reasonable profits (the rate of 
return of the main distribution company rose from 10 percent to 35 percent in the same decade) and 
have been willing to invest in new hydro capacity, as well as in transmission and distribution 
(Spiller 1996).  
Figure 4.7 Labor Productivity of the Distribution/Supply Businesses in Brazil, 1991–2000   139
Source: Mota (2003). 
  Overall, physical performance of the generating plant, transmission, and distribution improved 
dramatically with deregulation and privatization. Chile’s Endesa more than doubled its output 
between 1987 and 1997 and reduced the number of its employees from more than 3,000 to fewer 
than 1,700; and the number of clients per employee rose from 376 to more than 700. Thus, the 
enterprise more than doubled its labor productivity (Alexander and Estache 2000; Rudnick 2000). 
Argentina’s labor productivity (gigawatts per employee) increased more than 23 percent in the first 
five years of the reform (Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 1999).  S imilarly, growth in labor 
productivity of the distribution/supply companies in Brazil accelerated after privatization (Figure 
4.7).  From 1994 to 2000, the total number of employees was halved and productivity increased by 
an impressive 147 percent (Mota 2003). 
Figure 4.8  Thermal Plant Unavailability in Argentina, 1987–2000 
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Source: Rudnick and Zolezzi (2001). 
  The impact of reforms on the quality of service has been equally remarkable. In Chile, average 
time for emergency service declined from five hours in 1988 to two hours in 1994. In Argentina, 
thermal plant unavailability decreased from 52 percent in 1992, when most of the generating 
capacity was privatized, to 26 percent in 2000 (Figure 4.8) (Rudnick and Zolezzi 2001). In Brazil, in 
the first four years after privatization, the outage duration per customer decreased by more than 55 
percent in Light (the distribution company in Rio de Janeiro) and by 40 percent in Enersul (its 
counterpart in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul). In the same period, the outage frequency per 
customer fell by 60 percent in Light and 25 percent in Enersul. 
  Energy losses, theft included, have shrunk considerably, declining in Chile from 20.9 percent in 
1986 to 8.6 percent in 1996 (Fischer and Serra 2000).  Similarly, in Argentina, the privatized 
distribution companies have all succeeded in substantially reducing their distribution losses (Figure 
4.9).  For example, in 1993, Edenor’s losses totaled 26.2 percent of all distributed electricity; in 
2000, this value had been reduced t o only 10 percent (Edenor 2001).  Technical losses in 
transmission decreased from 5.7 percent in 1992 to 4.4 percent in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 4.9  Distribution Losses in Argentina, at Privatization and in 1999 
Source:  Feler (2001). 
By relaxing the financial constraints faced by SOEs and establishing a stable and fair regulatory 









increased slowly, from 44.3 percent in 1986 to only 48.4 percent in 1992 (Figure 4.10). During the 
five years following the reforms, service expansion accelerated considerably, and by 1997 coverage 
was more than 68 percent (Rudnick 1998). Network expansion has benefited the poor: in the lowest 
income per capita decile in Chile, the proportion without an electricity connection fell from 29.4 
percent in 1988 to 7.0 percent in 1998; in the second lowest decile the proportion fell from 19.9 
percent to 4.0 percent (Estache and others 2000). A rural electrification program, with competition, 
private investment, and decentralized decisionmaking, was launched in 1994. One of the most 
innovative elements of this program was the extent to which it relied on competition among 
distribution companies for the efficient implementation of the projects; and among regions, on 
competition for the funds provided by the central government. Coverage in rural areas increased 
from 53 percent in 1992 to 76 percent at the end of 1999, exceeding the target of 75 percent 
originally set for 2000 (Figure 4.11). 
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Figure 4.11  Rural Dwellings Obtaining Electricity and Rural Electricity Coverage in Chile, 1992–1999 
 
Note: Data for 1999 are estimates. 
     Source: Chile, National Energy Commission (1999). 
The Asian Crisis and Structural Deficiencies of the Single-Buyer Model 
The Asian financial crisis has called into question the strategy of promoting rapid entry of private 
finance into an otherwise unreformed electricity sector by means of IPPs selling to a state-owned 
utility under long-term PPAs. 
Power Shortages in Southeast Asia: Several factors conspired to create acute power shortages in 
the Southeast Asia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. These countries experienced rapid economic growth and consequently 
substantial increases in demand for electricity, but the public spending that had fueled much of that 
growth left the central governments unable to finance the needed expansion in electricity and other 
areas of physical infrastructure. For example, an investment of more than $40 billion is needed to 
meet Malaysian peak demand, expected to rise from 4.5 gigawatts in 1992 to 35.4 gigawatts by 
2020 (Power Asia 1993). Similarly, it was estimated in 1990 that Indonesia needed $20 billion to 
install 12 gigawatts of additional capacity by 2000, but a revised forecast in 1993 called for an 
additional 12 gigawatts of capacity within five years. Thailand’s electricity consumption grew at an 
average annual rate of 14.1 percent in 1990–1997. But its installed capacity grew at an average 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
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annual rate of only 7.7 percent. Indonesia’s electricity demand had grown at an average annual rate 
of 17 percent for several years before 1991, but its installed capacity grew at an average annual rate 
of only 15.3 percent.  In the Philippines, excess demand in 1992 corresponded to 48 percent of total 
system capacity, and Malaysia’s annual average reserve margins had fallen to 19 percent, far below 
the desired level of 30–40 percent for rapidly industrializing economies. 
Seeking rapid relief from these acute supply shortages, countries in the region encouraged the 
entry of IPPs by offering them long-term PPAs with state-owned, single-buyer utilities. The PPAs 
typically involved payment in dollars and required government guarantees, as default proceedings 
against a state-owned utility are not normally allowed. The strategy was very successful. Southeast 
Asia attracted $65 billion between 1990 and 1997, more than half the total for developing countries 
and substantially ahead of the only other major destination, Latin America (with $45 billion). 
Impact of the Financial Crisis: The financial crisis that started in Southeast Asia in 1997 had a 
dramatic negative effect on the exchange rate, as well as on GDP growth rates and hence on 
electricity demand. The collapse in currencies caused a doubling in the domestic cost of electricity 
under the PPAs, which the state-owned power company was reluctant to pass on to final consumers. 
In the Philippines, for example, the foreign debt of the national power corporation rose to more than 
20% of the total national debt (World Bank 1999). The fall in demand for electricity created strong 
pressures to renege on, delay, or renegotiate PPAs, causing foreign investors to lose confidence.  
It became painfully clear that this form of private investment in power generation is equivalent to 
an expensive foreign debt. The terms of the PPAs may conceal the true cost of the debt, but the 
interest rates are inevitably high because of the source of finance and the risk. Private investors 
inevitably borrow at higher interest rates than institutions like the World Bank, even in stable 
markets, and lending to state enterprises in corrupt economies is perceived as particularly risky by 
foreign investors. Some governments attempted to repudiate the debts entered into by their 
predecessors, often on claims of corrupt dealing, while other governments had to reschedule their 
loans, if not default. This form of private involvement neither led to much restructuring of the sector 
nor addressed the underlying problem of non-cost-reflective tariffs — if anything, the currency 
crisis seems to have made this worse. 
Problems of Market Power with Excess Demand   144
Table 4.7 Share of the three largest firms (2000) 
   Generation  Transmission  Distribution 
Argentina  30  80  50 
Brazil  40  60  40 
Chile  67  100  50 
Colombia  50  100  60 
Peru  100  100  100 
Bolivia  70  100  70 
El 
Salvador  83  100  88 
Panama  82  100  100 
Hungary  74  100  65 
Poland  45  100  21 
Czech 
Republic 
71  100  49 
Pakistan  95  100  100 
Thailand  100  100  100 
Malaysia  62  100  97 
Indonesia  100  100  100 
Source: Jamasb (2002) 
   
One of the primary virtues of unbundling in the network utilities is that regulation can be confined 
to the natural monopoly segments while in the 
competitive or contestable activities regulatory 
intervention can be eliminated.  In the case of 
the electricity sector that would be a mistake 
because even the potentially competitive 
elements are vulnerable to market power 
(Newbery 2002).  Even in some large 
industrialized countries where there was an 
opportunity to create several private generators 
of approximately equal size, the actual market 
structure of generation tends to be highly 
concentrated.  The problem of market 
concentration in generation is far more 
pronounced in a large number of DTEs because 
of the small size of their electricity markets (Table 4.7).  For example, in the Czech Republic, the 
largest power producer controls 75 percent of the country’s total generating capacity (Bacon and 
Besant-Jones 2002).  Thus, there is need for continued regulatory oversight to ensure that the 
wholesale markets are not manipulated.  Indeed, almost every organized electricity market around 
the world has in place some form of a price or revenue cap.   145
Box 4.6  Lessons from the California experience 
 
What lessons can be drawn from the Californian experience for electricity reform? 
 First, tight electricity markets, where the reserve margin falls below 10%, are likely to lead to volatile markets and 
high prices even if they are fairly competitive (meaning that there are four or more generating companies competing 
with each other at the margin of supply).   As demand tightens relative to supply, inelastic and unresponsive demand 
means that large price rises have little effect on demand, but each supplier has increasing and eventually very 
considerable market power. The large increase in price caused by any single company withdrawing a small amount 
of capacity is more than sufficient to compensate for the loss of profit on that volume of sales, making such 
withdrawals highly profitable in tight markets. 
Second, any transition from a vertically integrated utility to an unbundled structure introduces price risks between 
generators and suppliers that previously cancelled out. High wholesale selling prices for generators gives profits 
upstream that are matched by the losses of downstream suppliers who have to buy at these high wholesale prices and 
sell at predetermined retail prices, unless these purchases are hedged by contracts. The transition to (and subsequent 
operation of) an unbundled industry therefore needs contracts and hedging instruments to insure against possible 
unexpected events that can have dramatic effects on spot prices, particularly when suppliers sell on fixed price terms. 
The British privatization was accompanied by three-year contracts for both sale of electricity and purchase of fuel to 
reduce transitional risks. 
Third, in an interconnected system operating under a variety of different regulatory and operational jurisdictions, 
spare capacity is a public good that may not be adequately supplied unless some care is taken to ensure that it is 
adequately remunerated. Fourth, it is even harder for a decentralized market under multiple jurisdictions to ensure 
adequate reserve capacity with a potentially energy-constrained hydroelectric system, particularly where reservoir 
storage is limited, and annual water volume variations are high. Finally, uncoordinated and injudicious regulatory 
interventions in such an interconnected system can have perverse local effects, and very damaging impacts on the 
efficient pattern of inter-regional electricity trade  
 
Source: (Wolak and Nordhaus 2000, 2001). 
  Where wholesale markets have worked well in developed economies it has been in large part 
because of excess generating capacity, modest demand growth, and the availability of cheap new 
plant that allows independent power producers to enter at modest scale, putting downward pressure 
on wholesale prices. California has demonstrated that tight demand, low contract coverage, and a 
liberalized wholesale market can lead very rapidly to high prices and bankruptcy (Box 4.6).  That 
raises the obvious question, whether competitive markets can work as well in developing countries 
suffering from a shortage of capacity, current excess demand and forecast rapid demand growth? 
The answer will depend critically upon the existence of credit-worthy electricity buyers (ideally 
suppliers) willing to enter into longer term contracts on the back of which new investment in 
generation can be financed. This is turn requires satisfactory pricing of transmission and distribution 
to ensure that the power can be delivered from the generator to the customers. If capacity is scarce, 
then the spot price in a competitive market can rise to very high levels.  
Provided franchise customers are adequately covered by contracts, which can be imposed upon 
existing state-owned generators at the time they are unbundled, high spot prices have the desirable 
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support and finance entry. They also efficiently ration scarce supply to consumers most willing to 
pay the high spot prices, and motivate them to seek out more attractive longer term arrangements. 
They therefore provide finance at the margin where it is needed without necessarily raising average 
prices to all consumers. Markets, contracts, and well-regulated transmission and  
distribution charges therefore represent a significant improvement on a situation of power 
interruptions, underpriced electricity and an inability to finance the generation that is needed. 
  Nevertheless, although market power may be restrained in the short term through contracts, it 
will reappear when these contracts are due for renegotiation, at least if the generators are privately 
owned and cannot be coerced to sign new contracts.  Market power depends on the number of 
competing generators and the overall degree of market demand relative to capacity.  If demand is 
inelastic, and if all remaining generators cannot meet that demand, the remaining generator has 
considerable market power. In a competitive wholesale market, each generator will be aware of that 
power, and will offer at least marginal output at a high price.  Investment in response to the excess 
demand and high prices will reduce this market power if there are sufficiently many independent 
generating companies, but not if there are too few, at least until enough entry has taken place to alter 
the number of price-setting generators. 
  Relying on contracts alone may not be sufficient to address issues of market power, and it is 
important that the regulator has sufficient power to address market power issues as well as setting 
the price-caps or tariffs in the regulated natural monopoly sectors.  The dictum of confining 
regulation to the natural monopolies has often been taken too literally, paying too little attention to 
the unnatural, or at least undesirable, monopolies in generation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
The Water Sector 
he water sector has two distinguishing features that set it a part from other 
infrastructure:  the supply is location-specific and finite; and safe water is critical for 
life and health, hence its availability and affordability at adequate quality to the 
entire population takes on great welfare (and political) importance (ADB, 2000).  
These features, combined with other basic economic and technological characteristics of the water 
sector, define a somewhat limited range of institutional options that can be applied, create specific 
regulatory challenges, and raise the significance of  the water sector in meeting social and economic 
development objectives—especially poverty reduction and environmental sustainability.     
  Since the early 1990s there has been increasing recognition internationally that water should be 
managed as an economic good, and that its scarcity value requires policies and institutions that can 
achieve economic and financial sustainability of water provision (WMO, 1992).  At the same time, 
the inclusion of a water access target among the Millennium Development Goals
8 underscores the 
sector’s close connection to social equity.  The challenge for regulatory reform is to meet both 
efficiency and social welfare objectives in the water sector—balancing needs of operators, 
consumers, taxpayers, and the environment.  
  The state of the water sector is far from what it needs to be in developing countries and in many 
transition economies, both in terms of service delivered and of system efficiency.  Globally 1.1 
billion people are without access to “improved” water supplies (X percent of the rural population 
and 6 percent of urban), and 2.4 billion are without “improved” sanitation (X percent of the rural 
population and 14 percent of urban), according to WHO/UNICEF (2000).  However, these averages 
are misleading since they do not consider the quality, regularity, affordability or convenience of 
service—for example, an urban slum dweller is counted to have “access” if there is a public tap or 
public latrine within 100 meters of the home, although it may be shared with hundreds of other 
                                                 
8 “To halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water”.  
(United Nations, Millennium Summit, September 2000). The World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(September 2002) added another target: “To halve the proportion of people without access to adequate sanitation by 
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residents (IIED, 2003).
9  In the rapidly growing and smaller cities of low income countries, half or 
more of the residents (many of them living in informal and periurban settlements) do not have water 
connections (Hewett and Montgomery, 2002).  One major reason for this inadequate coverage is 
that water utilities, which serve mainly medium-to-larger urban settlements, are often highly 
inefficient in developing and transition economies.  Water losses (unaccounted for water, both 
technical and commercial) exceed one-third of production in many systems; staffing levels per 
connection are many times what is considered good practice in the industry; tariff revenues do not 
cover operating costs; the piped water flow and pressure are inconsistent, and the quality frequently 
unsafe to drink.   
  Faced with such inadequate service and an inability to sustain fiscal support to finance the 
necessary expansion and rehabilitation of systems, especially in the context of high unmet demand 
and often deteriorating water resources, many countries and cities have embarked on various paths 
of reform.   Structural and policy changes in the water sector have been slower, less sweeping and 
more difficult to sustain politically than those in other infrastructure sectors.  Although the scope for 
improved performance is clearly significant, the economic and technological characteristics of the 
sector allow no institutional “magic bullet” promising major efficiencies.  Ultimately, designing and 
sustaining effective reforms in this sector depends critically on managing the political agenda. 
   
The Economics of Water Supply 
 
The Nature of Supply and Demand   
The supply characteristics are determined most importantly by the basic water resources—location, 
quantity and quality of freshwater relative to competing demands in a given population area for uses 
including agriculture (which typically commands 80-90 percent of all water use), industrial and 
municipal needs, hydropower, and the often ignored ecological requirements (such as retaining 
wetlands).  The relevant geographic radius of natural supply for these demands is determined by the 
                                                 
9 For the urban population alone, an estimate of the numbers of people lacking “adequate” provision (sufficient in 
quantity and quality, given actual population densities) in Africa, Asia and LAC amounts to 0.7-1.0 billion for water 
and 0.8-1.1 billion for sanitation—compared to 0.1-0.5 billion based on WHO/UNICEF “improved” standard.  
(IIED, 2003)    149
costs of transporting surface water or pumping from aquifers.
10  The sustainability of a water 
resource system depends on whether current extraction rates (net usage, including the maintenance 
of water quality remaining in or returned to the source) is less than the inflow.  The initial quality of 
the water source determines the expenditure needed for treatment before use.  An increasing number 
of countries are experiencing an economic water scarcity, meaning that the costs of capture, 
treatment and transport would make supply and distribution unaffordable (World Bank 2002).  For 
most developing countries, the supply issue is not absolute scarcity but deteriorating quality of the 
raw resource and lack of connections for the growing population, especially for low income 
households, and unreliable service both to households and firms (ADB, 2000). 
  Competition for water among users and sectors of economic activity is often intense and rising 
with population growth, urbanization, and industrialization.  Many countries do not recognize 
private ownership rights over water supply but do recognize use rights, which are the focus of legal 
and institutional protections.  The urban water demand has both quantity and quality implications:  
most population growth is urban and urban users demand improved quality, while at the same time 
urban-based industrial and household discharges can deteriorate the quality of water sources unless 
properly disposed of or treated (Saleth and Dinar, 1999).  The recognition of sharpening demand 
competition has led policy and institutional reforms in many countries to focus increasingly (though 
not nearly enough in most cases) on issues of allocation, such as tradable water rights; on strategies 
of decentralized water management and control (while recognizing the need for integration and 
coordination across jurisdictions and user groups); and on ensuring both the economic viability and 
physical sustainability of water provision.  
  Because water supply is essential for life, at a certain minimum level of consumption demand is 
price inelastic.  However, the actual minimum supply required to sustain life and health is very 
small ( the WHO guideline is 25 liters per capita per day), far below the level of consumption 
subsidized in many countries where lifeline tariffs may extend up to 30 m3/month per connection 
(about 200 lpcd for a household of 5 persons) (Boland and Whittington, 2000). 
                                                 
10  Even where raw water appears abundant, its effective availability to a water utility is constrained by initial 
quality, by pumping and transport costs, and by claims for competing uses.  New fresh water supply can be 
“created” by desalination, the costs of which have fallen sharply (to US$0.47 per cubic meter with technology 
available in 2000, compared to a low of about US$1.60 in 1996  (Tynan 200)).  Even so, desalination is limited by 
location and 80 percent of total desalination output in the world is produced by the Persian Gulf states.  Reuse of 
treated wastewater is another means of augmenting freshwater supplies and is common in water scarce countries 
especially in the Middle East  (Haddadin, 2002).         150
Table 5.1: 
Ratio between Prices Charged by Vendor 
and by Public Utilities 
Country  City 
Ratio 
Bangladesh  Dacca  12-25 
Colombia  Cali  10 
Ecuador  Guayaquil  20 
Haiti  Port-au-Prince  17-100 
Honduras  Tegucigalpa  16-34 
Indonesia  DKI Jakarta  4-60 
  Surabaya  20-60 
Ivory Coast  Abidjan  5 
Kenya  Nairobi  7-11 
Mauritania  Nouakchott  100 
Nigeria  Lagos  4-10 
  Onitsha  6-38 
Pakistan  Karachi  23-83 
Peru  Lima  17 
Togo  Lome  7-10 
Turkey  Istanbul  10 
Uganda  Kampala  4-9 
     
Source: “Water Resources Policies and the 
Urban Poor: Innovative Approaches and 
Policy Imperatives.” Ramesh Bhatia and 
Malin Falkenmark. Water and 
Sanitation Currents, UNDP-World Bank 
 Even in the poorest urban areas many water uses 
are not for subsistence, and so consumption is 
somewhat price elastic (with estimates for developing 
countries ranging from  -.25 to  -.7).  Therefore 
demand management, especially to reduce waste 
under users’ control, is a relevant policy objective.  
(Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000)   
Because they are typically underserved by formal 
providers, the poor often pay extremely high rates 
and shares of their income for their water needs, 
much above the levels spent by the better-off, while 
consuming much less (Crane 1994).  (Table 5.1)  
Where the utility water is of poor quality, even 
middle-upper income households purchase from 
vendors.  (Komives, Whittington and Wu, 2001)  The 
willingness to pay for water is v ariable even for the 
poor (reflecting desired quality and convenience) and 
is an important factor that must be assessed to 
provide a financially sustainable system.  Although 
there is ample evidence linking adequate water supply and quality, when combined with sanitation, 
to health outcomes (Esrey 1996), the private consumer’s valuation of safe water quality, and 
especially of sanitation’s health benefits, may be less than the social value in terms of public health.  
This implies that incentives (pricing structures and sometimes user subsidies), coupled with public 
education, may be needed to ensure a socially desired level of minimum consumption.   
Economic features of the sector   
High fixed costs   
The economic and technological characteristics of the water sector determine  pricing and 
organizational alternatives, and the rationale for regulation.  The first of these characteristics is the   151
structure of costs.  Water delivery systems have four components
11: capture of the natural resource 
supply (e.g. reservoirs, wells), transportation (e.g. aqueducts and mains, the primary network), 
treatment to ensure adequate quality for use, and delivery to users (the secondary network of 
pipelines and taps)  (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000).  All of these components require fixed capital 
investment in long-lived assets, many of them underground.   
The fixed costs of supply are typically very high relative to variable costs, more so than for other 
utilities such as electricity.
12  This cost structure means that most revenues in a self-financing water 
utility are returns to capital; it also implies that a water provider may be able to operate for many 
years without recovering fixed costs, and in such circumstances is likely to face political difficulties 
when prices need to be raised.  Therefore, water providers have an economic incentive to extract 
monopoly rents, while at the same time being vulnerable to political pressures to keep prices low 
thus preventing adequate returns that would permit capital replacement and attract new investment.    
Natural monopoly 
Much, though not all, of the water supply system involves engineering scale economies which 
contribute to conditions of natural monopoly.  These technical scale economies pertain especially to 
the water capture and transportation components (for example, based on storage and pipe capacity 
characteristics).  But these economies do not necessarily dictate that an organizational monopoly is 
the most efficient structure throughout the system, even at the supply end.  In a multi-reservoir 
system, for example, each reservoir could function analogously to an electric generation facility in a 
large electrical grid, creating the possibility of a decentralized wholesale water market in which 
competing reservoirs bid to furnish water to either bulk water transportation networks or directly to 
user groups (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000).  Unlike electricity, however, water is not a 
homogeneous product, so each supplier into the distribution network would have to undergo quality 
monitoring. Because water has a low unit value relative to its transport costs, centralized 
transmission through a large national or regional network as in the case of electricity grid is 
impractical, and so water systems tend to be highly decentralized geographically and often operate 
under local (at municipal level) or provincial jurisdiction (Foster, 1996).   
                                                 
11 Wastewater capture and treatment may be considered a fourth component of supply, or a system of its own. 
12 For example, fixed costs account for over 80 percent of total water supply costs in the U.K. (Armstrong, Cowan 
and  Vickers, 1994).   152
Although there is increasing experimentation with third party access, especially to service low 
income neighborhoods as discussed later, it remains generally the case that the capture, 
transport/distribution and treatment of water from each natural source is a natural monopoly.
13  A 
single vertically-integrated utility is the usual industry structure
14, especially in small-medium sized 
markets.  For metropolitan areas with a larger market and reliance on multiple water sources, 
coexistence of several vertically integrated entities with each operating a separate local distribution 
network in separate zones of the city is more feasible, seen for example in metro Manila which is 
served by two contiguous water systems.     
The network features of water systems imply, as in other infrastructure sectors, a requirement for 
system coordination--especially for control of the quantity and quality of water intake.  The large 
component of capital stock underground also means that information on system conditions and 
operations is not readily evident to observation or comparison, creating a challenge for regulation. 
Externalities 
Water provision and use involve extensive externalities, both in terms of public health and 
environmental impact.  Excessive water off-take from private wells leads to costly building 
subsidence.   Poor disposal of untreated wastewater contaminates groundwater supplies and 
degrades natural resources in the wider region, such as watersheds and coastal habitats.  Water 
spillage and pooling from poor drainage contributes to disease risks.   
  Many of these negative effects can be diffuse and long term, making them more difficult to 
identify and prevent.  Reform of water and sanitation systems has historically received political 
impetus when the health dangers from inadequate provision have spilled over individual 
neighborhoods (usually low income) to affect the middle class and business interests—as in the case 
of the cholera epidemic in Lima in 1991 and high typhoid incidence in Santiago in the late 1980s 
that added urgency to the reform processes  (Shirley and Menard, 2002).  Policies governing water 
use rights, command-and-control regulations, and tax or fee-based restriction (“polluter pays”) may 
be appropriate to limit harmful externalities.  However, specifying such rules and charges correctly, 
without under-or over-restricting behavior to achieve the socially desired outcomes, and enforcing 
                                                 
13  Water treatment and transport (primary network distribution) are most likely to be the bottleneck elements of 
natural monopoly in urban water systems (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000). 
14 Vertical integration can be justified as well as a means of internalizing the environmental externalities of sewage 
discharge, and of permitting cross-subsidy of sewerage costs by water payments, since sewerage services cannot be 
disconnected for nonpayment (Foster 1996).    153
them are a real challenge.  Experience shows that command-and-control approaches are often less 
effective in curbing pollution than financial incentives,
15  or than institutional pressures such as 
monitoring and public exposure of polluters’ performance by citizen g roups or the media (World 
Bank 2001).       
The case of sanitation   
Much of what has been said here about the cost structure and natural monopoly characteristics of 
water supply also pertains to piped systems of sanitation, namely sewerage, as well as to stormwater 
drainage.  There are economies of scale in sewerage and economies of scope in combining water 
and sewerage transportation and delivery (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994).  However, cost 
recovery is more difficult for sanitation than for water alone, in part because piped sewerage is very 
costly
16 and because more of the benefits are external to the individual user.  Few lower-middle 
income countries have been able to meet the necessary conditions—adequate piped water flow, 
consumer willingness to pay, and fiscal ability to sustain financial subsidies for revenue shortfalls) 
to provide access to sustainable sewerage to more than a small minority of the urban population.
17  
Effective demand for piped sewerage is more articulated at higher income levels where users place a 
higher value on convenience, amenities and environmental impacts. 
   Satisfactory health benefits can be obtained from less sophisticated sanitation methods, such as 
ventilated pit latrines, shallow (condominial
18) sewers, and septic tanks, that are not at all or only 
partially networked but do require correct construction and maintenance.
19  The benefits and costs 
of these less expensive technologies are still not fully internal to the household, and so provision and 
use of such systems often require organization at the neighborhood level and may justify some 
public subsidy of initial construction costs.  Such regulation or public oversight as is needed is 
usually best provided through the community or NGO and/or the local government.  (PPIAF/WSP, 
                                                 
15 Pollution taxes on firms reduce the efficiency effects of water pricing, especially under price caps (Noll, Shirley 
and Cowan, 2000)  
16 In Durban, South Africa, for example, a conventional household water connection costs about US$180, and 
sewerage connection, US$800  (Presentation at the World Bank, December 10, 2002, by Neil McLeod, Executive 
Director, Durban Metro Water Services).  
17 UN-Habitat Global Urban Indicators database. 
18 Condominial sewers involve shallow, small bore pipes running through yards connecting house connections to a 
neighborhood receptor.  The system requires the neighbors to maintain the backyard network, the “condominial”, 
and therefore substitutes an institutional input (collective action) for capital (the physical assets).  
19  These service types are not technically suitable for very dense settlements or for some geological conditions 
because they can contaminate underground water. In Durban, the simplest improved sanitation scheme costs 
US$120, which is still much more than the simplest on-site water connection (US$28).   154
2001).  The remainder of this chapter focuses on water supply and sanitation business that is integral 
to a water utility. 
Technological change in water supply systems 
A significant difference between the water sector and most other infrastructure is that technological 
change in the past couple of decades has been much less dramatic or rapid, and has had less impact 
on the underlying economics of supply.  Unlike telecommunications there has been no revolution in 
the product and in underlying costs; unlike electricity generation, no new production methods; and 
unlike some segments of transport, no major innovations permitting fundamental improvements in 
operation and management, or affecting the availability of critical information.   The most 
significant technological innovation in conventional water systems has been the widespread 
introduction of metering at the point of consumption, which permits the utility to set a tariff 
reflecting the marginal cost of water used and to bill for actual consumption.   
  For metering to be worthwhile, the efficiency gains from giving customers an incentive to 
conserve water use must be at least as great as the transactions costs of installation and meter-based 
billing.  Therefore, metering is most attractive in situations of water scarcity.  In addition, if the costs 
of externalities are important in the water system (e.g. where there are serious problems of drainage 
or wastewater pollution), metering can permit usage-based prices to serve as a means of 
internalizing these externalities.  (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000)  Overall, for considerations of 
efficiency, conservation and externalities, in most DTEs  metering of consumption is recommended.  
But metering can also bring political advantages, by making information about consumption and 
pricing more widely available.  In Santiago metering is seen as giving consumers more control, by 
informing them of their actual consumption and making the billing more transparent (Clarke 2001).  
In Guinea, the extension of metering to all administrative connections after 1996 helped to reduce 
the amount of water billed to government and reduce its consumption, but also underscored the 
seriousness of official nonpayment (Menard and Clarke 2002). 
  In response to demands of low-income consumers for better access to water, lower cost 
“appropriate” technologies have become a more recognized component of the urban water system.
20  
For the most part these innovations were not the result of organized R&D efforts by the formal 
                                                 
20 Although in rural areas non-networked water provision has long been the norm, the low cost technologies 
becoming more formally recognized in urban areas may be linked to the network utility, e.g. as bulk distribution 
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utilities or government agencies, but rather a recognition and legitimization of existing alternative 
arrangements for self-provisioning and small-scale private distribution. Lower cost pipe 
technologies, some based on small-bore PVC pipes laid above ground, have reduced the economies 
of scale of secondary distribution.  When they purchase bulk water from the utility, these small scale 
providers benefit from the network economies of scale and the utility’s water treatment (Tynan, 
2000).   Even if the chemical quality of the water remains the same as that from the main system, 
however, it is not an identical product to the consumer because of lower pressure.  These alternative 
providers do meet a segment of user demands typically not served by the network and provide some 
measure of contestability to the utility within this niche market.   In the El Alto area of La Paz, 
Bolivia, when consumers were required to connect to the utility (because of its exclusivity rights), 
the consumers resisted because they preferred to stay with their alternative arrangements. (Komives, 
1999)  
The rationale for regulation 
The existence of natural monopoly and importance of fixed costs, externalities and social welfare 
concerns in the water sector create a strong rationale for government regulation both to protect the 
producer and the consumer. Water provision is not highly contestable and the consumer is not able 
to assess whether water is safe to drink.  Regulation in the public interest aims to guard against 
extraction of monopoly rents and  to ensure adequate water quality, while at the same time 
guaranteeing the investor a necessary return on long-lived assets.  Government ownership of water 
systems is not a substitute for regulation, since public monopolies can also have incentives to 
overcharge consumers who have no alternative supply, and to run down the capital stock and under-
invest. Ensuring that water supply can keep up with demand in a sustainable manner requires 
institutional arrangements that can introduce competition wherever possible and otherwise improve 
access to information to the regulator and to the consumer, and instill incentives for efficiency.  The 
next two sections discuss how relevant options for market structure, and regulatory rules, may meet 
these objectives under various conditions.   The final section describes some recent experiences with 
structural and regulatory reform.    
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Table 5.2 Institutional Options 
Option  Ownership   Financing Operations 
Service 




Contract  Public  Public  Private 
Lease 





Private  Private 
BOOT                              
Private then 
















Private  Private  Private 
Source:  World Bank,  Klas Ringskog, 1999 
 
Market Structure and Institutional Options 
Although the scope for competition is more limited in the water sector than in other areas of 
infrastructure
21, providing opportunity for competition in various forms is still a good principle for 
the structure of the market and design of sectoral institutions.  Local conditions will dominate in 
determining what structural options are relevant—most importantly, the size of the water market, 
the fixed costs of accessing the available water resources, and the minimum efficient size of the 
treatment facility required.  The attractiveness of the system to the private sector and possible 
benefits to be gained from privatization will also depend on the details of the regulatory 
arrangements, which are discussed  in the next section. 
The range of options for competition in water provision 
As noted earlier, the natural monopoly character 
of water supply is sufficiently strong that 
structural unbundling is not very widespread and 
so vertical integration of utilities is the dominant 
mode of organization even in industrial countries. 
Horizontal integration is also common, in the 
sense of a single utility being responsible for a 
whole urban market (multiple utility providers 
within a city being relatively rare).  The options 
for  direct competition are discussed below in 
three respects—as direct competition for specific 
services;  as competition  within the product 
market; and as competition for the market.  The 
latter is the main area of involvement by the 
                                                 
21 This is because a greater percentage of the costs in water systems are in the noncompetitive network than in 
potentially competitive areas.  This fact reduces the relative efficiency gains to be gained from competition in this 
sector.  While 40 percent of the production costs in electricity are in network components (transmission and 
distribution) and 60 percent in potentially competitive areas (generation), in water two-thirds of the costs are in the 
network and only one-third in areas amenable to competition.  (London Economics 1988)   157
international private sector.  Indirect competition knows as yardstick competition is discussed later 
as a mechanism of regulation.  The key features of the main institutional options in play are 
summarized in Table 5.2. 
Laying the groundwork for competition: decentralization and corporatization 
One of the points of international consensus regarding water management is subsidiarity, that is, 
placing responsibility at the lowest possible level—closest to the sources of demand and of relevant 
information, so as to increase accountability and efficiency. (WMO, 1992)  Decentralization of 
urban water management is seen in many countries by the separation of water business f rom 
government administrative departments by the creation of autonomous, self-financing utility-type 
entities (WDR 94), as is the trend within the European Union (Hall, 1998)  and in Mexico, Chile, 
Brazil and Morocco.  A 1997 Water Industry Policy in China has allowed water utilities to be 
created (Saleth and Dinar 1999).  Even while remaining publicly owned, such corporatized and 
commercialized structures present the minimum conditions for competition, either direct or indirect, 
by making the business nature of water supply more transparent.   
  Some urban water companies remain owned by the national government (such as SANAA in 
Honduras) or province (SABESP in Sao Paulo, Brazil).  Transferal to local government ownership 
and control has been occurring in some countries in the context of overall political and fiscal 
decentralization, for example in Hungary (Lobina and Hall, 1999).   Another traditional structure, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, is a single water company having 
responsibility for several or all water services in the country, rural and urban. (Box 5.1)  The intent 
is to cross-subsidize the small town systems (usually) with the revenues from the larger cities. 
However, in Africa this national organization of the sector has not been very effective in extending 
service across the country relative to a more decentralized structure.  Service coverage, both in the 
capital city and in all urban areas, in countries with a single provider is on average lower than in 
countries where water provision is organized subnationally.  Moreover, the ratio of coverage outside 
of the capital to coverage in the capital is not, on average, higher in those African countries where 
water supply is under a single national entity compared to countries where it is organized at the local 
level.   These results suggest that regional cross-subsidies have not been very effective and that  
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monopoly supply, at least at the national scale, has not promoted service expansion.  (Clarke and 
Wallsten, 2002) 
Competitive procurement by a State owned enterprise:  “Contracting-out” specific services 
The practice of “contracting out” the right to 
perform specific functions for a water utility 
can introduce a focused element of competition.  
(Box 5.2)  When potential contractors bid for 
such work to standards specified by the utility, 
it can provide incentives for efficiency and 
bring the company new skills and practices.  
Competitive contracting-out is the least 
complex form of private sector participation 
because the utility retains overall responsibility 
for operations and for fixed assets.  The practice 
can help “break the ice” for public-private sector collaboration and elicit valuable information about 
costs of basic operations  (Idelovitch and Ringskog 1995)  Prior to the company’s partial divestiture, 
EMOS in Santiago successfully contracted-out not only billing and meter-reading but also planning 
Box 5.1  Small town and rural water systems 
 
In Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal the organization of a single national operator is designed for interregional cross-
subsidization, with the capital cities providing most of the revenues to cover the costs of serving secondary and 
smaller urban areas at a uniform national tariff.  In Cote d’Ivoire this system has functioned relatively well for a 
time in incorporating towns into the service area of the national water company, SODECI.  But as villages are 
outgrowing their community management systems and the national operator has been unable to expand to all 
small communities, the limitations of this system are becoming apparent.  The countries are looking to 
decentralize and create more incentives for competitive private provision to expand and improve services in the 
smaller markets.  In Senegal the failures of the national entity to expand services to the rural communities has 
stimulated a dynamic system of community water systems, headed by village water committees and in some 
cases funded by migrant remittances.  Recognizing the limitations of serving the country through one national 
utility, reforms in Senegal are raising the legal standing of the village water committees and organizing a system 
for service delegation that could promote local small-scale private providers.  Some of the small towns on the 
perimeter of the formal utility network have opted to continue controlling their water services locally, even 
preferring to pay higher tariffs if they see that the benefits could be retained locally to support other community 
activities. 
 
Source: Tremolet, Browning and Howard, 2002;  Tremolet, 2002 
Box 5.2  Service Contracts in Mexico City  
 
In Mexico City, service contracts were issued with 
four private companies in 1993-94 for meter 
installation and reading, and billing.  The main 
objective was to improve the efficiency of water and 
sewerage operations by reducing waste and raising 
revenues collected.  A further aim was to acquire for 
the government better information on the condition of 
the physical assets, as a prerequisite to issuing a full 
management concession in a later phase (which has 
been delayed indefinitely).  The contracts 
corresponded to different zones of the city, but the 
contract specification and bids were not sufficiently 
comparable to permit benchmarking costs and 
performance among the zones. 
 
Source: Haggerty, Brook and Zuluaga, 1999   159
studies, construction and rehabilitation works, general repair and maintenance, computer and 
payroll services, public relations and industrial relations services (Alfaro 1996).  In Chennai, India, 
the Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board has achieved cost savings of 45-65 percent in 
its sewage pumping stations that are contracted-out privately (World Bank/PPIAF, 1999). 
Service contracts typically have short duration (months or 1-2 years) and can be subject to 
frequent rebidding.  However, without open bidding, service contracts do not entail any particular 
incentive for improved efficiency.  Privatized or privately concessioned utilities frequently procure 
goods and services preferentially from their own subsidiaries.
22  This need not be a concern if the 
overall concession was awarded competitively and the contract is well designed to promote the right 
overall incentives, but overreliance on a private operator’s subsidiaries can add to a climate of 
public distrust in the utility. 
Competition within the market 
Competition by utility companies operating in parallel within the same urban water market has been 
relatively rare.  In Paris and Manila, two large metropolitan areas, the market has been divided into 
separate zones with different companies which do not compete with each other directly but whose 
performance can be compared by a regulator (yardstick competition).  Competition for customers 
can also take place at the boundaries of such service areas.  Most product competition within a 
market occurs between piped water and unpiped sources (vendors or well water), but this is 
normally financially unattractive because p iped water can be provided much more cheaply.  
However, it may become worthwhile for customers to seek such alternatives if the utility water is of 
very poor quality or excessively overpriced.  Bypass of the utility network may also be feasible for 
some large customers who might be able to provide their own local system.    
Competition in the product market for water is permitted in the legal frameworks of the UK  and 
Australia as third party access to network infrastructure.  However, the expense of transporting 
water means that common carriage and cross-border competition are not very economical, and as of 
1997/98 common carriage had not been implemented in the water sector in either country. (ADB, 
2000;  Cowan, 1997). 
                                                 
22 When a subsidiary of Vivendi (Generale des Eaux) was awarded the operating concession in Szeged, Hungary in 
1993, a works company majority-owned by GdE was established at the same time and acquired an annual contract 
for all the maintenance work and exclusive rights to all works contracts issued by the Szeged concession.  Bayliss, 
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 Any competition within the water market can only become significant where the utility is not 
given an exclusive right to service customers in a particular area.  (Klein, 1996)  Such exclusivity is 
often awarded both to permit the utility to cross-subsidize different customers within the market, 
and to make a concession contract or equity share more attractive to the private investor.  
Governments may also justify exclusivity arrangements as a means to discourage use of alternative 
unsafe water or negative externalities from private well-drilling.   But exclusivity can work against 
the public interest where water coverage is very low and utility performance very poor—the case in 
most cities of low income countries.   
In Paraguay, independent small scale operators (aguateros) using low cost, small-bore pipes to 
distribute bulk water within periurban neighborhoods not connected to the main network system 
have been operating for years (Solo, 1998).  Alternative providers have also been at least tolerated in 
many African cities (Collignon and Vezina, 2000).  Formal utilities typically have little experience 
in providing their standard connections to the unplanned, quasi-legal settlements of the poor that are 
often characterized by extreme density, difficult topography, and unclear land tenure.  In cities 
where large shares and numbers of residents live in such circumstances, allowing and encouraging 
alternative operators, as well as the utilities, to extend services of various qualities through 
innovative means is vital to achieve water for the poor within a reasonable timeframe and cost 
(PPIAF/WSP, 2001).  
Competition for the market 
Although long-run investment concessions have been one of the major modes of private sector 
participation and “competition  for  the market” of network utilities in recent y ears, two less 
extensive forms of private involvement are also seen in the water sector—management contracts 
and leases.  Management contracts, with a duration of about 5 years, are limited to operations and 
maintenance.  They are fee-based and do not entail any financial risk to the contractor nor 
responsibility for investment.  The potential for management contracts to improve operational 
efficiency depends greatly on how performance targets are defined, what incentives are specified for 
the operator, and how the contract is monitored 
It is generally recognized that a management contractor has at best very limited leeway to effect 
change if the institutional and political environment is not supportive, so this model has not been 
widely replicated.  Mexico City, for example, does not have an institutional structure conducive to   161
the success of  a management contract, as responsibilities for water supply are fragmented across 
agencies and 16 municipal governments, there is no legal basis for cutting off nonpayers, and no 
single regulator.  In addition, the way that the service contractors were handled, with numerous 
delays, reduced the government’s credibility with the private sector and undercut support for the 
second phase of private involvement, issuance of a broader management contract (Haggerty, Brook 
and Zuluaga, 1999)  In Johannesburg, at the same time the municipal water service was corporatized 
in the late 1990s it was bid out for a management contract, because public opposition precluded 
attempting a long term private concession.  The contract includes several incentive provisions which 
are paid out only made after a reputable international firm gives an independent assessment of the 
utility’s performance (PPIAF/WSP, 2001). 
Lease contracts (sometimes called affermage) are longer than management contracts—usually 
15-20 years—and cover the full range of management responsibilities (technical and commercial).  
Funding of investment in new capacity remains the responsibility of the public sector.  The operator 
is subject to some commercial risk, in the event of a shortfall between the affermage fee paid to it by 
the contracting authority (which is based on the volume of water produced or sold) and actual 
revenues collected.  A performance bonus may be added, related to efficiency.  Among DTEs, water 
leasing has operated longest in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire (since 1957) and currently is practiced inter 
alia in Guinea, Mozambique,
23 Niger and Senegal in Sub-Saharan Africa, Antalya in Turkey and 
Gdansk in Poland.    
  In concessions, the contractor acquires a long term right (typically for 20-30 years) to the use of 
all utility assets, as well as responsibility to make and finance new investments, with specified 
performance targets.  The assets are returned to the public authority at the end of the contract period, 
and the concessionaire is compensated for own investments not fully amoritzed. Among the DTEs, 
in recent years water (and in some cases sewerage) concessions have been awarded and are 
functioning for Bucharest, Buenos Aires, Lima, and Sofia, to name some of the largest urban water 
companies, and for the national water and electricity authority of Gabon (the first true concession in 
Sub-Saharan Africa).  Given their long duration, concessions pose major issues to both ensure 
credibility on the government’s part and to permit necessary adjustments in major contract 
parameters, as discussed in the next section.    
                                                 
23 Mozambique features a slight difference from these other cases, in that the operator pays a lease fee to the 
contracting authority which is fixed in advance and based on the financing costs of the infrastructure;  the balance of 
the tariff revenue collected is retained by the operator as payment (PPIAF/WSP, 2001).   162
Box 5.3  Private sector transactions in water and sanitation 
 
Private participation in water supply and sewerage has remained much below that of other infrastructure sectors 
(representing only 5.3 percent of global private investment in infrastructure in DTEs during 1990-2001).  Private flows 
for WSS averaged $US4.6 billion in 1999-2001, compared to a decade high of US$9.3 billion in 1997 (in 2001 dollars).  
Latin America has received the largest number of private water/sanitation projects, but East Asia the highest share of 
investment value, with other regions well behind.  Concessions are by far the most common type of projects in the 
sector, representing over 80 percent of investments in the 1990s while  divestiture and operations/maintenance contracts 
are the least common (only 12 percent of contract types over the decade).   Over half of the private WSS projects, and 
three-quarters of the investment value, has been awarded in six countries, among which are Argentina and Brazil.  
 
Source:  World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database.  (Izaguirre, 2002) 
New water supply and/or water treatment utilities have also been established under BOO or 
BOOT
24 concession contracts in Chengdu (China), Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), Pusan (South 
Korea), and West Bangkok (Haarmeyer and Coy, 2002).  Often BOO/T contracts, which are 
typically greenfield facilities rather than investment in existing water distribution systems, have 
take-or-pay provisions that can subject the government to contingent liabilities.
25 Making new 
investments in bulk water supply without curbing wastage in the distribution system may worsen 
service and harmful environmental externalities.  Although greenfield projects are often politically 
easier to negotiate than fundamental system reform and restructuring, they underscore the urgency 
of adjustment to retail tariffs and to demand management (ADB 2000). 
Privatization of ownership 
Sale of equity shares in water companies to private parties, with or without attendant restructuring 
or regulatory changes, is  also occurring though with less frequency than in electricity or 
telecommunications.  In Chile in 1999 the government initiated equity sales in several water 
companies, including EMOS (renamed Aguas Andinas) in Santiago, which had one of the best 
performance records of any public water enterprise in developing countries.  The sales were 
intended as a prelude to concessioning but political resistance halted the procedure. 
                                                 
24 Build-Operate-Transfer and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
25 Many of the Asian BOO/T contracts have been of this type, although governments have heeded warnings about 
overly generous revenue guarantees based on earlier IPPs in power generation (ADB, 2000).   163
In brief, the water sector does not illustrate wide variation or innovation in market structure or 
institutional options, and private sector participation has been modest in scale.  (Box 5.3) While 
competition is inherently limited, the opportunities are often not fully tapped—for example, major 
private concessions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in Timisoara, Romania, and in 
Jakarta were awarded without any competitive tendering (Bayliss, Hall and Lobina 2001; Lobina, 
2001).  Few long-term concessions have been terminated by the public authority or been lost to the 
original holder upon rebidding and renewal. The major private participants in internationally-bid 
contracts are very few, dominated by the two largest French multinationals (Vivendi and  Suez-
Lyonnaise, which between them hold two-thirds of the global privatized water market), and several 
smaller European–owned companies (SAUR, Thames, Anglian and IWL) (Hall and Lobina 2002).  
However, these companies are collaborators as often as competitors, since they frequently partner as 
consortia to win contracts (Bayliss, Hall and Lobina, 2001).  What is critical to the sector’s 
performance, therefore, is the content of regulatory design and its enforcement.   
The choice of regulatory rules 
Regulation of the water sector needs to serve three major economic and social welfare objectives—
the weighting of which will vary by local conditions of the water resources, economic development, 
and politics: 
•  Efficiency—production and delivery of water at least cost, maintenance of assets, and 
conservation of supply 
•  Equity—access to affordable and good quality service for all 
•  Environmental sustainability—minimizing pollution and damage to natural resources. 
The main challenges facing the regulator are lack of information, and balancing the interests of 
the investor, the consumer, and the taxpayer.  Asymmetry of information on costs is a bigger 
constraint in the water sector than other infrastructure activities because of the limits to competition 
as a discovery mechanism, and because much of the water infrastructure is underground and not 
readily observable.  Similarly, the quality of water can only be partially assessed by the consumer 
(in terms of clarity, taste, smell) but requires regular expert testing.   To satisfy the interests of the 
investor the regulator needs to provide a credible commitment that adequate returns on long-lived 
capital assets can be achieved—this implies curbing public sector performance risk.  To protect the 
consumer, the regulator must ensure that the water will remain safe and affordable.  And to the   164
citizen-taxpayer, this assurance must extend to needs today and to future generations without 
creating an undue fiscal or debt burden, or irretrievably damaging natural resources.  This section 
focuses on the regulation of pricing with some discussion of other regulatory rules (quality and 
other performance targets, especially pertaining to service expansion) to establish incentives and 
behaviors consistent with these concerns. 
Pricing policy 
In most circumstances the optimal pricing structure for water is a two-part tariff, with the first part 
being a capacity charge and the second reflecting marginal cost. This second part, a volumetric 
usage charge, assumes increased importance when water is scarce.  (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000)  
Ideally the usage charge should vary to reflect periods of peak demand relative to supply. 
The short-run marginal costs of using any unit of water include not only the variable operation 
and maintenance costs, but also a resource or opportunity cost (from withdrawal of water from 
alternative uses, such as agriculture) and a discharge cost (of wastewater to the environment, if not 
treated).  Including this last element in the tariff would permit to internalize the negative 
externalities of water use.  Payments for the opportunity cost and externalities of water use may be 
collected with the tariff but should be kept not by the utility but by the owner of the water resource, 
such as a water management authority.  However, few water systems (especially in the DTEs) 
charge for all these elements of true marginal cost even when environmental impacts and cross-
sectoral allocation are burning issues  (PPIAF/WSP, 2001)
26   
Indeed, even the basic operation and maintenance costs are often inadequately covered by tariff 
revenues.  As an extreme illustration, in Lima in 1989, operating costs amounted to about 150 
percent of operating revenues.  (Alcazar, Xu and Zuluaga, 2000)  Because of the high ratio of fixed 
to variable costs as noted earlier, in a self-financing utility a large share of revenue is quasi-rents.  
Whether the utility is publicly owned or private and regulated, political pressures will be strong to 
expropriate these quasi-rents by imposing low prices.  Even if expropriation does not occur through 
price levels, it may through government non-payment of its own water bills—as has been a major 
                                                 
26 Pricing of water to reflect accurately the full social costs of exploitation for alternative uses and of externalities 
would require that the interests of alternative users and of those affected by externalities are well articulated.  
However, since some users are not able to participate effectively in a market for water, because of collective action 
problems, poorly defined property rights, or transactional and information costs, water pricing can at best take into 
account only some of the opportunity costs and externalities.  (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000)   165
problem for the water companies in Abidjan and Conakry, where chronic payment arrears by public 
customers undercuts the tariff schemes (Shirley and Menard, 2002).   
 
The information handicap 
Even with the best political will, a regulator will have difficulty committing to allow efficient prices 
in the water system, because it has less access to information than the operator.  A simple cost-plus 
pricing regulation is common because it relies on what the operator reports, but it does not provide 
incentives for improving efficiency.  In Guinea the regulator of the lease contact, SONEG, has weak 
authority to compel information reporting by the leaseholder, SEEG.  As a result of this weakness 
and political interference by the government, external audits revealed that the cost-plus formulas 
used to adjust tariffs had been misapplied, resulting in excessive price increases granted to SEEG.  
(Menard and Clarke, 2002)  To combat the problem of information asymmetry, two approaches are 
used to reveal cost information:  auctioning and yardstick competition.   
Auctioning is especially appealing in the water sector because it can be applied to the range of 
contracting arrangements outlined earlier.  Successful auctioning requires careful design and a 
minimum number of bidders.  In Buenos Aires, for example, the water and sewerage concession 
was auctioned in 1993 to the bidder offering the lowest price of water for a given set of performance 
parameters.  The winning bidders offered to deliver water at a price about 27 percent below the 
prevailing price, and committed to make annual investments in the first five years well in excess of 
those under state ownership (Klein, 1996).  However, in 2000 there was only one bidder (Suez 
Lyonnaise) for Cameroon’s water supply concession.  In Cote d’Ivoire the government renewed the 
lease contract with SODECI, the private lease holder, in 1988 without rebidding, but used the threat 
of an auction to successfully win a reduction of the real tariff by 20 percent—an outcome which 
suggests that SODECI had been enjoying considerable rents.  (Kerf, 2000). There can be conflicts 
of objectives in the  design and awarding of concessions because of competing interests.  In 
Budapest in 1997 the water supply concession was granted not to the consortium that offered the 
lowest price for water, but the one that promised the local government the highest transfer payment 
even with a water price above other bids (Hall 1998).  
Since lack of information is also a deterrent for potential private operators, making system 
information available to potential bidders is critical to a competitive tender and a major due   166
Box 5.4  An abortive attempt at water concessioning in Atlanta, Georgia 
 
In the United States, 94 percent of municipal water systems (some 5000 separate utilities) are publicly controlled and 
most face massive requirements of repair and rehabilitation.  In an effort to achieve operating efficiencies and access 
to private capital, over a thousand of these systems have turned to private long term concessions (up from only 400 in 
1997).  Atlanta undertook the largest such concession in 1999, signing a 20-year contract with United Water, a 
subsidiary of Suez.   The concessionaire was to undertake $800 million in repairs over five years.   But by January 
2003, both sides conceded failure and agreed to cancel the contract.    What happened?  In the three years under the 
concession, the residents and city officials complained that the service was poor and unresponsive, fraught with water 
main breaks and safety failures leading to occasional “boil only alerts”.  But United Water argued that the system’s 
infrastructure was in a much worse state of disrepair than it had been led to believe before the concession was signed, 
and that it was losing $10 million annually under a $22 million a year contract that the city refused to renegotiate.  
 
Source:  Douglas Jehl, “As Cities Move to Privatize Water, Atlanta Steps Back,” New York Times, February 10, 
2003.  
diligence responsibility prior to inviting any private participation. And even when the water price 
has been set through auctioning of a long-term contract, it may still need to be renegotiated in 
response to changed circumstances outside the operator’s control.  The investors need assurance that 
they will be covered in the event of adverse external circumstances and, at the same time, the 
regulator needs to keep pressure on the operator to sustain a high level of efficiency and to pass on 
to consumers or taxpayers a share of the gains from any external or unforeseen cost reductions.
27  
This tension has turned some water concessions into a battle of wills even where economic and 
institutional conditions should ensure success.  (Box 5.4)  
Re-bidding of a major franchise is too costly and disruptive to be a practical approach for price 
adjustment, so between auctions a more calculated method of periodic adjustment by the regulator 
is needed.   The shortcomings of rate of return regulation are discussed elsewhere in this report, and 
for the water sector this approach is clearly too information-intensive.  An alternative increasingly 
seen as more appropriate for this sector, first adopted in 1990 by OFWAT (the office of water 
regulation in England and Wales), is a price cap (RPI – X)  method of adjustment, which can 
                                                 
27 In the UK, periodic cost adjustments for unforeseen circumstances  (“interim determinations”) can include price 
clawbacks if external factors cause significant cost savings to the utility.  In 1992-94 the regulator decreed lower 
price increases than allowed under the 1989 price indexation formula because construction costs had fallen due to a 
national recession  (Klein, 1996).       167
provide incentives for productivity gains.  During the first periodic (5-year) review of prices under 
the formula OFWAT determined (in the face of consumer dissatisfaction) that the approved prices 
had been overly generous and tightened the parameters in the formula.  However, the transparency 
of the method reduces some of the risk that such a review could be abused by the regulator  (ADB 
2000).    
Even under a price cap, information on efficiency and other parameters is still necessary for the 
regulator to monitor the utility’s performance.  Yardstick competition permits indirect or by-proxy 
comparison among actual or stylized providers.  Finding relevant comparators is obviously not easy, 
as the required information may be specific to a firm or a water system.  A further issue is that using 
partial indicators of productivity can lead to inconsistent ranking of performance across utilities; 
where possible, regulators should use estimates of the industry’s o verall efficiency frontier.  
(Estache and Rossi, 2001)  OFWAT has relied on benchmarking most intensively for price 
regulation, and in Chile the regulator refers to long-run marginal cost calculations of a “model” 
company (Klein 1996).           
Balancing interests and allocating risks  
A general principle of risk allocation is that each party should bear the risks it is best able to 
mitigate.  Contracts and regulatory rules should require the operator/investor to bear the commercial 
risk (of demand and payment) but be able to cut off delinquent customers; construction risks (for 
concessions);  and risks that can be hedged, such as normal foreign exchange and interest rate risk.  
Households should be required to pay for services, but within a social contract where costs of 
connection and of minimum consumption are shared for those unable to pay.  The government 
(taxpayers) should bear these social commitments.  Individuals must also be responsible for their 
own behaviors related to water and sanitation use and disposal but again, where basic hygiene 
education and access to minimum services are not adequate, the public sector must be proactive to 
correct these failures. Risks associated with political change, protecting the quality of water 
resources, and protecting against major macroeconomic setbacks are best borne by the government 
(ADB, 2000).  However, in practice the magnitude and cost implications of external shocks are not 
always immediately evident and may require some burden-sharing among the government, the 
utility and its customers.   168
  Interests of investors: With a clear mechanism of price adjustment the risks to the investor can 
be contained, but only insofar as the public owner and regulator make credible commitments—so 
that the investor can be assured that short term political pressures will not undermine the best laid 
plans.  Credibility can be established by rules separating regulation from the government’s 
ownership role, protecting the independence of the regulator, and strengthening the legal security of 
investors, as discussed in earlier chapters of this report.  Further commitment devices can include 
public sector performance bonds, dispute resolution mechanisms (such as international arbitration in 
major cases), and roles for consumer representation.  The multilateral institutions have played a part 
in backing the government’s commitments, as in Guinea where the World Bank provided partial 
financing of a revenue subsidy during a period of phased-in tariff increases. 
Because international experience with concession design is still evolving and each situation is 
different, flexibility on the part of the regulator is an important part of its credibility.  The side-by-
side concessions instituted for West and East Manila in 1997 were generally considered to be well 
prepared and designed.  (ADB, 2000) However, a particular feature that allocated the existing debt 
portfolio of the parent utility (MWSS) to the West Manila concession, while leaving the East with 
the obligation to seek new financing for its larger investment requirements, has had the 
unanticipated effect of saddling Manila West with massive foreign exchange losses stemming from 
the 1997 regional crisis (which struck shortly after the contracts were signed).  The consortium for 
this concession has demanded a doubling of the prices agreed at initial bidding.
 28  Resolution to this 
financial problem, which could not have been fully foreseen (and adds to the stresses caused by El 
Nino), may be critical to continuance of the West concession.   
  Interests of government/taxpayers
:  A contrary risk to expropriation, and greater from the 
taxpayer’s (and consumer’s) perspective, is the risk of regulatory capture.
29  Capture is evident in 
some of the long-term concessions where the public authority has been reluctant to challenge the 
incumbent.    However, regulatory capture has not prevailed in the face of extreme political 
opposition to a concession’s performance--in Tucuman (Argentina), the 30-year concession granted 
to a subsidiary of Generale des Eaux  (now Vivendi) in 1995 was terminated in 1998, because 
consumers rebelled against the doubling of tariffs while the company failed to meet planned 
                                                 
28 Public Services International, “Paying for Privatisation:; higher prices, lower employment,” World Water Forum, 
The Hague, 17-22 March 2000. 
29 Most of the research literature on the politics of regulation focuses on risks of capture, not expropriation (Noll, 
Shirley and Cowan, 2000).   169
investment and water quality expectations.  The water service in the province has since been 
returned to public operation (Hall and Lobina, 2002).   In Cochabamba (Bolivia) and Szeged 
(Hungary), as well as in Tucuman, the multinational concessionaires have pursued legal claims for 
compensation after disputes, which, in some circumstances, could make it very costly and difficult 
for government to end such contracts (Bayliss, Hall and Lobina, 2001). 
A regulator can also be captured by powerful interests other than the utility, such as certain user 
groups or suppliers.  To guard against excessive influence of any well-organized party it is essential 
for regulation to proceed with open access to information on decisions, procedural transparency, 
opportunity for any stakeholder group to represent its concerns, and judicial reviews (Noll, Shirley 
and Cowan, 2000). 
  Interests of consumers: In addition to attending to the basic structure and level of the water 
tariff, the regulator is also concerned with its application to different classes of customers.  Many 
water systems, as with electricity and some transport services, feature internal cross subsidies from 
industrial and commercial users to households.  The general drawbacks of internal subsidy schemes 
are discussed elsewhere in this report; they are particularly problematic for the water sector in 
circumstances where large shares of the population are very poor or without service connections, so 
the burden on certain customer classes, such as large firms, is very high and could entice them to 
exit the network (as in Lima and Mexico City).    170
Price and regulatory policy 
towards households in 
developing countries needs to 
be designed to permit 
sustainable, affordable water 
consumption for all, with 
incentives for residents to avoid 
waste and for the utility to 
extend connections to unserved 
neighborhoods.  To ensure this 
outcome it is important to 
examine regulatory rules 
explicitly in terms of how 
benefits and costs will fall to different consumers.  In several of the proposed provincial concessions 
in Argentina, the initial regulatory terms featured a tariff structure favorable to existing users and 
weak provisions for funding new connections.  But the strongest gains were anticipated to accrue to 
the government, through fees to be paid by concession operators.  By subjecting the proposed 
contracts to stakeholder analysis it was possible to identify the extent to which the terms would 
benefit government disproportionately and disfavor consumers (Figure 5.1).  After redesign of the 
concession, net losses to customer groups were converted to net gains—except for the poorest 
customers, for whom further tariff reform would be needed  (van den Berg, 2000).  
Ensuring access and affordability for the low income population 
 
Figure 5.1 Winners and Losers Before and After  
Adjustments to Concessions--Parana, Argentina 
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Source: "Water concessions - Who wins, who loses, and what to do  
about it", Van Den Berg, Caroline 2000 
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Box 5.5  Creative management of the 
free water commitment in Durban 
 
In South Africa recent national law has 
instituted free water for a minimum 
consumption of 200 liters per household 
per day.  Durban Metro Water therefore 
does not bill households for the first 6 
cubic meters consumed per month.
1
Instead of allowing this subsidy to create a 
financial burden to other consumers or 
rationing water through poor service or 
nonconnection, the utility has decided to 
apply  innovative low cost schemes to 
meet the needs of its low income 
customers.  In partnerships with two 
private sector  firms (Lyonnaise des Eaux 
and Vivendi), who are responsible for 
designing and managing pilot projects to 
test such schemes, the utility is developing 
a range of service levels that are geared to 
customers’ actual effective demand and are 
upgradeable.  For  water, the options 
include semi-pressure systems with water 
tanks on household roofs, which permits 
the mains to be smaller than usual, and 
delivery to the household is metered.  Low 
cost sanitation, complementary to the 
semi-pressure water system, includes 
options of improved latrines and 
condominial sewers that are maintained by 
the community.  The arrangements restrict 
water flow to minimize waste and theft, 
include provisions for credit for 
connection, and incorporate user education 
and community mobilization.  Sanctions 
for nonpayment are enforced.    
 
Source: Brocklehurst, 2001  
The urgency of meeting the needs of poor households through urban water sector reform has been 
getting increasing international recognition (PPIAF/WSP 2001).  In many cities of the developing 
world 40 to over 50 percent of the population lives below the locally-defined poverty line (WDI 
2003).  And while officially reported data on access to water often suggest that the vast majority of 
urban residents are already serviced, the averages mask major gaps and inadequacies.   Residents 
living in quasi-legal or periurban settlements 
(representing millions of people in many large cities) are 
often not counted as part of urban jurisdictions, so not 
recognized as a customer base by official urban agencies.  
And the effective access and quality of water even for 
those with nominal connection is often very poor—for 
example, coverage data in Conakry include people using 
standpipes, which in Africa serve an average of fifteen 
people.  At the time Lima initiated reform of its state 
owned water company in the early 1990s, 48 percent of 
the connected population received water service for less 
than twelve hours a day, and 28 percent for less than six 
hours (Shirley and Menard, 2002)   
Policies aiming to promote access and affordability for 
low income consumers have included guarantee of free 
minimum service, increasing block tariffs (IBTs), direct 
(nontariff) subsidies to users, and mandates (community 
service obligations), performance incentives and fiscal 
transfers to utilities to encourage new connections.  
(Clarke and Wallsten, 2002;  Chisari, Estache and 
Laffont, 1999)  One city in South Africa has used the 
national free water policy as an incentive for innovation 
(Box 5.5 )  In Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal a social tariff 
covers consumption up to 18 and 20 cubic meters, respectively, and the government absorbs the 
connection costs for households eligible for this  tariff (Tremolet, 2002).  Higher consumption levels 
pay progressively higher tariffs.     172
Box 5.6:  Making new connections affordable in 
Buenos Aires 
 
The concession contract in Buenos Aires featured 
targets for new connections, with priority to be 
given to investment in poor areas.  To finance the 
extensions an infrastructure fee was introduced, 
payable by the new customers over two years.  For 
lower income households this fee was unaffordable; 
moreover, the new customers objected to the 
investment charge as unfair, since for others who 
had gotten connections before the concession these 
costs had been spread over the entire customer base.  
Although the access fees were adjusted several 
times, affordability and resentment created a crisis 
leading to renegotiation of the contract in 1997.  At 
that time the infrastructure charge was replaced by a 
bimonthly “Universal Service and Environmental 
Improvement Fee” which is levied on all customers 
regardless of when they connected to the network. 
Connection charges were reduced and made 
repayable  in interest-free installments spread over 
five years.   
Even though these changes led to a 74 percent 
decrease in average bills for households in poor 
neighborhoods, problems of affordability persist.  
There are also concerns that t he renegotiation 
reduced some of the targets for expansion, which 
will mainly affect low income neighborhoods.   
 
Source:  PPIAF/WSP 2001; Alcazar, Abdala and 
Shirley 2000 
Such increasing block tariffs (IBTs) are quite widely used in developing countries because they 
are perceived to be fair and to discourage excessive consumption, although the actual effects can be 
rather perverse.  (Boland and Whittington, 2000)  In countries where many poor households share 
connections, IBTs can shift these users into the higher rate categories.   The system also can create a 
disincentive for the private operator to extend service to low volume consumers (PPIAF/WSP 
2001), and can only be maintained under exclusivity.  A uniform volumetric charge for water is 
therefore more equitable in practice, although may be less politically popular. 
In most countries, subsidies through  a “social tariff” are ineffective at reaching the poor, 
regressive, and (when inadequately funded by government), contribute to utility deficits and to 
rationing.  In Belem (Brazil) in the mid-1990s, 
the poorest quintile received none of the total 
subsidy  expenditure, the second quintile 
received only 12 percent, and the richest 
quintile absorbed almost 40 percent (Alfaro, 
Blanlot, Bradburd and Briscoe 1997; WDR 
1994). Chile is one of the very few developing 
countries that operates a  direct subsidy for 
water consumption that is means tested, and 
administered by the municipal government.  
The subsidy expenditure (funded by national 
government) for eligible households is then 
transferred to the utility and netted out of the 
water bills for these customers, who must 
remain in good standing.   This model remains 
one of the best examples of subsidy design but 
has not been widely replicated elsewhere, 
possibly because it requires a strong 
administrative capacity.  (Foster, Gomez-Lobo 
and Halpern, 2000)  
If subsidies are required to ensure affordable water service for the poor they should ideally focus 
on access rather than consumption, in order to avoid distorting incentives for efficient use.    173
Box 5.7 Adapting quality standards to permit extension of low cost service:  El  Alto (Bolivia) 
 
In La Paz (Bolivia) the Suez-led water concession awarded in 1997 to Aguas del Illimani contained explicit 
targets for connection of poor households but did not provide adequate financial incentives for the company and 
the government did not make provisions to ease affordability with targeted transfers.The concession contract 
specified that metered in-house water and sewer connections were the only acceptable standard, which put 
service out of reach of low income households and virtually guaranteed failure for the company in meeting its 
ambitious target of total water coverage in four years.  However, the regulator and the company agreed to 
experiment with a less expensive, condominial technology for water and sewerage, which was found to be 
affordable and acceptable to the population, and has permitted affordable service to be extended in the poor 
neighborhood of El Alto. By 2001 the condominial technology was legitimized by the Bolivian Institute for 
Technical Norms and Standards 
 
Source: Hall and Lobina, 2002; PPIAF/WSP, 2001; Komives 1999 
Connection costs have typically been found to pose a greater barrier to affordability than even 
normal tariff rates  (Tynan, 2000).  In recent years lease and concession contracts  have encouraged 
new connections with various approaches and mixed success.  What is evident is that incentives for 
both consumers (affordability) and for the investors (profitability) need to be right, and the contracts 
should encourage flexible and innovative approaches to meeting targets.  In Buenos Aires, after a 
rocky start a more satisfactory method of financing new connections has been found, but the pace of 
new expansions may be less than originally planned.  (Box 5.6)  In the contracts for two parallel 
concessions operating in East and West Manila, the concessionaire is permitted and even 
encouraged under certain circumstances to relax its exclusivity by delegating a service license to a 
third party, such as a bulk provider.  Retail sales by these licensees are counted as contributing to the 
concessionaires’ coverage targets (PPIAF/WSP 2001).         
  Implications of quality and other performance regulations for serving low income households: 
Regulation in the water sector typically includes specific standards that utilities must meet, not only 
of water safety but also of service levels, water pressure, equipment, specific technologies and 
procedures (e.g. for billing).  Though well intentioned, such standards are often make it virtually 
impossible for the utility to incorporate lower cost approaches as discussed above, or to provide a 
menu of services in line with poor households’ willingness to pay—as illustrated by the experience 
in El Alto/La Paz, Bolivia  (Box 5.7).   174
Box 5.8  Providing financial incentives for 
extending “social connections” under the water 
lease in Cote d’Ivoire 
 
The least contract between the government of Cote 
d’Ivoire and the private lease holder, SODECI, 
contains several provisions to promote extension of 
services to low income households.  Since the 
company’s remuneration comes from tariff 
revenues it has an incentive to serve new customers 
and additional funds are available to the operator to 
install subsidized “social connections”. In addition 
to a “social tariff”, the “social connection” is fully 
subsidized for households that meet eligibility 
criteria set by the government.  The social 
connections are financed by a charge, separate from 
the water tariff, which the operator is obliged to 
collect from all water customers.  The proceeds are 
deposited in a separate account dedicated to social 
connections, and the operator retains the same profit 
as with regular connections.     
Over 300,000 new connections, 90 percent of them 
social connections, have been made since renewal 
of the lease contract in 1988.   While the operator 
has no financial disincentive to serve new 
customers, a major drawback of the lease contract is  
that SODECI is only permitted to install 
connections in legal settlements, while an estimated 
70 percent of the unserved population is non-
Ivoirien and living in illegal settlements 
 
Source:  PPIAF/WSP, 2001 
Especially where large shares of the 
population do not have connection, regulators 
need to take a flexible approach even to output 
standards, to encourage innovation.  As a general 
rule, quality and performance regulations should 
be  output-based rather than input-based, to 
provide the maximum incentive for the utility to 
seek creative and efficient approaches to meeting 
targets (PPIAF/WSP, 2001).   To protect public 
health, minimum health standards of water 
quality and pressure should not be compromised 
but these are often below the levels actually 
imposed by regulation.
30  Legal restrictions on 
the utility, such as exclusivity provisions as noted 
earlier or proscription against connections to 
households with formal land title, can be 
formidable barriers.  (Box 5.8 – Cote d’Ivoire) 
Rigid business  practices such as monthly billing 
can also exclude customers with very low purchasing power (Baker and Tremolet, 2000).   
Organizing water regulation and ensuring enforcement capacity  
As with the other infrastructure sectors, regulation of water can be undertaken through a national 
agency, such as OFWAT, or at the local/regional level.
31  Since water is provided as a local service 
that is usually (especially after political decentralization) the responsibility of local governments, it 
is important that these authorities be well represented in the regulatory agency.  Few municipal 
governments have the capacity to design competitive contracting themselves or to carry out 
regulation, and obtaining expert advice can be essential to ensure a balanced negotiation with more 
knowledgeable private partners.  Municipalities have agreed to guarantee concession holders against 
                                                 
30 Minimum standards should be for pressure of at least 1.5 bar to avoid contamination, availability of 20 lpcd, 24-
hour continuity of flow, and WHO standards of water safety (PPIAF/WSP, 2001) 
31 Issues related to management of water resources, however, often need to be addressed at a higher jurisdictional 
level, which may be cross-regional and even cross-border.   175
revenue losses in the Czech Republic and Hungary, which creates a major risk for taxpayers that 
they may not fully appreciate at the time (Hall, 1997).  Municipal involvement in the regulatory 
board of Buenos Aires, and control by several municipalities in the case of Mexico City, did not 
contribute to regulatory autonomy nor avoid problems of politicization (Shirley and Menard, 2002).  
Since municipalities are often water providers, conflicts of interest need to be avoided.  In the case 
of the lease for Gdansk, for example, the City is both a regulator and a contractual party, owning 49 
percent of the consortium that holds the contact.
32 
Unclear relations between levels of government can be a problem for water regulation.  In the 
case of the water concession for the city of Cordoba, A rgentina, lack of  clear division of 
responsibilities between the provincial government, which owned the infrastructure, and the 
municipality, which retained responsibility for making residential connections (while the operator’s 
responsibility was only to build and extend the primary network), undermined the overall regulatory 
role of the public sector (Nickson, 2001).  Such circumstances can strengthen the bargaining power 
of the private operator.  Sometimes the regulator has been bypassed entirely in critical decision-
making, as in Buenos Aires where government (the Ministry of the Economy and Department of 
Natural Resources) renegotiated the concession in 1997 without any intervention by the regulator 
(ETOSS).  The outcome was appealed by some consumers’ associations and by the national 
ombudsman, in part because the process had undercut the credibility of the regulatory agency 
(Conte Grand, 1998).   
Consumer involvement in water regulation can be an invaluable means of providing information 
to the regulator (especially on the needs of poor consumers) and creating oversight of both 
regulatory and operator behavior.  Consumer representation in regulatory reviews is more common 
in industrial countries than in most of even the reformed water systems of DTEs noted here.  Indeed, 
a lack of public disclosure of key information and contractual provisions is rather common and 
advocated by the multinationals to protect commercial secrets.  For example, documents concerning 
the Budapest Sewerage Company, in which a consortium of Vivendi and a German company holds 
an equity share, are not made available even to the city council and matters concerning the company 
are debated in closed council sessions.
33  Transparency and a two-way flow of information with the 
                                                 
32 Klaus Ringskog, presentation on “Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Wastewater: Case Studies”, 
The World Bank, 1998. 
33 Public Services International, “Undermining Democracy and the Environment”, PSI Briefing—World Water 
Forum, The Hague, 17-22 March 2000.   176
public on system performance, coupled with sound basic institutions undergirding regulation (rule 
of law, checks and balances, protection of property rights and contracts), may be the best system to 
ensure that regulation balances the interests of multiple stakeholders in the fairest manner.  
The Outcome of Water Reforms 
Major structural and regulatory reforms, and private sector participation, are more recent and less 
ubiquitous in the water sector than in other infrastructure sectors, so it is even more difficult to 
obtain a clear and robust picture of outcomes.  Of the large private sector partnerships, most are only 
about five years old, with the exception of leasing in Abidjan and the water concession in Macau, 
China, which was launched in 1982 as the first of its type in Asia but built on decades of previous 
experience with private sector provision.  Attributing results to reforms is also complicated because 
the changes in institutional arrangements, especially those that convert public operation into formal 
contracts with private providers, make explicit what may have been prevailing but hidden under the 
public system—such as nonpayment of water bills by government agencies, other implicit taxes and 
subsidies, and the backlog in system maintenance.  Any assessment of the performance of reforms 
or institutional arrangements should ideally take full account of the prevailing sectoral and 
economic conditions, and the details of regulation as actually applied.  Such thorough analysis is not 
available for many cases over time, and especially not in a form that permits comparison among 
different regulatory or contractual regimes.  This section summarizes findings from such 
comparative analyses (cross-country/city and cross-institutional type) as have been done to date.  
Definitive conclusions about success or failure are not possible at this time, but many of the factors 
contributing to the likelihood of more positive or negative outcomes are becoming better 
understood. 
Comparison across water systems 
Shirley and Menard (2002) have compared the content and outcomes (through 1996) of six cases of 
water system reform initiated between 1988-93:  the concession in Buenos Aires (BA), service 
contracts in Mexico City, state ownership and operation in Santiago (including contracting-out) and 
in Lima (where a concession was planned but not implemented), and lease contracts in Abidjan
34 
                                                 
34 Although Abidjan has had a lease contract with a private company continuously since 1957, when the lease 
expired in 1986 the government used the threat of an auction to win a price reduction.  The renewed contract gave 
the operator more control over the management of investment.    177
and Conakry.  Table 5.3  summarizes the initial conditions in the six cities.  Rates of connection 
were lowest for the two African cities, which not surprisingly were the poorest and most rapidly  
growing of the sample.  Water stress (unsustainability of the water resources) was most severe in 
Lima and Mexico City, however.  
 
 
Table 5.3: Conditions and Reforms in the Sample Water Systems 
   Buenos Aires  Mexico City  Lima  SantiagoAbidjan Conakry 
Year of start of reform  1993  1993  1992  1989  1988  1989 
Type of reform                   
   Planned  Concession  Management  Concession  Sale  Lease
6  Lease 
   Implemented  Concession  Service contract  SOE  SOE  Lease  Lease 
Population in service area (millions) 
at time of reform 
8.70  8.40  6.40  4.60  2.00  1.00 
GDP per capita at time of reform 
(US$)
1 
8,861  7,647  3,462  7,101  1,582  1,398 
Population connected (%) at time of 
reforms 
                 
   Water
2  0.70  97%
3  0.75  0.99  0.60  38%
7 
    Sewerage  0.58  86%
3  0.70  0.88  0.35  0.10 
Population growth rate (%) Annual 
ave. 1980-1995  
1.5%
4  0.03  2.35  0.02  0.05  0.06 
Water production (millions of M
3 per 
year) at time of reform 
1402.00  1113.00  527.00  478.00  67.00  163.00 
Source: "Cities awash: reforming urban water systems in developing countries", M. Shirley and C. Menard, 
1999 
1National.  
2Includes private taps in yards of dwelling.  These were predominant in Abidjan and Conakry,  





6 Before reform the lease in Abidjan had some characteristics 
similar to a management contract.
  7Includes people with access to standpipes or neighbors’ taps   178
The regulatory frameworks 
Table 5.4 outlines key features of the regulatory regimes.  Competition featured only in Buenos 
Aires, Abidjan and Conakry, through competitive bidding.  As the only case of concessioning,  the 
regulatory framework in BA imposed a fuller range of financial risks on the operator/investor than 
the other systems.  However, the two lease contracts also provided for some form of efficiency 
pricing as well as full metering, with tariffs covering marginal costs as in BA.  All but Santiago used  
internal cross-subsidization of low volume by high volume customers. None of the cases except 
Santiago both set coverage expansion targets for the operator, and made it affordable or the poor to 
connect (although this was improved after the renegotiation in BA).  The institutional structure of 
each regime (commitment devices, regulatory neutrality, enforcement mechanisms, consumer 
representation) was not very strong or formalized in most cases, but was clearly the best in 
Santiago—which, perhaps ironically, represented the case of state ownership and operation. 
Results 
Changes in economic welfare after the reforms, combining the effects to government, consumers, 
workers and domestic investors, can be estimated and compared to a counterfactual (non-reform) 
scenario.  For the cases where data permit, the per capita welfare gains are estimated to be largest in 
Buenos Aires (US$150 in 1996 prices), US$64 in Santiago and US$12 in Guinea; for Lima, 
assuming the concession had been implemented as designed, the welfare gains were estimated as 
US$85 versus US$8 in the actual (minimum-reform) case.










                                                 
35 Method of calculation is explained in Shirley and Menard (2002).   179
 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison of Characteristics of the Regulatory Contracts 
   Buenos Aires  Lima  Mexico City  Santiago  Abidjan  Conakry 
Information:                   
Competition for market?  Concession bid 
competitively 





Yardstick competition?  No  No   No  Some  No  No 
                
 Separate monitor? 
Yes   Yes. 
Only of service 
contracts  Yes  No  No 
                 
Incentives:                   
a. Operator                   
Coverage targets?  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Waste targets?  Yes  No  Stage III  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pollution targets?  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Bears investment risk?  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Responsible for sewerage 
operation?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 









Tariffs cover MC?  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No or low cross subsidies?  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
b. Consumer                   
Affordable for poor to connect 
to water?  No
1  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes, usage not 
affordable 
                    
To sewerage?  No
1  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Metered prices?  Few  Few  Increasing  100%  ~100%  ~100% 
Pollution tax or other measures?Treatment 
targets 






No  No 
Commitment:                   
Performance bonds  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Dispute resolution  Yes  No  No  Yes  No
2  No
2 
Consumer representation  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Institutions:                   








& balances  Donors  Donors 
Cutoffs allowed? 
Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Yes, except 
Govt. 
Yes, but no 
penalty for 
theft 
Independent, neutral regulator?  Yes, but 
political board  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Neutral enforcement?  Courts, but not 
independent 
No  No 
Courts, 
arbitration 
No  No 
1Became affordable after the 1997 renegotiation.  
2Does not include international 
arbitration       180
     Figure 5.2  Labor Productivity 











































  Source: "Cities awash: reforming urban water systems in 
developing countries", M. Shirley and Cl. Menard, 1999 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Operating Costs as % of Operating Revenues 



















  Source: "Cities awash: reforming urban water systems in developing countries", M. Shirley and Cl. 
Menard, 1999 
 
Source: "Cities awash: reforming urban water systems in developing countries",   
M. Shirley and Cl. Menard, 1999 
 
The initial results after a few years of reform can be observed by comparing before and after 
indicators of efficiency and other 
performance measures.  Figures 
5.2 and 5.3 show the trends in 
labor productivity and in 
operating costs in pre-and post-
reform periods.  Employees per 
connection  
fell in each city after the reforms, 
and costs fell below revenues in 
all cases except Mexico City.  
Table 5.4 summarizes the growth 
in coverage and new connections, 
and reduction in unaccounted for 
water after the reforms.  All 
the cities except Lima showed 
improvement in the coverage 
indicators, in some cases 
(Abidjan and Conakry) quite 
dramatically.  Unaccounted 
for water, a measure 
combining physical losses 
(due to poor maintenance) and 
commercial losses (poor 
financial management or 
illegal use), fell significantly 
in BA, Lima and Santiago but the improvement was less evident in the other three cities.     181
Table 5.4  Effects of the Reforms on Access and Waste 
Lima  Lima 












                    
Pre reform
1  70%  95%
5  75%  75%  99%  72%
6  38%
7 
1996  81%  97%
4  75%  85%  100%  82%
6  47% 
Sewerage 
Coverage 
                    
Pre reform
1  58%  86%
5  70%  70%  88%  35%
6  * 
1996  62%  91%







                    
Pre reform
1  2.10%  n.a.  4.00%     2.90%  4.00%  -0.10% 




                    
Pre reform  44%  37-47% 42%  42%  34%  13%  35-60% 
1996  34%  37%  36%  30%  20%  16%  50% 
Source: "Cities awash: reforming urban water systems in developing 
countries", M. Shirley and Cl. Menard, 1999 
1 Pre reform dates are: Buenos Aires 1992; Lima 1991; Mexico City 1992; 
Santiago 1988; Abidjan 1987;  
Conakry 1988. 
2Does not include public standpipes. 
3Estimated on the basis of 
draft concession agreement.   
41995.  
51990.  
6for all urban areas under private operation.  
71989.  
8Unaccounted 
for water (UFW) is the difference between volume of water distributed to the 
delivery system and water sold, and includes physical losses from pipe breaks 
and overflows as well as commercial losses from illegal use, under registration   
of users, etc.). 
*The sewerage estimates in Abidjan and Conakry are not believed to have changed much.     
   
 
Quantitative Studies 
Few studies have tried to subject 
performance data from different 
water systems to econometric 
analysis in order to determine 
factors driving better or worse 
outcomes.  One such study by 
Estache and Kouassi (2002) 
derives a combined productivity 
indicator for 21 African water 
utilities and determines how 
each compares to an estimated 
“production frontier” for the 
group.  The analysis confirms a 
wide heterogeneity in 
performance and large scope for 
improvements, as also evident 
from case studies.  The authors conclude that the institutional capacity of the country, as well as 
quality of governance, are key factors determining efficiency and more important than private 
participation in itself.
36    
In another study of alternative efficiency measures for 50 Asian water utilities, Estache and Rossi 
(2001) find statistically s ignificant evidence that private operation is correlated with greater 
efficiency, using several different indicators.   
Clarke and Wallsten (2002) compare the performance of water systems in Africa in terms of their 
piped water coverage of urban households headed by individuals with different levels of education 
(taken as a measure of overall household welfare).  This analysis finds that in the countries with 
public operators, coverage of households whose head has no education is lower (25.4 percent) than 
                                                 
36 The sample of 21 utilities includes only two that involve the private sector (through leases).  According to the 
analysis of efficiency these did not rate as the highest performing companies during the period under study.   182
in countries with established private operators (30.6 percent).  Conclusions are similar when 
comparing the share of connected households with uneducated heads as a percentage of the share of 
connected households whose heads have secondary education (thus controlling for the country’s 
level of development).
37   This study also concluded from cross-country analysis that there was no 
evidence that reforms of water and other infrastructure sectors harm low income consumers, and the 
poor seem to benefit at least  in terms of increasing their chances of become connected to the 
network services.   
Conclusions 
The political economy of water has not been highly favorable to reform in many countries, which 
partly explains why the water sector is behind electricity, telecoms or transport in restructuring or 
privatization.  Major water reforms have tended to be provoked by public health crises, as in the 
case of major epidemics as mentioned, and to some extent by fiscal or macroeconomic pressures 
such as rising inflation that reduces real water revenues.  Inflation, mounting budget deficits and 
government debt were factors leading up to the reforms initiated in Buenos Aires, Lima, Conakry, 
Santiago and Mexico City in the late 1980s-early 1990s (Shirley and Menard, 2002).   
The circumstances that mattered most to the course of reform in these cities studied was the 
relative power of potential winners and losers.  Water reform typically has high social benefits but 
low political benefits, especially in comparison to other utilities (Menard and Shirley, 2001).  The 
political benefits may come from expanded service to the unconnected population, typically the 
urban poor, and improved quality of service to middle income groups.  But these political gains may 
be smaller than the risks from necessary price increases and from cutbacks in patronage 
employment in publicly owned utilities.  Water sector reforms have been politically most difficult to 
sustain in cities where the marginal supply price of water is steeply increasing and wastewater 
creates large externalities—such as Lima and Mexico City, as discussed earlier.  In Buenos Aires, by 
contrast, the lower cost, renewable water resource made it possible to reduce water prices and still 
generate enough return to attract private investment (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2000). 
                                                 
37 Only two countries (Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea) are counted in the sample as having established private operators.  
The two other countries with more recent private participation (Senegal and CAR) also show higher rates of 
connection of noneducated household heads than the average for public systems.   183
Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions about what kinds of water sector reforms and 
institutional arrangements are most effective in different circumstances, the following observations 
can be made: 
Identifying winners and losers in advance, and adjusting the balance where possible, may help 
the sustainability of reform.  A perception of fairness and evenhandedness is important—as 
evidenced by the protests in Buenos Aires, when newly connected households were charged 
installation fees that existing customers had not had to incur.    
  Price increases can be acceptable when customers see that quality and service are improving as 
well, when they are well informed, and when they can control their own consumption.  Where 
supply capacity is constrained price increases can help expand service and so benefit the poor. 
However, expansion of coverage to low-income households cannot be taken for granted but, 
where this is a policy objective, must be a deliberate focus of regulatory and contract design.  Where 
necessary, subsidies should be assigned to support connection not consumption, and regulatory rules 
should favor innovation and competition by providers. 
Lack of information is a major constraint to the private sector (especially potential entrants), to 
the public sector as regulator, and to the consumer.  Improving access to information may lesson 
distrust and defuse some of the sector’s political volatility.     184
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CHAPTER SIX 
An Agenda for Action 
ince the 1980s, a large number of developing and transition economies (DTEs) 
have implemented far-reaching structural reform, market liberalization, and 
privatization programs in their infrastructure sectors.  While the experience varies 
considerably across countries and industries, by and large, these first generation 
reforms have brought about several of the expected benefits of market liberalization and private 
enterprise: enhanced productivity and cost-effectiveness, improved output quality, greater 
responsiveness to consumer and business needs, and increased investment driven by market 
incentives rather than bureaucratic preference.  Still, the critics of the reform process are right in 
pointing out the many instances where privatization was undertaken in the absence of institutional 
safeguards and conducted in ways that were widely viewed as illegitimate.  In those 
circumstances, the transfer of state assets to private control may indeed have been a dubious 
achievement (Stiglitz 1999).  Concerns are increasingly being expressed about the distributional 
consequences of privatization and market liberalization--especially their impacts on basic service 
provision to poor households and other disadvantaged groups (Chisari et al 2001). 
  Whether, especially in emerging market economies, the privatization of infrastructure supply was 
desirable even in the absence of effective regulatory and other institutional safeguards is ultimately 
an empirical question.  However, the proposed agenda for action is not intended to provide an 
answer to that question.  It is still too early for an unequivocal verdict—indeed, if there can ever be 
one, given the multi-faceted character of these industries’ performance, the difficulty of constructing 
theoretically defensible counterfactuals, and the lack of tight analytic models which would permit 
precise hypothesis testing.  Instead, the proposed agenda focuses on the second-generation 
regulatory reforms that will need to be implemented if even carefully crafted privatization and 
restructuring programs are to satisfy their public interest goals and expectations (Jacobs 1999).  
This report presented many cases, in many DTEs, where the network utilities were privatized, 
restructured, and placed under regulation in ways that were influenced by the state-of-the-art in 
policy, and that reflect genuine creativity applied for the public interest.  In short, there is much to   185
applaud in these sectors, from their new architectures to the skills and commitment of those who 
crafted them, who operate in them, and who regulate them.  However, even in those countries 
where there has been an excellent process of restructuring, unintended consequences of the 
reforms have arisen and caused significant problems.  The emerging second-generation regulatory 
problems in the DTEs’ network utilities are endemic to infrastructure sectors everywhere and 
largely reflect issues that arise after privatization, especially when combined with unbundling.  In 
fact, the asserted deficiencies of their regulatory systems are characteristic of the performance of 
economic regulation as we have observed it in the advanced industrial economies. 
Both experience and economic logic suggest that the post-reform improvements in performance 
will be limited, and probably unsustainable in the long-run, unless accompanied by appropriate 
second-generation regulatory reforms.  These include: (i) the design of end-user pricing policies 
that strike a satisfactory balance between economic efficiency and social equity; (iii) rules 
governing access to bottleneck infrastructural facilities—i.e. network components that are 
essential for the provision of final services and too costly to duplicate; and (iii) alternative ways of 
promoting access to service for the poor.        
Pricing Reform—Balancing Efficiency with Social Equity 
Successful privatization and restructuring programs require pricing policies that provide signals and 
incentives for efficiency by consumers, suppliers and investors.  However, the prevailing pricing 
structures in many DTEs continue to conflict with the dictates of economic efficiency [World Bank 
(WDR) 1994].    In most of these countries, old-style centralized price setting is still conducted by 
ministries with a mandate to establish price controls to serve macroeconomic objectives (Bruce et al 
1999).  Thus, the real challenge facing the DTEs is not merely their ability to adopt privatization 
timetables and establish regulatory institutions, but rather to put in place effective price rebalancing 
and price regulation for the future. 
  Some of the observed deviation from optimal policy can be attributed to political and social 
constraints—noneconomic and equity considerations inevitably intrude into the process of devising 
and administering economically efficient pricing structures (Kahn 1988, Dinar 2000).  Indeed, 
inefficient pricing rules are frequently the consequence and instrument of a complex system of 
cross-subsidies within the broad domain of social policy.  But, the observed deviations from optimal 
pricing are also due to a genuine lack of appreciation of the power of alternative pricing schemes   186
that could strike a more satisfactory balance between economic efficiency and social equity.  In 
particular, price differentiation and competitive pricing flexibility, potentially very valuable tools in 
efforts to achieve revenue adequacy and expand service to the poor, have not been sufficiently 
exploited in the DTEs. 
  Policy solutions that are consistent with both economic efficiency and social equity are not 
always available or politically feasible.  Pricing reform is one of the most challenging tasks 
confronting policymakers in the DTEs (Argentina 1996, Hungary 2000, Romania 2000, Mexico 
2001).  It is also an area of policy where: (i) the uncritical replication of approaches developed in 
advanced industrial economies is likely to prove most problematic for the DTEs, and (ii) the 
technical assistance offered by multilateral organizations and other external advisors has been the 
least satisfactory. 
  There is an urgent need for applied policy research to identify next-best pricing policies that 
provide the requisite incentives for efficiency by consumers, suppliers and investors while serving 
the community’s conception of justice.  As a first step, the potential use of differentiated, non-linear, 
and other pricing schemes to ease the transition to cost-reflective and competitive pricing in the 
infrastructure sectors of DTEs should be examined.  In these countries’ current situations, the policy 
emphasis should not be on “optimal” tariffs but rather on tariff reform—to find feasible directions of 
change in tariff structures which achieve some combination of welfare increase and revenue 
adequacy (Armstrong and Rees 2000).  However, changes in the rate structures should not be so 
precipitous as to cause severe economic dislocations.  Thus, policymakers in these countries need to 
plan early on for a smooth transition to cost-reflective prices.  That is the only way to avoid serious 
dislocations for their national industries and their customers (Monson and Rohlfs 1993).  Otherwise, 
consumers without viable alternatives—notably the poor—will suffer the most. 
Pricing Issues in the DTEs 
The pricing issues facing policy makers in the DTEs are unique in several respects.  
Revenue Inadequacy 
Inefficient pricing policies  have been one of the most important causes for the secular 
deterioration in the performance of the infrastructure sectors in the DTEs prior to the reform era 
(e.g. Brazil 1992, 1994).  These countries, unfortunately, were in even less of a position to afford   187
the costs of resource misallocation and inefficiency in production than their developed 
counterparts.  Price controls were imposed without regard to their performance implications, 
subjecting the operating entities to considerable financial distress and substantially impairing their 
ability to maintain and expand service, especially in poor and rural areas.  The failure of many 
governments to prescribe adequate rate increases, especially during periods of high inflation, 
effectively decapitalized their i nfrastructure sectors.  As a result, quality of service suffered.  
Moreover, the inability of financially impaired infrastructure industries to respond sufficiently to 
the increasing demands of modernized economies for better and more varied services constrained 
domestic growth and hampered international competitiveness.  This problem was particularly 
pronounced in the telecommunications sector, but also serious in electricity and transportation. 
Unsustainable Social Pricing Schemes 
On the demand side, many of the infrastructure services tend to be extremely price and income 
inelastic.  Thus, their pricing has important distributional implications.  Subsidizing basic services, 
such as electricity and water, appears politically attractive as it can approximate a lump-sum grant, 
targeted in proportion to the number of household members.  Conversely, raising the price of basic 
infrastructural services appears like a lump-sum tax bearing heavily on the poor, elderly, and those 
with large families (Newbery 1999).  Not surprisingly, the movement towards cost-reflective tariffs 
frequently encounters strong political obstacles.   
Past policies in the infrastructure sectors have therefore led to prices with systematic cross-
subsidization [Kahn 1984, World Bank(WDR)].  The publicly articulated rationale is that such 
policies foster desirable social goals (helping certain classes of customers who would otherwise be 
disadvantaged) and positive economic externalities associated with universal service.  In practice, 
however, a substantial portion of the benefits frequently flowed to those outside of the intended 
target group.
38  The lack of policy attention to tight targeting led to significant distortions in usage 
and investment decisions. 
                                                 
38 As documented by the World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report: Infrastructure for Development, major 
beneficiaries of these subsidy programs are the higher income groups since they are the large consumers of 
infrastructure services.  Moreover, the resulting revenue inadequacy inhibits the extension of services to poorer 
groups of consumers, for example those in rural areas.  This is particularly true in the water and electricity sectors.   188
  Both economic theory and regulatory experience suggest that it is impossible to maintain 
significant cross-subsidies in the structure of prices for long, with open entry and no remedial 
policies, whether or not that would seem to be desirable (Box 6.1). 
 
 
Box 6.1  Picking apart cross-subsidies 
 
To use this term rigorously, a customer service that is priced above its stand-alone cost provides a cross-subsidy to 
another customer service that is priced below its incremental cost.
39  Economic logic teaches that prices with cross-
subsidies are unsustainable in an environment of open entry, and that such competition predictably leads to inefficiencies.  
The reason is simple—entrants will be impelled by the profit motive to divert the overpriced business, regardless of these 
entrants’ efficiency, while entrants are unlikely to relieve the incumbent service provider from the financial burden of 
serving customers whose prices do not compensate the costs required to serve them (Willig, 1994).  Thus, even suppliers 
with inefficiently high costs may find entry profitable in reaction to pricing that has the mandate of providing a flow of 
cross subsidies.  Entry of this kind not only raises industry costs, but it also erodes the very ability to finance the 
subsidies that motivate the policy. 
The other side of the cross-subsidization coin is the set of prices that lie below their services’ incremental costs.  While 
these prices convey the subsidies that motivate the policy, they also discourage the competitive entry of alternative 
suppliers who would contribute to industry efficiency.  An entrant might have incremental costs of providing services 
that are lower than the incremental costs of the incumbent service provider, but are greater than the level of the cross-
subsidized prices.  Such a supplier might enter and enhance consumer welfare in an undistorted competitive 
environment, and yet find it financially unrewarding to enter in the face of cross subsidies. 
 
Source: Willig (1994). 
Policymakers in the DTEs therefore suffer from an apparently irreconcilable dilemma.  Social 
development goals and political pressures have led them to design infrastructure pricing with 
significant cross-subsidies.  At the same in recent years, these policymakers have sought to 
competitively restructure, liberalize and privatize their infrastructure sectors.  These two goals 
are ordinarily incompatible (Baumol, 1999).  Competitive entry will destroy the cross-subsidy. 
  Since the network utilities play such a critical role in the economy it is imperative that the 
removal of pricing distortions in these sectors be a key component of any economic reform 
program in the DTEs.   However, there are good reasons to avoid too abrupt price changes, 
which can cause large and unnecessary adjustment costs to consumers and firms alike.  Even 
optimal prices, if instituted extremely rapidly and without sufficient notice, can lead to a 
transition process that is damaging and costly, and hence far from optimal (Baumol 1995).  This 
is a point that has been unfortunately ignored in some privatization and restructuring programs, 
                                                 
39 The stand-alone cost of service is defined as the cost (including a competitive return to capital) that would be 
incurred by an efficient entrant if it were to undertake to provide that service alone, or if it were instead to provide 
that service in combination with some other services of the enterprise whose regulation is at issue.  The incremental 
cost of a service or a collection of services is the added cost to the system of providing them, given all other system 
activities.   189
thereby creating public disenchantment with the reform process and a real danger of policy 




Potential Solutions: Competitive Pricing Flexibility 
With the progressive introduction of competition and privatization, rebalancing of prices (change in 
both levels and structure of tariff schemes) for different basic infrastructural services becomes 
necessary—both for the operating entities’ sake, and for the public interest.  However, radical, across-
the-board realignment of prices with underlying costs may impose serious hardship for the poor.  The 
question is how to achieve the important objective of revenue adequacy while affording adequate 
protection to certain disadvantaged groups.  To resolve issues and questions of this kind, economics 
offers pertinent and well-established principles and insights that flow from both theory and regulatory 
experience around the world.  
  Constraints of price uniformity or regulatory mandates that disallow price differentiation can 
seriously undermine revenue adequacy, by limiting the ability of infrastructure operators to 
efficiently exploit the characteristics of demand and extract more revenue from high valuation 
customers.  As an alternative, using nonlinear prices can be particularly useful by alleviating the 
need for radical tariff rebalancing.  The infrastructure entities must be permitted to compete with 
flexibility of prices and terms, in order for the economy to receive the benefits of market 
liberalization that motivate pro-competitive policy in the first instance.  In order to cover their fixed 
costs, sunk costs, costs of various obligations, and the revenue requirements promised by the 
privatization agreements, prices will best serve the public interests if they are permitted by 
regulation to vary among classes of users in accordance with value of service, as well as in response 
to the marginal costs of service.  The need to set some prices aggressively low in order to retain the 
business means that other prices should be permitted to take up the slack in order to efficiently 
secure adequate revenues. 
  For example, in telecommunications, policymakers should permit the rapid installation of new 
access lines, wired or wireless, based on pricing that reflects differences in the value of service and 
is designed to clear backlogs.  Also, consumers who place relatively high value on a service should   190
contribute relatively large net revenues to the coverage of unattributable, fixed and common costs.  
By offering discounts with non-linear prices to non-captive customers, the utility will be able to 
recover the costs of the local loop with marginal access prices much closer to incremental cost and 
keep all customers in the network, to the benefit of all. 
 
 
A Practical Pricing Regime—“Constrained Market Pricing” 
The data requirement is the prime regulatory dilemma besetting the pursuit of pricing rules that 
can elicit economic efficiency.  The informational problems are likely to be especially severe in 
the DTEs, where the auditing technologies are weak and regulatory bodies lack the proper 
technical expertise (Beato and Laffont 2002).  In particular, information on current demand 
elasticities and other pertinent attributes of the demand relationships are virtually unobtainable in 
practice. 
There is promising solution to this dilemma that has been successfully adopted in some 
countries (ICC, 1985)—constrained market pricing.  It divides the setting of final product prices 
into two stages.  The first stage consists of the regulator imposing floor-ceiling constraints upon 
the setting of prices by the regulated firm.  Such constraints can fortunately be expressed in the 
required quantitative terms with the aid of cost information alone. The second part of the price-
determination process is then left to the firm, whose self-interest will lead it to take demand 
conditions into account.  The regulated firm is prohibited from selecting any prices that violate the 
cost-based constraints adopted by the regulator; but within those limits the firm is granted the 
freedom to select the prices that best promote its interest. 
The regulated price ceiling and floor for each product are derived from the competitive-market 
model.  Thus, the firm is never permitted to adopt a price that exceeds the amount at which an 
efficient entrant-rival could afford to supply the product in a competitive market in which inputs 
are available on competitive terms--this price ceiling is called the “stand-alone cost” of the product 
or service in question. (Recall Box 6.1) A price constrained not to exceed the stand-alone cost 
ensures that purchasers will pay no more for this item than they would have if it were sold in an 
effectively competitive (contestable) market.  The price floors reflect the product’s marginal or 
average incremental cost.  This approach, in essence, seeks to enforce competitive behavior in   191
arenas where such behavior is not the automatic result of market conditions (Baumol and Willig, 
1988). 
The primary purpose of the stand-alone cost ceiling, aside from its role in eliciting economic 
efficiency, is to protect consumers from monopolistic exploitation through the imposition of 
excessive prices by the regulated firm.  Similarly, the primary purpose of the price floors, 
economic efficiency aside, is to protect actual or prospective rivals of the regulated firm from 
predatory pricing and related practices that can seriously handicap these competitors or drive them 
from the field altogether.  
  The application of differentiated pricing rules in the DTEs, when it has been considered at all, 
has often been dismissed as too difficult to implement and contrary to social equity.  However, it is 
possible, and indeed imperative, that such pricing approaches be made practicable in the context of 
infrastructure sectors that have been facing chronic problems of revenue inadequacy, 
underinvestment, and low coverage ratios.  These rules should be viewed as a source of qualitative 
guidance rather than as generators of precise and definitive prescriptions for pricing.  In many 
instances, price differentiation may have much more profound implications for revenue adequacy 
than the orthodox uniform price rebalancing schemes (e.g., across-the board price rises), and 
provide greater potential for social equity than the unsustainable internal cross-subsidies under price 
uniformity. 
The Next Steps   
The priority for action, involving both applied research and detailed policy analysis, is to adapt a set 
of practical, flexible, differentiated pricing rules for infrastructure services that strike a proper 
balance between economic efficiency and social equity.  This agenda will also entail developing a 
systematic cross-country database on infrastructure pricing and regulatory determinations that will 
permit emerging regulatory entities to utilize world cost and other relevant benchmarks.  Reform 
programs in several countries have been criticized as excessively and unjustifiably increasing prices 
and hurting the poor, yet reform remains essential to achieve developmental objectives (including 
poverty reduction) in a sustainable manner.   Pricing is an area of policy where practical research is 
needed to aid in the real-time design and application of improved—second best, but workable—
pricing reforms.  This applied research would draw on the theoretical insights of the literature on 
competitive pricing flexibility and non-linear pricing rules, to design transitional approaches that   192
The design of appropriate access and 
interconnection pricing rules has become 
one of the central and perhaps most 
complex and controversial regulatory 
tasks in the network utilities.  This task is 
even more daunting in the DTEs because 
of severe measurement problems with 
respect to the relevant economic variables 
and the lack of the requisite technical 
expertise. 
permit applying cost-reflective prices in  the restructured and privatized network utilities, taking 
account of regulatory and informational constraints and perceptions of social fairness. 
Facilitating Access to Bottleneck Facilities  
Restructuring of utilities requires policy makers in the DTEs to address a difficult new issue.  As a 
part of restructuring, potential competitors will often require access to essential (bottleneck) network 
facilities.  Thus, the removal of legal barriers to competitive entry is not sufficient by itself to install 
a regime of effectively functioning competition in the infrastructure sectors.  Competitors must have 
access to these bottleneck facilities on non-discriminatory terms if they are to have a reasonable 
opportunity to compete.  If competition is to flourish, it may require explicit regulatory intervention 
to ensure such access, particularly in situations where those essential facilities are themselves 
controlled by the incumbent infrastructure operators, who will in many settings have ordinary 
business incentives to deny rivals fair access. 
The Issue 
The emerging experience from several countries reveals that the allocation of bottleneck 
infrastructure facilities and the broad issues of access and interconnection are of critical importance 
in the deregulation and competitive restructuring of the infrastructure sectors.  In the 
telecommunications industry, the bottleneck is access to the local loop by suppliers of long-distance 
services; in electricity, rival generators must 
have access to transmission facilities; in the gas 
sector, producers require access to transmission 
pipelines; in railroads, the provision of services 
is dependent on access to the track.  Still, the 
regulators face the enormously important task of 
identifying the appropriate terms and scope of 
compelled sharing of such essential facilities.  The benefits of liberalizing the potentially 
competitive segments of these industries will not obtain unless a proper access and interconnection 
framework is put in place (Armstrong and Doyle 1995, Valetti and Estache 1998, Kessides et al 
1999).   193
  One of the primary challenges facing regulators in the DTEs is to ensure access of competitors to 
bottleneck facilities on terms that are consistent with efficient competition--i.e., to set a level and 
structure of a ccess prices which promote dynamic efficiency through entry and investment 
decisions, while enabling the owner of the respective network to remain financially solvent.  Thus, 
prices should be sufficiently high to be compensatory (at least cover the long-run incremental cost 
of the use of the network by the entrant), yet not so high as to preclude efficient operations by the 
entrant. 
  The access problem is especially vexing in situations where competitors require a bottleneck 
input controlled by one of their rivals.  Monopoly control of bottleneck facilities can create 
irresistible incentives to behave anti-competitively and cross-subsidize unregulated competitive 
activities from regulated monopoly ones.  Without regulatory constraint, the holder of the bottleneck 
monopoly could repress competition by creating artificial handicaps for its rivals in the market for 
the final products sold to consumers.  The monopolist can impose costs on its competitors by 
impeding their access to the bottleneck, thereby raising the prices that they must charge to cover 
their elevated costs, and thus weakening their ability to compete. 
Two Alternative Models 
The economic literature offers two major approaches to the efficient pricing of bottleneck facilities: 
the Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), or parity pricing, and the Laffont-
Tirole global price cap rule (Baumol et al 1997, Laffont and Tirole 1994, 1996).  Efficient 
component pricing is the name that has been given to the principle that the holder of the bottleneck 
facility should offer its services at a price that yields it the same contribution that it would earn from 
performing the end-user service itself.  ECPR is consistent with efficient competition--it ensures that 
the responsibility for supplying the contested services is distributed among actual and potential 
rivals in such a way as to minimize total costs.  However, ECPR does not in itself permit 
competition to fulfill its other important functions of eliminating allocative inefficiency and eroding 
monopoly profits--the ultimate determination of how large a markup of the retail price above 
marginal cost is economically efficient, and therefore what level of contribution should 
correspondingly be incorporated in access charges, must be correctly supplied by regulation.  This 
requirement is likely to be substantially violated in DTEs with deficient regulatory mechanisms 
where the regulatorily-imposed price structures are frequently inefficient.   194
  The Laffont-Tirole rule recognizes the fact that the profit of the integrated incumbent is an 
increasing function of both the access charge and the final retail price.  Under a break-even 
constraint, a higher access charge would permit the regulated firm to lower its final price.  A 
regulator concerned with consumer welfare would take this trade off explicitly into account.  The 
socially optimal level of the access charge will depend on the benefits of reducing the retail price 
(which will depend on the elasticity of demand) and the effects of raising the access charge on 
productive inefficiency (which will depend on the entrants' elasticity of supply). 
  However, despite their internal consistency and powerful theoretical results, the translation of 
either approaches into workable rules and actual access pricing schedules for the guidance of 
regulators and their accountants and engineers has been proven to be an extraordinarily difficult and 
contentious task.  The first approach suffers from very restrictive assumptions that limit significantly 
its applied policy  content.  Indeed, the case for adopting ECPR is not so unequivocal when 
allocative and dynamic efficiency are important issues, as is likely to be the case in many DTEs--i.e. 
when even inefficient competition could make a substantial contribution to allocative efficiency and 
to stimulating improvements in efficiency and service innovation (Kahn and Taylor 1994).  The 
Laffont-Tirole rule has substantial informational requirements (demand and supply elasticities are 
generally very difficult to estimate in practice).  Thus, its translation into operational rules than can 
be applied in real world settings is challenging. 
The Next Steps 
An important priority for public policy in the restructured utilities of the DTEs is to develop a 
regulatory architecture for network access that has realistic prospects of being effectively 
implemented .  There is an urgent need to translate the principles and results of the theoretical and 
analytic work on access into a set of tractable and workable rules and procedures, especially in the 
face of severe measurement problems with respect to the relevant economic variables.  One 
promising direction for applied policy analysis is to build on the powerful insights of ECPR and the 
Laffont-Tirole price cap rule, and to develop a hybrid model that combines the two approaches with 
the objective of promoting productive and allocative efficiency.  Moreover, in the context of the 
DTEs, it is imperative to identify the conditions, if any, under which it is appropriate to use access 
pricing as an instrument for the promotion of supplementary goals (e.g. expanding service to the 
poor) that go beyond the attainment of economic efficiency.   195
Promoting Access to the Poor 
In the past few years, there have been increasing concerns expressed about the impacts of 
privatization and market liberalization policies in the DTEs on low-income households. (Estache, 
Foster, and Wodon 2002).  In particular, some worried that competition would make the traditional 
method of financing access for low-income households—cross subsidies from higher income 
customers--more difficult if not ultimately impossible.  The fear was that new competitors entering 
the market would target only the most profitable customers, eroding the profits that incumbent 
enterprises had used to subsidize service to low-income groups and high-cost areas.  Consequently, 
even if privatization and competition resulted in system expansion and lower average tariffs, it was 
thought that low-income households might end up paying higher prices and governments might 
need to find new sources for financing universal access—a very difficult task in the DTEs because 
of their inefficient and distortionary tax regimes. 
The Issue 
Although low coverage among low-income and rural households suggests that public monopolies 
have not successfully promoted access to infrastructure services among these groups in most 
developing countries (Figure 6.1), it is not clear that privatization and liberalization will 
automatically benefit these groups either.  Although case-study  evidence suggests that public 
monopolies have often been overstaffed, inefficient, and have lacked the resources needed for 
expanding service, tariffs have often been heavily subsidized from general government revenues 
and companies have often cross-subsidized certain consumers or services--although in practice it is 
unclear whether these have reached the poor.  The impact that reform has on coverage will therefore 
depend upon how effectively it removes constraints on investment and how it impacts prices paid by 
low-income consumers. 
  The empirical evidence on the effects of reforms on the poor is limited, although case studies and 
data gleaned from household surveys suggest some important preliminary trends.  First, there is 
little evidence that reforms consistently hurt poor or rural consumers in terms of access to service.  
(Clarke and Wallsten 2002)  Even when service prices have increased for these households, the 
share of poor and rural residents with connections has often not fallen and in many cases has even 
increased.  Further, case studies reveal that allowing competition in infrastructure services can 
dramatically improve service to the poor – competition can allow a range of price and quality   196
options, making service possible to regions and income l evels that a monopoly provider would 
never have considered. 
  It is important to note, however, that the impacts of reform vary from country-to-country and 
city-to-city.  In countries and cities where coverage is already very high among poor households, or 
where many poor consumers have informal or illegal connections, significant price increases and 
regularization of customer accounts might lead to a reduction in coverage among low-income 
households even if total coverage increases.   In contrast, in countries where service was heavily 
rationed prior to reform, privatization and liberalization might result in increased coverage for low-
income households, even if prices increase. 
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Source: Clarke and Wallsten (2002). 
 
The Next Steps 
Existing research is suggestive, but rigorously evaluating access by the poor to infrastructure 
facilities is imperative for the design of pro-poor regulatory policies.  There is little consistent data 
to support the design of such policies.  There is an urgent need to obtain additional data on 
infrastructure services and low-income households.  In particular, the demand side of 
infrastructure services and the poor needs to be analyzed more thoroughly--not only to what extent 
the poor are connected to infrastructure services provided by the large utilities, but also factors that   197
affect their decision to connect, the role of informal service providers, and how the presence of 
alternatives affects household connection. 
Understanding willingness-to-pay and demand is critical to assessing the effects of reforms and 
ensuring access.  For example, data constraints prevent existing policy analysis from determining 
whether households remain unconnected because they are not willing to pay for service in the 
presence of viable, perhaps informal, alternatives or whether those alternatives exist because 
households are unable to connect due to credit constraints or because the utility does not provide 
service in the area.  Existing data from the DTEs do not allow policy analysts to distinguish 
between competing hypotheses for nonconnection.  Knowing the reason is crucial for developing 
policy responses to enhance access and designing projects that will be effective in extending 
service to rural areas and to the poor.    198
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